{ "id": 1627336, "name": "Charles RUSSELL v. Jimmy MILLER, Mayor", "name_abbreviation": "Russell v. Miller", "decision_date": "1972-12-11", "docket_number": "5787", "first_page": "583", "last_page": "585", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "253 Ark. 583" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "487 S.W.2d 617" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "227 Ark. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1705383 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/227/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 L. Ed. 2d 745", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 S. Ct. 735", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "404 U.S. 1058", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6476678, 6476615, 6477163, 6476973, 6476533, 6476919, 6477049, 6476859, 6476797 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/404/1058-03", "/us/404/1058-02", "/us/404/1058-09", "/us/404/1058-07", "/us/404/1058-01", "/us/404/1058-06", "/us/404/1058-08", "/us/404/1058-05", "/us/404/1058-04" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 282, "char_count": 3492, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.0721956662674946e-07, "percentile": 0.8574113780378702 }, "sha256": "d631fa71c7977421ff8834dbb333d7fc72d4019fe61023b999a785655c2fe810", "simhash": "1:f66f66f3cd211fe4", "word_count": 601 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:44:30.788798+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Charles RUSSELL v. Jimmy MILLER, Mayor" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nThe appellant was charged in the mayor\u2019s court of the city of Judsonia with driving while intoxicated, an offense under State law. The mayor denied the defendant\u2019s motion to transfer the case to the municipal court of the city of Searcy. The defendant then petitioned the circuit court for a writ of mandamus directing the mayor to grant the requested transfer. This appeal is from a circuit court order denying the petition for mandamus.\nWe think the appellant\u2019s position is well taken. The statute invests the mayor\u2019s court with the jurisdiction and power of a justice of the peace in criminal cases arising from State offenses committed within the corporate limits. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 19-1102 (Repl. 1968). A separate statute provides that in any criminal case brought before a justice of the peace in any township in a county wherein a municipal court exists, the defendant may, on motion, take a change of venue to the municipal court. Upon the filing of such a motion of the justice of the peace \u201cshall have no further jurisdiction in the case.\u201d Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 22-725 (Repl. 1962). The section just cited is part of Act 60 of 1927, as amended, which also provides that the municipal court\u2019s jurisdiction is exclusive of justices of the peace in townships subject to the act. Section 22-709.\nWhen the statutes are read together we construe them to mean that the jurisdiction of the mayor\u2019s court, like that of the justice of the peace, is subject to a motion to transfer to municipal court when a State offense is involved. Evidently the legislature sought to achieve equality and uniformity of treatment with respect to such offenses, by making it possible for the cases to be heard by the same tribunal. Moreover, the municipal judge is required by Act 60, supra (\u00a7 22-704), to be a licensed lawyer, but there is no similar requirement with regard to mayors or justices of the peace. Thus there are sound reasons supporting the appellant\u2019s contention, while, on the other hand, we discern no basis for a legislative distinction between the justice of the peace court and the mayor\u2019s court (now renamed the city court by Act 153 of 1971; Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 19-1102.1 [Supp. 1971]).\nWe must decline counsel\u2019s invitation to speculate about the effects upon our city courts that may result from the Supreme Court\u2019s decision last month in Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 404 U.S. 1058, 92 S. Ct. 735, 30 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1972). There Ward, in support of his objection to being tried in the mayor\u2019s court, showed that the mayor had broad responsibilities in the successful administration of the village government and also that the fines imposed by him in the mayor\u2019s court amounted to specified and substantial portions of the village income. The court held the mayor\u2019s conflict of interest to be so great as to preclude him from presiding at the trial. In the case at bar the appellant made no similar objection to being tried by the mayor, offered no similar proof with respect to the city\u2019s income, and in fact is not even going to be tried by the mayor, under our decision. Hence any comment by us upon the Supreme Court\u2019s decision would be contrary to our settled practice of not discussing questions of theoretical interest only. Lytle v. Zebold, 227 Ark. 431, 299 S.W. 2d 74 (1957).\nReversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Troy Wiley, for appellant.", "Lightle, Tedder & Hannah, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Charles RUSSELL v. Jimmy MILLER, Mayor\n5787\n487 S.W. 2d 617\nOpinion delivered December 11, 1972\nTroy Wiley, for appellant.\nLightle, Tedder & Hannah, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0583-01", "first_page_order": 627, "last_page_order": 629 }