{
  "id": 1629970,
  "name": "Preston CANTRELL et ux. v. The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY of America et al",
  "name_abbreviation": "Cantrell v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America",
  "decision_date": "1972-03-13",
  "docket_number": "5-5800",
  "first_page": "70",
  "last_page": "73",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "252 Ark. 70"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "477 S.W.2d 484"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
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    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "325 F. Supp. 1194",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F. Supp.",
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        3238432
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      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/f-supp/325/1194-01"
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    {
      "cite": "314 N.Y.S. 2d 188",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d",
      "year": 1970,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "368 F. 2d 791",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2056860
      ],
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      "year": 1966,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/f2d/368/0791-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "227 Ark. 161",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1705458
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1956,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/227/0161-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "462 S.W. 2d 837",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "249 Ark. 959",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8724842
      ],
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/249/0959-01"
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    }
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  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 405,
    "char_count": 6590,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.84,
    "pagerank": {
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      "percentile": 0.5428511469201486
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    "simhash": "1:b96f975bd67edc92",
    "word_count": 1105
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:02.058798+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Preston CANTRELL et ux v. The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY of America et al"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Lyle Brown, Justice.\nThis is a suit to determine the disposition of the proceeds of a veteran\u2019s life insurance policy. The real contestants are the surviving parents of the veteran as opposed to the claim of Donya Dee Kilgore on behalf of her illegitimate child, she contending that the veteran was the father of the child. The chancellor held that the proceeds should go to the child and the parents of the veteran appeal.\nIn February 1968, Donya Dee Kilgore, a single girl, gave birth to a male child. She forthwith filed a complaint and affidavit in the Garland County Court alleging that Jerry Dale Cantrell was the father of the child. She asked for monthly support for the child and for her lying-in expenses. In June 1968 the cause came on for hearing, wherein young Cantrell executed and filed in that court an affidavit that he was the father of the child and was agreeable to paying support money and lying-in expenses. The affidavit was notarized by his attorney. Judgment was accordingly entered.\nIn January 1969 Jerry Dale Cantrell was inducted into the armed forces. He applied for, and was granted, a serviceman\u2019s life insurance policy in the principal sum of $10,000. He elected not to name a beneficiary but did designate that the proceeds be paid in thirty-six monthly installments. In the absence of a beneficiary, it was provided under the automatic features of the policy that the proceeds would go first, to the widow; second, to the child or children of the serviceman; and third, if no child or children, to the parents of the serviceman. Cantrell died in Vietnam.\nThe question shortly arose as to the disposition of the funds, the mother on behalf of the child laying claim thereto and the serviceman\u2019s parents claiming the money. Suit was started by The Prudential Insurance Company of America filing a bill of interpleader. They paid into the registry of the court all accrued sums and are so depositing the monthly accruals. Arkansas Bank & Trust Company of Hot Springs was designated as guardian of the child\u2019s estate. All proper parties are before the court.\nAppellants, the parents of the veteran, argue under their first point that under our statutes and case law, this illegitimate child cannot inherit from the veteran. We have a descent and distribution statute covering illegitimate children. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 61-141 (Repl. 1971). There having been no marriage between the parties, the child would not, under that statute, inherit from Jerry Dale Cantrell. The same is true under our holdings in Bell v. Bell, 249 Ark. 959, 462 S.W. 2d 837 (1971), and Parker v. Hadley, 227 Ark. 161, 296 S.W. 2d 391 (1956). This is not a case calling for the application of our laws of descent and distribution. We are dealing with a federal statute which, under the circumstances in this particular case, says the proceeds shall go to the child of the deceased veteran. 38 USCA \u00a7 770. Those jurisdictions of which we are aware which have treated the subject, have given the word \u201cchild\u201d its natural meaning to include illegitimate as well as legitimate children. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 368 F. 2d 791 (1966).\nA New York statute provides that an illegitimate child inherits from its father if the court enters an order of filiation during the lifetime of the father. 17B McKinney \u00a7 4-1.2. In Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Hernandez et al, 314 N.Y.S. 2d 188 (1970), the veteran took out an insurance policy and did not name a beneficiary. Upon his death, a contest arose over the benefits of the policy as between two illegitimate children and the parents of the veteran. There had been no order of filiation entered during the lifetime of the father. The court waived aside the filiation requirement. \u201cHowever, the better and more modern view is to abolish the unchosen birth given shackles of illegitimacy and to confer filial equality wherever possible.\u201d It was pointed out that in support of the birth registration of the children the veteran executed instruments acknowledging his paternity. The court said: \u201cThe application of the statute appears even more irrational when examined under the light of the unrefuted formal acknowledgments of paternity.\u201d\nPrudential Insurance Co. v. Jack et al, 325 F. Supp. 1194 (1971), is in point. Like the case before us, this was a contest between the parents of the serviceman and his illegitimate child. It was stipulated that the serviceman informally acknowledged that he was the father of the child. The court reviewed the legislative history of the servicemen\u2019s insurance program and concluded that it was the legislative intent that the term \u201cchild\u201d include illegitimate children if the recognition of parenthood was made in writing. Such an acknowledgement was made in a letter to the child\u2019s mother. The state law of descent and distribution of the state of residency was not mentioned in the opinion and we conclude it was not even argued.\nMetropolitan Life v. Thompson, supra, is in point. That was a contest over the proceeds of a federal employee\u2019s life insurance policy as between the mother of the deceased and an illegitimate child. The child was illegitimate under New York law. The court held that the meaning of the term \u201cchild,\u201d in the absence of provisions to the contrary, was a federal question. It was specifically held that the local laws of inheritance had no application; and it concluded that the word \u201cchild\u201d as used in the act and under ordinary connotation, included an illegitimate child.\nThe other point for reversal is that the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of an affidavit introduced in the bastardy proceedings in the Garland County Court. There is no merit to that contention. When the serviceman was apprised of the instigation of the bastardy proceeding he hired an attorney. That affidavit, to which we have heretofore referred, was made a part of the county court record. The affidavit and the judgment of the county court (which has never been attacked) were introduced in the proceedings in this case. We are cited no reason why those complete proceedings should not have been introduced. The affidavit actually amounted to sworn testimony before the county court and was made a part of the county court record with the full knowledge of the serviceman\u2019s employed counsel. In fact his attorney notarized it.\nThe decree is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Lyle Brown, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Ben M. McCray, for appellants.",
      "Evans, Farrar ir Callahan, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Preston CANTRELL et ux v. The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY of America et al\n5-5800\n477 S.W. 2d 484\nOpinion delivered March 13, 1972\nBen M. McCray, for appellants.\nEvans, Farrar ir Callahan, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0070-01",
  "first_page_order": 94,
  "last_page_order": 97
}