{ "id": 1636914, "name": "Irmagard K. CORBIN v. SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT OF FORT SMITH", "name_abbreviation": "Corbin v. Special School District", "decision_date": "1971-04-05", "docket_number": "5-5537", "first_page": "357", "last_page": "367", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "250 Ark. 357" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "465 S.W.2d 342" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "213 Ark. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1467056 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/213/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ark. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1684819 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/235/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S. W. 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ark. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1355704 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/158/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ark. 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1691724 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/233/0789-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 714, "char_count": 17073, "ocr_confidence": 0.841, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.1105297346326985e-07, "percentile": 0.8599422205696162 }, "sha256": "52477d406bfabca004fe08dcbf2c009d7cff73467269937927be87f5be6de6df", "simhash": "1:ff135dec655eed3f", "word_count": 2874 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:35:57.384009+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Irmagard K. CORBIN v. SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT OF FORT SMITH" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "J. Fred Jones, Justice.\nMrs. Irmagard K. Corbin taught school in the Special School District of Fort Smith under a contract running from August, 1969, to May 29, 1970. On June 1, 1970, she was advised by the school board that she would not be employed for the ensuing school year. Mrs. Corbin filed a complaint in the Sebastian County Circuit Court for a declaratory judgment holding the district subject to, and in violation of, the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 5-701\u20145-714 [Supp. 1969]) She contended that the regulations promulgated by the board under which her contract was not renewed were void, and that she is still an employee of the district under her teacher\u2019s contract. She sought judgment for salary allegedly due her and for an order reinstating her as a teacher in the Fort Smith Special School District.\nThe school board demurred to the complaint, the demurrer was sustained by the trial court and the complaint dismissed. On her appeal to this court Mrs. Corbin relies on the following points for reversal:\n\u201cThe Arkansas Administrative Procedures Act applies to the adoption of regulations by School Districts.\nThe Board has no authority to adopt the regulation disqualifying plain tiff from teaching.\nA School Board may not terminate a teacher arbitrarily.\u201d\nIn January, 1970, the board of directors of the district adopted a resolution which reads as follows:\n\u201cThe spouse of the superintendent, the assistant superintendent, and the director of finance and business affairs shall not be employed by the Fort Smith Schools in any capacity.\u201d\nMrs. Corbin is the wife of Chris D. Corbin, the superintendent of schools in Fort Smith. Mrs. Corbin taught in the Fort Smith Schools from September, 1963, through May, 1966. She took a leave of absence; obtained a master\u2019s degree, and was re-employed as an elementary teacher by the Fort Smith School District under a written contract for the school year 1969-70. The contract was for the period from August 25, 1969, to May 29, 1970, at a total salary of $8,132, to be paid in monthly installments. The contract provided for termination by either party \u201cpursuant to the Continuing Contract Law (Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 80-1304 [Supp. 1969]).\u201d\nOn June 1, 1970, the Fort Smith School Board notified Mrs. Corbin of its intent not to re-employ her in a letter reading as follows:\n\u201cIn conformity with the Arkansas continuing contract law, I am notifying you that on May 11 the Fort Smith School Board voted not to renew your contract for the school year 1970-71.\nThe Board stated as a reason for not renewing the contract that it would be against School Board policy. The policy referred to was presented and voted on at the January 26, 1970, meeting of the Board and is as follows:\n\u2018The spouse of the superintendent, the assistant superintendent, and the director of finance and business affairs shall not be employed by the Fort Smith Schools in any capacity.\u2019 \u201d\nIn her complaint Mrs. Corbin attacks the resolution of the board on the grounds that it was not adopted in the manner. as required by the provisions of the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act (Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 5-701\u20145-714 [Supp. 1969]). The demurrer filed by the school board alleges that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.\nIt appears conceded by the parties that the Administrative Procedure Act (Act 434 of 1967; Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 5-701\u20145-714 [Supp. 1969]) applies only to state agencies. So, the question presented under the appellant\u2019s first point is whether the Special School District of Fort Smith is an \u201cagency\u201d within the meaning of the Act. We agree with the trial court that it is not. \u201cAgency,\u201d as defined in \u00a7 1 (a) of Act 434 and as digested in \u00a7 5-701 (a), is as follows:\n\u201c \u2018Agency\u2019 means each board, commission, department, officer, or other authority of the government of the State of Arkansas, whether or not within or subject to review by another agency, except the General Assembly, the courts, and the Governor. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to repeal delegations of authority as provided by law. Provided, the word \u2018agency\u2019 as used in this Act shall not include the Arkansas Public Service Commission, the Arkansas Commerce Commission, the Arkansas Pollution Control Commission, the Contractors Licensing Board, the State Health Board and the Arkansas Workmen\u2019s Compensation Commission, it being hereby determined by the General Assembly that the existing laws governing such agencies provide adequate administrative procedures for said agencies.