{
  "id": 1597684,
  "name": "Johnny James JONES v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Jones v. State",
  "decision_date": "1970-05-11",
  "docket_number": "5505",
  "first_page": "694",
  "last_page": "696",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "248 Ark. 694"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "453 S.W.2d 403"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "243 Ark. 62",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1967,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/ark/243/0062-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "241 Ark. 120",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1723978
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1966,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/241/0120-01"
      ]
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:57.001151+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Johnny James JONES v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Lyle Brown, Justice.\nAppellant, Johnny James Jones, was found guilty of rape and sentenced to thirty years imprisonment. His plea for reversal is based on a single point, namely, alleged improper remarks in the closing argument of the prosecuting attorney.\nThe defendant elected not to testify. The prosecutor made these statements concerning the whereabouts of the accused on the morning of the alleged rape:\nI leave you with a thought. Johnny James Jones knows where he was on that morning. . . . Johnny James Jones knows where he was on the 9th of July at 8:30 in the morning. There are two people who know where he was \u2014 Mrs. Linda Hicks [prosecutrix] and Johnny James Jones.\nDefense counsel immediately interposed this objection:\nYour honor, at this time I would have to object to the reference, \u2018Johnny James Jones knows where he was on the 9th of July.\u2019 We do not have to prove his innocence. The State proves guilt and Mr. Jones certainly does not have an obligation to tell the jury where he was.\nTHE COURT: That\u2019s true. Your objection is sustained in that respect.\nThe closing argument was shortly concluded without further incident. Then followed the instructions to the jury as to forms of verdicts, whereupon the jury retired to deliberate. Shortly thereafter defense counsel moved for a mistrial \u201cwith respect to Mr. Thompson\u2019s closing argument and his reference to the failure of the accused to take the stand and state his presence on the morning of July 9, 1969.\u201d The motion was denied. Appellant contends here that the trial court committed reversible error in overruling his motion.\nThe fallacy in the point for reversal lies in the fact that the second objection came too late. Our holdings are in accord with the general rule stated in Wharton\u2019s Criminal Law and Procedure (1957), \u00a7 2079:\nThe remedy for any improprieties on the part of the prosecuting attorney in summing up is to interpose immediate objection. . . . Generally the argument must be interrupted at the moment it is made; to delay until the end of the argument is generally fatal ....\nA case in point is Shipp v. State, 241 Ark. 120, 406 S. W. 2d 361 (1966). After the jury had retired, defense counsel moved for a mistrial because of an alleged improper statement made in the closing argument of the prosecuting attorney. We held that the objection \u201ccame too late and the point cannot now be urged.\u201d Also, see Childs v. State, 243 Ark. 62, 418 S. W. 2d 793 (1967). The reason for the rule is obvious. The most appropriate time for the trial judge to evaluate an error in the proceedings is at the time an error is made; in most instances the judge can cure any such error by appropriate admonition. In fact in the instant case we think the trial court could have removed any objectionable inferences contained in the prosecutor\u2019s statement had the proper request for admonition been timely made.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Lyle Brown, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Walton Mauarras, for appellant.",
      "Joe Purcell, Attorney General; Michael Barrier, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Johnny James JONES v. STATE of Arkansas\n5505\n453 S. W. 2d 403\nOpinion delivered May 11, 1970\n[Rehearing denied June 1, 1970.]\nWalton Mauarras, for appellant.\nJoe Purcell, Attorney General; Michael Barrier, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0694-01",
  "first_page_order": 716,
  "last_page_order": 718
}