{
  "id": 1627384,
  "name": "John PRUITT v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Pruitt v. State",
  "decision_date": "1972-09-04",
  "docket_number": "5730",
  "first_page": "19",
  "last_page": "22",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "253 Ark. 19"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "484 S.W.2d 87"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "249 Ark. 480",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8721174
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1970,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/249/0480-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "243 Ark. 60",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8717740
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1967,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/243/0060-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "247 Ark. 424",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1600633
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1969,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/247/0424-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "246 Ark. 1057",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1604054
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1969,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/246/1057-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "230 Ark. 688",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1700259
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1959,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/230/0688-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 391,
    "char_count": 6250,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.819,
    "pagerank": {
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      "percentile": 0.4801934398491958
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    "simhash": "1:57ebcdcc1e0cbe5e",
    "word_count": 1017
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:44:30.788798+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "John PRUITT v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Frank Holt, Justice.\nThe appellant was convicted of the crime of first degree rape by a jury which imposed a life sentence in the State Penitentiary. There was no appeal from that judgment. After two years as an inmate he now has filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to our Criminal Procedure Rule 1. The trial court, by written findings of fact and conclusions of law, dismissed appellant\u2019s petition. On appeal the appellant first contends for reversal that \u201chis apprehension without warrant in his home and isolation in jail without bail and questioning by prosecuting attorney without being advised he was entitled to counsel and he could remain silent were acts and conducts on the part of the State invading and destroying his constitutional rights.\u201d We find no merit in these multiple contentions.\nThe appellant was arrested at his home without a warrant. The arresting officer testified that the mother of the eight-year-old victim complained to him and he referred her to the prosecuting attorney. Thereupon the prosecuting attorney called the arresting officer and instructed him to apprehend and arrest the appellant inasmuch as there was a warrant being issued charging appellant with the crime of rape. The records reflect that an information charging this offense was filed by the prosecuting attorney and a bench warrant issued for appellant\u2019s arrest on this same date. The bench warrant was served on appellant in jail the following day. The arresting officer also testified that when he arrested the appellant he advised him that a warrant had been issued for him for the alleged crime. Certainly there were sufficient reasonable grounds for the officer to believe appellant had committed the alleged felony and, therefore, his arrest was valid without a warrant. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 43-403 (1971 Repl.), Clubb v. State, 230 Ark. 688, 326 S.W. 2d 816 (1959), Jones v. State, 246 Ark. 1057, 441 S.W. 2d 458 (1969).\nIn response to appellant\u2019s testimony that he was never advised of his constitutional rights, the state adduced testimony from an arresting officer that appellant was advised of his rights at the time of his arrest. Also, the next day this witness was present along with another officer when the prosecuting attorney advised appellant of his constitutional rights or the Miranda requirements. This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s finding that appellant was advised of his constitutional rights. Indeed, the appellant in his argument admits that no confession was ever secured from him. The officers merely testified that appellant said he was too drunk to remember his activities except that he thought he \u201cgot stuck somewhere\u201d and had to be \u201cpulled out.\u201d As to being held without bail, we observe that no testimony was adduced that application for bail was ever made or denied.\nAppellant next asserts he was denied the right to testify and available defense witnesses were not \u201ccalled or used.\u201d The appellant testified that he expressed the desire to take the witness stand in his own behalf and was advised by his attorney that \u201cit wouldn\u2019t do any good for me to testify.\u201d Appellant\u2019s wife testified that she was present and available as a witness and desired to testify, and appellant\u2019s counsel told her that \u201cit would be better if we didn\u2019t testify.\u201d The appellant\u2019s attorney testified that since the appellant had previously been convicted of crimes of homicide and indecent exposure that he advised him about the \u201chazards\u201d of taking the stand inasmuch as the state could elicit this information on cross-examination. However, the attorney testified that he left the decision to the appellant as to whether he should become a witness and that appellant on his own accord decided not to do so. His attorney further testified that appellant\u2019s wife refused to testify in his behalf. Also, he had contacted the individuals furnished him by appellant and they refused to appear as witnesses in appellant\u2019s behalf. We have held that an attorney\u2019s trial tactics and strategy involving elements of discretion and judgment, about which competent counsel might honestly disagree \u201cafter the event\u201d or trial, do not constitute the denial of a fair trial. Credit v. State, 247 Ark. 424, 445 S.W. 2d 718 (1969). In the case at bar, appellant\u2019s court appointed counsel is a veteran practitioner of approximately 30 years, which includes experience as a prosecuting attorney and city attorney. Appellant\u2019s trial counsel filed various successful motions relating to appellant\u2019s defense including a commitment to the state hospital for a sanity examination. Following appellant\u2019s conviction, the attorney promptly filed a motion for a new trial. Before he could perfect the appeal, the trial court relieved the court appointed attorney at appellant\u2019s written request. Appellant did not pursue the appeal. Appellant\u2019s presently retained counsel initiated this proceeding for post-conviction relief.\nAppellant next contends for reversal \u201cthat state\u2019s witnesses fabricated facts against him of which he could not have been guilty, and to which he did not have any opportunity to rebut.\u201d Appellant does not favor us with an argument in support of this assertion. Suffice it to say that we agree with the trial court\u2019s finding that the credibility, bias, and prejudice of witnesses are issues of fact, which are properly presented at the original trial and do not come within the purview of post-conviction relief. Our Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1 was not designed or formulated to provide a petitioner with a new trial based upon issues of fact which were or could have been raised at the original trial. Cox v. State, 243 Ark. 60, 418 S.W. 2d 799 (1967), Ballew v. State, 249 Ark. 480, 459 S.W. 2d 577 (1970).\nIn the case at bar, after fully reviewing and canvassing the record, we are of the view that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial court\u2019s refusal to vacate appellant\u2019s sentence and the appellant has not demonstrated a violation of his constitutional rights.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Frank Holt, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Donald Poe and Donald Goodner, for appellant.",
      "Ray Thornton, Atty. Gen., by: Milton Lueken, Asst. Atty. Gen.,, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "John PRUITT v. STATE of Arkansas\n5730\n484 S.W. 2d 87\nOpinion delivered September 4, 1972\nDonald Poe and Donald Goodner, for appellant.\nRay Thornton, Atty. Gen., by: Milton Lueken, Asst. Atty. Gen.,, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0019-01",
  "first_page_order": 43,
  "last_page_order": 46
}