\u201d (Emphasis supplied).\nIt is obvious that the primary purpose of Act 434 of 1967 was to consolidate and recodify the provisions of Act 183 of 1953 and Act 103 of 1963, because \u00a7 16 of Act 434 of 1967 provides as follows:\n\u201cAll acts or parts of acts in conflict with this Act are hereby repealed, but such repeal shall not affect proceedings pending on the effective date of this Act. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following acts are expressly repealed.\n(1) Act 103 of 1963, codified as Sections 5-701 through 5-725 of the Arkansas Statutes Annotated;\n(2) Act 183 of 1953, codified as Sections 5-501 through 5-505 of the Arkansas Statutes Annotated.\u201d\nAct 183 of 1953 was entitled an Act to \u201cprovide for the filing and publication of regulations of agencies, departments and branches of state government; to provide for the effect on failure to comply with the Act; to declare the inapplication of the Act; to provide an effective date; and for other purposes.\u201d This Act simply provided that:\n\u201cAll agencies, departments or branches of the State government now or hereafter authorized to promulgate regulations under authority of law shall perform the following Acts before such regulation or regulations become effective:\n1. File certified copies of such regulation or regulations with the following:\n(a) The Governor of the State of Arkansas.\n(b) The Secretary of State of the State of Arkansas.\n(c) The Recorder of each County in Arkansas.\u201d\nThis 1953 Act then required each agency, department or branch of state government to keep on file for public inspection during regular business hours any regulations promulgated. It also provided that the Act would not apply to any agency, department or branch of the State government which would be excluded from its operation by authority of the Constitution of Arkansas or amendments thereto.\nThe other repealed Act, 103 of 1963, was entitled an Act to \u201cestablish uniform administrative procedures for occupational and professional licensing boards and commissions; to prescribe a uniform procedure for taking appeals from such boards and commissions; and for other purposes.\u201d Section 1 of this Act provided as follows:\n\u201cFor the purpose of this Act the term \u2018board\u2019 shall mean and include the following:\nAbstractors\u2019 Board of Examiners,\nArkansas State Board of Architects,\nArkansas Athletic Commission * *\nThen follow 26 other designated boards and commissions, ' none of which included the board of directors of local school districts. Section 1 of this Act did end, however, with the following two paragraphs:\n'\u201cAny other state board, commission or agency hereafter created with authority to exercise control over the licensing of any occupation or profession, unless it is expressly excepted in whole or in part from the provisions of this Act.\nProvided that all licensing boards in existence on the effective date of this Act and not specifically enumerated herein shall be exempt from the provisions of this Act.\u201d\nWhile Act 103 of 1963 defined the designated boards and commissions under the term \u201cboard,\u201d Act 434 of 1967 uses the term \u201cagency\u201d to mean each board, commission, department, officer or other authority of the government of the State of Arkansas, whether or not within or subject to review by another agency, except the General Assembly, the courts, and the Governor.\n\u2019 We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act applies only to state agencies; that local school districts are political subdivisions of the state and are not state agencies within the meaning of the Act. (Muse v. Prescott School District, 233 Ark. 789, 349 S. W. 2d 329).\nAs to appellant\u2019s second point, we do not share the appellant\u2019s interpretation of the effect the regulation adopted by the board had on Mrs. Corbin\u2019s qualifications for teaching. All the resolution amounted to, as we interpret it, was an agreement between the members of the board, and announcement in the form of the resolution, that the board would not employ the spouse of a superintendent, assistant superintendent or the director of finance and business affairs. This resolution had nothing whatever to do with Mrs. Corbin\u2019s qualifications to teach; it had no more effect on Mrs. Corbin\u2019s qualifications to teach than it did on Mr. Corbin\u2019s qualifications to serve as a school superintendent. By the board\u2019s compliance with its resolution, the only effect it had on the Corbins was to prevent both of them being employed in the Fort Smith Special School District at the same time, with one of them being employed as superintendent, with the attending superintending control over the other.\nThe appellant argues that the legislature has delegated no such broad powers to boards of directors of school districts that would enable such boards to set standards of qualification of teachers inconsistent with that fixed by the legislature. We agree with the appellant in this argument, but that is not the case before us. As already stated, the resolution complained of did not go to the qualifications of the teacher at all\u2014it went to the district board\u2019s discretion in the employment of teachers and other necessary employees as authorized in \u00a7 80-509 (d) (Supp. 1969), and in doing all things necessary and lawful for the conduct of an efficient free public school or schools in the district as authorized by subsection (m) of the same section.\nIn Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S. W. 538, the board of directors of a school district had adopted, and required the enforcement of, a set of rules, one of which forbade the use of paint or cosmetics by female students. An 18 year old female student appeared in school wearing \u201ctalcum powder\u201d on her face and she was denied admittance until she complied with the rules. While the rules were suspended by the board during the pendency of the appeal, in upholding the authority of the board in making such rules, this court at page 252 of the Arkansas Report said:\n\u201cThe question therefore is not whether we approve this rule as one we would have made as directors of the district, nor are we required to find whether it was essential to the maintenance of discipline. On the contrary, we must uphold the rule, unless we find that the directors have clearly abused their discretion, and that the rule is not one reasonably calculated to effect the purpose intended, that is, of promoting discipline in the school, and we do not so find.