{ "id": 1629878, "name": "SOUTHWESTERN BELL TEL. CO. v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY CO.", "name_abbreviation": "Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.", "decision_date": "1972-04-24", "docket_number": "5-5869", "first_page": "400", "last_page": "403", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "252 Ark. 400" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "479 S.W.2d 232" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "244 Ark. 1211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8726034 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/244/1211-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 F. Supp. 442", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1520152 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/214/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 F. Supp. 703", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1569011 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/264/0703-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 363, "char_count": 5637, "ocr_confidence": 0.844, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6242706350937003e-07, "percentile": 0.687841839427704 }, "sha256": "f6afb2464398fd935fc8397c344727ae6f579a3c03a97e7af9081bbf62d89d8e", "simhash": "1:cdcb2b46966fa6a0", "word_count": 879 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:02.058798+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SOUTHWESTERN BELL TEL. CO. v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY CO." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Frank Holt, Justice.\nAppellant-insured initiated a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish that appellee-insurer was obligated to defend, under the provision of an insurance policy issued by appellee, a personal injury suit brought against appellant. The trial court agreed with the appellee that the policy\u2019s exclusionary language exempted appellee from defending appellant. For reversal of that judgment, the appellant contends that the trial court\u2019s decision and judgment in favor of appellee and against appellant contradicts the law and the undisputed evidence.\nIn March, 1969, the appellant entered into a written contract with an independent contractor to perform certain plowing, trenching work, and lay appellant\u2019s telephone ground cables and wires. This construction work was covered by an \u201cOwners\u2019 and Contractors\u2019 Protective Liability Policy\u201d issued by appellee. This policy specifically designated coverage for the work operation to be performed by the appellant\u2019s contractor. The contractor proceeded to dig the required trenches and lay the cables and wires. After the telephone wires and cables were laid, including service wires to a Mr. Thompson\u2019s residence, the trenches were then backfilled by the contractor and the machinery removed from the construction site. The appellant\u2019s construction supervisor inspected its contractor\u2019s work the latter part of August, 1969, and wrote on their contract, \u201cWORK PERSONALLY INSPECTED AND FOUND TO BE COMPLETED IN A SATISFACTORY MANNER.\u201d A few days later, about September 1, appellant paid its contractor in full for the completed work under the contract. About two months later, the Thompsons\u2019 grandson was injured when he tripped and fell on the Thompson premises because of a depression in the trench which had resulted from the settling of the' backfill due to rainfall. The contractor, shortly thereafter at appellant\u2019s request, shoveled sufficient dirt in the trench to correct the depression. Subsequently, a court action was instituted against the appellant to recover damages for the child\u2019s injuries.\nIn support of its contention that appellee should defend appellant in this action, the appellant focuses its appeal upon that portion of the insurance policy which reads:\n\u201cThe company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of\nCoverage A. bodily injury***\nto which this policy applies, caused by an occurrence and arising out of (1) operations performed for the named insured by the contractor designated in the declarations at the location designated therein***. (2) ***and the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury\nThe appellant also adduced undisputed evidence from its supervisor and its contractor that based upon an oral understanding between appellant and its contractor the contractor would, following approval and payment of this work project and upon notification by appellant, return to the construction site and refill any sunken trenches without any additional pay. This was an established procedure between the parties for many years and occurred in the case at bar:\nThe appellee, in denying the asserted coverage, relies on that portion of the policy which reads:\n\u201cThis policy does not apply: (b) to bodily injury or property damage occurring after (1) all work on the project (other than service, maintenance or repairs) to be performed by or on behalf of the named insured at the site of the covered operations has been completed or ***.\u201d\nIt is appellant\u2019s position that the contract was not completed and even if the main work project was completed, the parathentical words in the above quoted clause provide a continuous coverage following completion of the project. It is the appellee\u2019s contention that appellant\u2019s interpretation ignores the phraseology which denies any coverage for bodily injuries \u201coccurring after\u201d completion of the project and further that the parenthetical words are a limitation on the insurance coverage and not an exception to the exclusionary clause.\nWe think the trial court was correct in construing the contract as not providing the asserted coverage. Certainly, the appellant had accepted the main work project as being satisfactorily completed; however, the appellant would construe the parenthetical clause, \u201cother than service, maintenance, or repairs,\u201d to include these items or restoration work as an extension of the time element provided for in the policy. We cannot agree. In our view, there is no ambiguity in the exclusionary clause. The exclusionary clause clearly defines the extent of the work project or the time element and does not include the asserted coverage for restoration work following completion of the project. See King v. United States F. & G. Co., 264 F. Supp. 703 (1967); Clauss v. American Ins. Co., 214 F. Supp. 442 (1963). Also, we recognize the general rule that where there is a practical acceptance by a proprietor upon completion of its contractor\u2019s work thereupon the liability of the contractor as to third persons ceases and the responsibility \u201cfor maintaining or using [it] in its defective condition [is] shifted to the proprietor.\u201d Chesser v. King, 244 Ark. 1211, 428 S.W. 2d 633 (1968). This is in accord with the contention of the appellee in the case at bar.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Frank Holt, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Donald K. King and Charles G. Hollis, for appellant.", "Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, by: William R. Overton, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SOUTHWESTERN BELL TEL. CO. v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY CO.\n5-5869\n479 S.W. 2d 232\nOpinion delivered April 24, 1972\nDonald K. King and Charles G. Hollis, for appellant.\nWright, Lindsey & Jennings, by: William R. Overton, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0400-01", "first_page_order": 424, "last_page_order": 427 }