{
  "id": 1624202,
  "name": "Lawrence Jo Jo SCOTT v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Scott v. State",
  "decision_date": "1973-04-16",
  "docket_number": "CR 73-14",
  "first_page": "271",
  "last_page": "273",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "254 Ark. 271"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "492 S.W.2d 902"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
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    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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      "cite": "234 Ark. 46",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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    {
      "cite": "29 L. Ed. 2d 865",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d",
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "91 S. Ct. 2273",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "S. Ct.",
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "403 U.S. 954",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        12044250
      ],
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "440 S.W.2d 244",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "246 Ark. 838",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1604064
      ],
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/246/0838-01"
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    {
      "cite": "251 Ark. 918",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1633429
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/ark/251/0918-01"
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  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 4864,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:26:13.512056+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Lawrence Jo Jo SCOTT v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "John A. Fogleman, Justice.\nThis is the second appeal in this case. The first is reported at 251 Ark. 918, 475 S.W. 2d 699. There we held that the evidence then before the court was sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape. Upon retrial, the appellant was again convicted of rape without the testimony relating to an incriminating remark by appellant, which we found to have been improperly admitted in the first trial.\nOn this appeal, appellant again contends that there was insufficient evidence that he had sexual intercourse with the two-year-old child alleged to have been the victim of the crime. The evidence is not materially different, with the exception above noted, from that given at the first trial and outlined in the opinion on the first appeal. We then rejected the same arguments now advanced on behalf of appellant, i.e., that sexual intercourse as defined in the present rape statute [Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-3402 (Repl. 1964)] means more than the slight penetration held sufficient to constitute the crime under previous statutes. Appellant argues that the testimony of Dr. Porter, who examined the little girl after the events leading up to the charge against appellant, clearly shows that there was no actual penetration, therefore there could have been no rape. In the previous trial, Dr. Porter\u2019s statement was admitted into evidence by agreement. In this trial he testified in person. While the doctor stated, as emphasized by appellant, that there had been no actual penetration because the child\u2019s vagina was too small to have admitted either a penis or a finger, he qualified this statement by saying that the penetration was sufficient to tear the hymen and that her vagina was torn almost into the rectum. Thus, there was no material variation in the physician\u2019s testimony in the two cases.\nAppellant\u2019s remaining point for reversal is another contention made and rejected on the first appeal, i.e., prejudice by the state\u2019s failure to produce tangible evidence. Appellant argues that we should reconsider this matter because there is a discrepancy between the testimony of former Deputy Sheriff Tom Womack (an investigator with the prosecuting attorney\u2019s office at the time of the second trial) in this trial and his testimony at the first trial. In this connection, he points out that Womack, when asked on the first trial if there was anything unusual about the shorts removed from Scott shortly after he was taken into custody, responded only that they had blood stains in front, but, on the second trial added, when asked about the appearance of Scott\u2019s body at the time, that there was a large amount of blood on the inside of the shorts and there appeared to be blood stains on Scott\u2019s penis. He further points out that, on the second trial, Womack said that the blood stains on Scott\u2019s clothing and person were bright red, some nine hours after the alleged incident. Appellant also contrasts Womack\u2019s testimony with that of Deputy Sheriff Little at the first trial that there was no blood visible on Scott\u2019s outer clothing at the time of his arrest, and that the dried blood on Scott\u2019s undershorts was \u201cclear, you know, not red blood like \u2014 maybe two or three hours old.\u201d Little did not testify at the second trial. Appellant also contends that neither of the officers had previously testified about observing blood on the inside of Scott\u2019s shorts when they were removed. Scott further argues that Womack was inconsistent in his testimony at the second trial in that, in response to one question, he said that the shorts were white in color and later described them as white with brown dots. In arguing the prejudicial effect of failure of the state to produce the shorts, appellant also points out that the officer described the shorts as \u201cboxer-type\u201d while appellant\u2019s aunt said they were jockey shorts. All these matters were for consideration by the jury in evaluating the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given to his testimony. It was the function of the jury to resolve any inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony presented at the second trial. Davis v. State, 246 Ark. 838, 440 S.W.2d 244, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 954, 91 S. Ct. 2273, 29 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1971). Doubtless they were emphasized by appellant\u2019s attorney in closing arguments, at least as forcefully as they are stated here. We are not convinced that our holding was erroneous on the first appeal.\nActually, it would be difficult to find a case where the rule that the \u201claw of the case\u201d governs on the second appeal should be more readily applied. See Mode v. State, 234 Ark. 46, 350 S.W.2d 675.\nThe judgment is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "John A. Fogleman, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Louis W. Rosteck, for appellant.",
      "Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by: Gene O\u2019Daniel, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Lawrence Jo Jo SCOTT v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 73-14\n492 S.W. 2d 902\nOpinion delivered April 16, 1973\nLouis W. Rosteck, for appellant.\nJim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by: Gene O\u2019Daniel, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0271-01",
  "first_page_order": 293,
  "last_page_order": 295
}