\u201d\nWe see no reason why the same reasoning should not apply in the case at bar. We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the board had the authority to adopt and enforce the resolution as incidental to its unquestioned and specifically delegated authority to hire teachers and \u201cdo all things necessary and lawful for the conduct of an efficient free public school ... in the district.\u201d\nIn Safferstone v. Tucker, 235 Ark. 70, 357 S. W. 2d 3, this court said:\n\u201cThe law involved appears to be well settled. In this State a broad discretion is vested in the board of directors of each school district in the matter of directing the operation of the schools and a chancery court has no power to interfere with such boards in the exercise of that discretion unless there is a clear abuse of it and the burden is upon those charging such an abuse to prove it by clear and convincing evidence.\u201d\nAnd in White v. Jenkins, 213 Ark. 119, 209 S. W. 2d 457, we said:\n\u201cIt is well settled that courts may not intervene to control matters in the discretion of administrative bodies such as school boards, in the absence of a showing of an abuse of such discretion. Necessarily, some latitude in the exercise of this discretion must be given to these boards. They represent the people of the locality affected and naturally are closer to the problems to be solved than any court or other agency could be.\u201d\nThe board having the authority to exercise its discretion, the question then, is whether the action taken by the board in the case at bar was arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, wrongful, discriminating or oppressive. We cannot say from the record before us that it was. The board of directors was elected by the people of the district and was charged with the responsibility of hiring superintendents, teachers and other necessary employees, and in doing all things necessary and lawful for the conduct of an efficient free public school in the district.\nWhat effect the employment of the spouse of a superintendent who would work under his supervision would have on the morale and efficiency of other teachers, and the efficient conduct of a free public school the board was required to maintain, we do not know; nor are we required to ascertain. We find no evidence in the record that the board abused its discretion, and we hold that the trial court was correct in refusing to interfere with the exercise of the discretion of the board in matters confided to its judgment.\nAs to appellant\u2019s third point, the language of the statute as well as that of the contract is plain. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 80-1304 (b) (Supp. 1969) provides as follows:\n\u201cEvery teacher in the State shall be employed by written contract. In districts which include cities of 10,000 or more population, according to the last Federal census, school boards may elect the superintendent for a period not to exceed 3 years. In other school districts employing a superintendent, school boards may elect the superintendent for a period of not to exceed 2 years. All other teachers and personnel of school districts shall be employed by written contract annually.\n* * *\nEvery contract of employment hereafter made between a teacher and a board of school directors shall be renewed in writing on the same terms and for the same salary, unless increased or decreased by law, for the school year next succeeding the date of termination fixed therein, which renewal may be made by indorsement on the existing contract instrument; unless during the period of such contract or within ten (10) days after the termination of said school term, the teacher shall he notified by the school board in writing delivered in person or mailed to him or her at last and usual known address by registered mail that such contract will not be renewed for such succeeding year, or unless the teacher during the period of the contract or within ten (10) days after close of school shall deliver or mail by registered mail to such board his or her written resignation as such teacher, or unless such contract is superseded by another contract between the parties. Provided that no contract for the succeeding school year shall be entered into between the school board and any person prior to the beginning of the second semester of the current school year. If a teacher quits or refuses to teach in accordance with his or her contract without just cause, he or she is hereby prohibited from teaching elsewhere during the time for which he or she had been employed. Provided, that nothing herein shall prohibit any school board from entering into a two. [2] year or three [3] year contract as authorized in the first paragraph of this subsection.\u201d \u2018Emphasis supplied).\nThe contract between Mrs. Corbin and the district provides as follows:\n\u201cTIME: The time period covered by this contract is: 9 Months of school; 182 Days of school; 9+ Calendar months; From August 25, 1969, to May 29, 1970.\nlU, IS1\u00bb *U* \u20225P TP -JP\nTERMINATION: By either party pursuant to the continuing contract law (80-1304).\u201d\nMrs. Corbin\u2019s contract expired by its terms on May 29, 1970. It could have been automatically renewed by endorsement for an additional term, ,had not Mrs. Cor-bin or the district given notice to the other during the term of the contract, or within 10 days after its termination, that the contract would not be renewed for the ensuing year. The board of directors of the district did notify Mrs. Corbin on June 1, 1970, (within 10 days after the termination of her contract) that the contract would not be renewed.\nWe are of the opinion that Mrs. Corbin\u2019s rights in this case are governed by her contract and the statutory law relating thereto, and not on \u201can expectancy of continued employment\u201d by the Fort Smith Special School District while her husband is superintendent of schools in that district.\nThe judgment is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "J. Fred Jones, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Warren & Bullion, for appellant.", "Pearce, Robinson ir McCord, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Irmagard K. CORBIN v. SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT OF FORT SMITH\n5-5537\n465 S. W. 2d 342\nOpinion delivered April 5, 1971\nWarren & Bullion, for appellant.\nPearce, Robinson ir McCord, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0357-01", "first_page_order": 387, "last_page_order": 397 }