{
  "id": 1627323,
  "name": "Vern BARNETT v. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Barnett v. Maryland Casualty Co.",
  "decision_date": "1973-02-25",
  "docket_number": "5-6181",
  "first_page": "1103",
  "last_page": "1104",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "253 Ark. 1103"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "490 S.W.2d 784"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "32 S.W. 2d 310",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "year": 1930,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "182 Ark. 496",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1389754
      ],
      "year": 1930,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/182/0496-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 3104,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.81,
    "pagerank": {
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      "percentile": 0.34605473137623083
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    "sha256": "a11f9288d385e1fd11177fc88fcf69bf5a26bdeebbead6d37c929ba5d1647907",
    "simhash": "1:1fbdeb2d37217be4",
    "word_count": 493
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:44:30.788798+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Vern BARNETT v. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Frank Holt, Justice.\nThe only issue on appeal is whether the appellant\u2019s residential homeowner\u2019s insurance policy covered the fire loss of his electric cook stove which was not on the insured premises. Based upon a stipulation of facts, the trial court, sitting as a jury, adjudged that appellant recover nothing from the appellee insurer and dismissed appellant\u2019s complaint. Appellant asserts that this adverse judgment is contrary to the law and facts and, accordingly, should be reversed. We cannot agree.\nThe appellant owned a rental house. A tenant purchased and installed the electric stove during his occupancy. When the tenant moved the appellant acquired ownership of the stove in payment of the tenant\u2019s rental indebtedness. Appellant did not remove the stove. Within the month he again rented the house. His new tenant, an employee, had a stove which \u201cwould not fit in the space.\u201d Appellant \u201cloaned\u201d the electric stove to his new tenant \u201cwith no additional rent being charged,\u201d reserving the right to remove the stove at any time. About three months after renting the house to the new tenant, the house and stove were destroyed by fire. The agreed value of the stove is $326.\nAppellant\u2019s homeowner\u2019s insurance policy on his own dwelling (not the rental house) provided coverage for \u201cunscheduled personal property usual or incidental to the occupancy of the premises as a dwelling ***while on the described premises and ***such unscheduled personal property while elsewhere than on the described premises, any where in the world.\u201d (emphasis added) This coverage excluded \u201cproperty rented or held for rental to others by the insured\u201d and \"business property while away from the described premises;...\u201d These exclusions were pleaded as affirmative defenses and, also, that the coverage for unscheduled personal property included only such \u201cpersonal property usual or incidental to the occupancy of the premises as a dwelling insured under the contract of insurance.\u201d\nIt clearly appears that \u201csuch unscheduled property while elsewhere\u201d must be \u201cusual and incidental to the occupancy of the [insured] premises\u201d in order to be covered by appellant\u2019s homeowner\u2019s policy. There is no evidence that appellant acquired, used or even contemplated the use of this particular electric stove in his own residence. To the contrary, the electric stove was acquired in connection with a business or the rental of a house. The stove, so acquired, was left in the rental house, as a loan, since the tenant\u2019s stove wouldn\u2019t fit. A contract of insurance, like other contracts, must be accorded a reasonable interpretation in giving legal effect to its language and provisions. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Spencer, 182 Ark. 496, 32 S.W. 2d 310 (1930). In the case at bar, we cannot say the trial court\u2019s interpretation is unreasonable nor that the court\u2019s finding is unsupported by substantial evidence.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Frank Holt, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Douglas Bradley and Jon R. Coleman, for appellant.",
      "Barnett, Wheatley, Smith ir Deacon, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Vern BARNETT v. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY\n5-6181\n490 S.W. 2d 784\nOpinion delivered February 25, 1973\nDouglas Bradley and Jon R. Coleman, for appellant.\nBarnett, Wheatley, Smith ir Deacon, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "1103-01",
  "first_page_order": 1153,
  "last_page_order": 1154
}