{ "id": 8721828, "name": "Sherman A. JOHNSON v. LUMBERMEN'S RECIPROCAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE et al", "name_abbreviation": "Johnson v. Lumbermen's Reciprocal Insurance Exchange", "decision_date": "1970-11-30", "docket_number": "5-5396", "first_page": "550", "last_page": "552", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "249 Ark. 550" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "460 S.W.2d 53" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "217 Ark. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718813 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/217/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 S. W. 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1909, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ark. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1513785 ], "year": 1909, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/90/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 Ark. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604115 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/246/0011-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 284, "char_count": 3523, "ocr_confidence": 0.837, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.97426162790835e-08, "percentile": 0.4633501798753518 }, "sha256": "87d0e39cf091b65a88c9bc8a5fc93296d7078f9bf81940be3560fff367e54b1e", "simhash": "1:c3490e7a9c34618a", "word_count": 574 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:50:24.525274+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Sherman A. JOHNSON v. LUMBERMEN\u2019S RECIPROCAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE et al" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nThis suit to set aside an order of the workmen\u2019s compensation commission was brought in the Pulaski Chancery Court, where it was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The correctness of the order of dismissal is the only issue on appeal.\nJohnson\u2019s complaint asserts that on April 2, 1966, while he was employed by J. M. Hampton & Sons Lumber Company, he suffered a back injury in the course of his employment. In November of that year Johnson and the employer\u2019s insurance carrier, Lumbermen\u2019s Reciprocal Insurance Exchange, filed a joint petition for final settlement, which was approved by the compensation commission. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1319 (1) (Repl. 1960). Under the joint settlement Johnson received $1,850 as full compensation for his injury.\nThe present complaint was filed by Johnson in the chancery court in March, 1968, the defendants being Lumbermen\u2019s and the Arkansas Workmen\u2019s Compensation Commission. The complaint asserts that Johnson, uneducated and without an attorney, was defrauded in the joint settlement. Specifically, it is charged that Lumbermen\u2019s claims adjuster and its examining physician falsely and fraudulently represented Johnson\u2019s condition to be less serious than it actually was and that Lumbermen\u2019s thereby obtained Johnson\u2019s consent to an inadequate settlement. The complaint asks that the commission\u2019s order approving the settlement be set aside.\nThe chancery court\u2019s order of dismissal must be affirmed. In Cook v. Brown, 246 Ark. 11, 436 S. W. 2d 482 (1969), we discussed the joint settlement procedure, pointing out that it is a statutory method of putting into effect a compromise settlement reached by negotiations between the parties. The commission\u2019s approval is required as a protection to the injured worker. There we held that, in the absence of any assertion of fraud or insanity, the commission is not authorized to reopen a settlement made in good faith, merely because the claimant\u2019s partial disability later proves to be greater than it was originally thought to be.\nIn the case at bar the claimant, affirmatively asserting fraud, relies upon the broad power of chancery to set aside a judgment for fraud in its procurement. David v. Rhea, 90 Ark. 261, 119 S. W. 271 (1909). Such fraud, however, must be extrinsic to the questions presented for decision. For example, as we explained in Alexander v. Alexander, 217 Ark. 230, 229 S. W. 2d 234 (1950), there is extrinsic fraud when a party is kept away from the trial by his adversary\u2019s deception or when a party is corruptly betrayed by his own attorney. \u201cOn the other hand,\u201d we went on to say, \u201cthe doctrine is equally well settled that the court will not set aside a judgment because it was founded on a fraudulent instrument, or perjured evidence, or for any matter which was actually presented and considered in the judgment assailed.\u201d Our Reports contain many cases to the same effect.\nWe are not presented here with any question about the compensation commission\u2019s power to grant relief in a situation of this kind. The sole issue before us is that of the chancery court\u2019s jurisdiction. Upon that issue it is clear that the trial court\u2019s decision was correct, for there is no assertion of extrinsic fraud in the procurement of the commission\u2019s order.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "William W. Green and M. C. Lewis, Jr., for appellant.", "Wright, Lindsey