{
  "id": 1630024,
  "name": "Willie BRANCH et ux v. STANDARD TITLE COMPANY et al",
  "name_abbreviation": "Branch v. Standard Title Co.",
  "decision_date": "1972-05-29",
  "docket_number": "5-5912",
  "first_page": "737",
  "last_page": "741",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "252 Ark. 737"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "480 S.W.2d 568"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "33 Ark. 465",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8724669
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/33/0465-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "211 Ark. 725",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1473301
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "208"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/211/0725-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "211 Ark. 733",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1473261
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/211/0733-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "217 Ark. 619",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8722991
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1950,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/217/0619-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 428,
    "char_count": 7081,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.813,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.1693912207279321e-07,
      "percentile": 0.5859635059804645
    },
    "sha256": "ab9ef5b32adc738c13d5c5bddb4585ad78da0b2bd339b876f551f41ca0c29ee4",
    "simhash": "1:d43bb497ed6c89f0",
    "word_count": 1149
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:02.058798+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Willie BRANCH et ux v. STANDARD TITLE COMPANY et al"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Frank Holt, Justice.\nThis is an action to recover for the alleged negligent disbursement of escrow funds and to establish subrogation rights. Appellants contracted with Jim Hart for the construction of a residence at a total cost of $16,500. To assist in financing, appellants deeded their property to Hart who obtained a temporary loan for construction purposes from the Pine Bluff National Bank. The appellees were not involved in this loan. Subsequently, appellants applied to appellee-Modern American Mortgage Corporation for permanent financing on their residence and secured a $10,000 loan. This amount was paid to appellee-Standard Title Company with the instruction to disburse the funds after completion of the construction and upon a determination that appellants\u2019 mortgage to Modern American would constitute a first lien; and further, that a title insurance policy be issued to Modern American from appellee-Standard Title Insurance Company, which would indemnify it against any loss by virtue of any prior liens. Thereafter, appellee-Standard Title Company as escrow agent, with appellants\u2019 consent, deducted certain expenses from the principal amount and on November 22, 1968, issued a check for the balance of the loan, $9,037.88, to Hart and M. J. Probst, appellee-Standard Title Co.\u2019s attorney. Probst, acting as agent for appellee-Standard Title Co., paid off the temporary loan at the Pine Bluff Bank. After obtaining an affidavit from Hart, the contractor, that he had paid for all materials and labor used in the construction of the house, Probst remitted the balance to Hart.\nA month later, appellants received notice from a materialman, O. L. Puryear and Sons, Inc., that a bill for $2,472.06, representing material furnished in construction of appellants\u2019 house, was unpaid by their contractor. Puryear filed a lien and reduced it to a judgment. Thereafter, appellants filed this action to recover for their payment of Puryear\u2019s judgment alleging that appellees, Standard Title Co. and Standard Title Ins. Co., were negligent in paying to the contractor, who absconded, the balance of the permanent loan proceeds without first ascertaining whether the Puryear material used in the construction of the residence was paid; and, further, that appellants were entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the appellee-mortgagee (Modern American Mortgage Corp.) under the terms of the title insurance policy issued to the mortgagee by appellee-Standard Title Ins. Co.\nFor reversal of an adverse decree, appellants first contend that the Chancellor erred in holding that appelleeStandard Title Co. was not negligent in disbursing the proceeds of the permanent loan; and also, in refusing to subrogate the appellants to the rights of Modern American (mortgagee) under its title insurance policy issued by appellee-Standard Title Ins. Co. since appellants had to pay the Puryear lien.\nAppellant, Willie Branch, testified that he agreed to the payment of the money to Hart and Probst after conferring with a lawyer of his own choice on two separate occasions, \u201cthe last of August or the first of September\u201d and in November. Appellant talked with this lawyer after receiving a statement from appellee-Standard Title Company listing certain disbursements or deductions. He testified on cross-examination, \u201cI went to him to ask information on whether if there was any liens, and debts was owed on the property by the contractor [Hart], who would be liable and how we would go about seeing it was paid. It was when I carried the papers to show him, after he brought them down. Yes, that was November 22. The same day I signed them.\u201d On that date, appellant and his wife signed a letter addressed to appellee-Standard Title Company authorizing and directing that the net loan proceeds in its possession as escrow agent be paid by check jointly to Hart and M. J. Probst. Accordingly, a check for $9,037.88 was forwarded to them.\nPrior to appellants\u2019 (both Branch and his wife) consultations with an attorney, he had been informed by Puryear during August that the cost of materials used in the construction of the residence had not been paid. Appellant testified: \u201cWell, he told me he had furnished some material out there and he had not been paid. Yes sir, and several others had done the same.\u201d Appellant further testified that in October he had personally paid Hart $7,498.25 without first determining whether Puryear had at any time between August and October received payment for the materials used in the construction of the residence.\nWe prefer to rest out opinion upon appellees\u2019 assertion that appellants are estopped from asserting their claim. In Rogers v. Hill, 217 Ark. 619, 232 S.W. 2d 443 (1950), we aptly said:\n\u201cThe doctrine of estoppel in pais was early recognized in decisions of this court and is available as a defense to a claimed right either at law or in equity. See Gambill v. Wilson, 211 Ark. 733, 202 S.W. 2d 185. In the recent case of Williams v. Davis, 211 Ark. 725, at page 731, 202 S.W. 2d 205, 208, we quoted with approval, this statement in Jowers v. Phelphs, 33 Ark. 465: \u2018Estoppels in pais depend upon facts, which are rarely in any two cases precisely the same. The principle upon which they are applied is clear and well defined. A party who by his acts, declarations, or admissions, or by failure to act or speak under circumstances where he should do so, either designedly, or with willful disregard of the interests of others, induces or misleads another to conduct or dealings which he would not have entered upon but for this misleading influence, will not be allowed, afterwards, to come in and assert his right, to the detriment of the person so misled.\u2019 \u201d\nAs we view the evidence, Branch paid $7,498.25 in cash to his contractor (Hart) and a month later authorized and directed appellee-Standard Title Company, the escrow agent, to pay the net proceeds of the $10,000 loan direct to Hart and Probst with the admitted knowledge of the possible outstanding material bill owed to Puryear without apprising them of his knowledge. These acts arid knowledge are inconsistent with the right presently asserted by appellants and are detrimental to appellees.\nAs to the appellants\u2019 claim for subrogation, we further observe that appellee-Standard Title Ins. Co.\u2019s duty under the insurance policy was contractual in nature and extended only to the mortgagee. Also, the appellants, as owners of the property, had the primary (and not a secondary) responsibility to discharge the Puryear encumbrance or lien upon their property. Ark. Stat. Annot. \u00a7 51-601 (Repl. 1971). The doctrine of subrogation cannot be invoked by appellants in the case at bar.\nIt follows that it is unnecessary to discuss appellants\u2019 contention that they are entitled to recover their expenses which were incurred in defending the Puryear claim for a lien.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Frank Holt, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Shelby R. Blackmon and U. A. Gentry, for appellants.",
      "Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Willie BRANCH et ux v. STANDARD TITLE COMPANY et al\n5-5912\n480 S.W. 2d 568\nOpinion delivered May 29, 1972\nShelby R. Blackmon and U. A. Gentry, for appellants.\nWright, Lindsey & Jennings, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0737-01",
  "first_page_order": 761,
  "last_page_order": 765
}