{
  "id": 1624132,
  "name": "G. R. PALMER et al v. Dale CLINE, Director, Aekansas Department of Labor et al",
  "name_abbreviation": "Palmer v. Cline",
  "decision_date": "1973-05-07",
  "docket_number": "73-4",
  "first_page": "393",
  "last_page": "395",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "254 Ark. 393"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "494 S.W.2d 112"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "63 S.W. 2d 980",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "year": 1933,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "188 Ark. 77",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1428401
      ],
      "year": 1933,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/188/0077-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "30 Ark. 69",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1881174
      ],
      "year": 1875,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/30/0069-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "62 S.W. 2d 39",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "year": 1933,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "187 Ark. 832",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1432077
      ],
      "year": 1933,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/187/0832-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 5020,
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    "sha256": "63b4cd2b9d9b5761c40d8bc3996722a7474576456e15bc062778b4c3147189b7",
    "simhash": "1:8361adb5d53d7c8a",
    "word_count": 817
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:26:13.512056+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "G. R. PALMER et al v. Dale CLINE, Director, Aekansas Department of Labor et al"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nThis case presents a jurisdictional issue under the Employment Security Act. The appellants filed a petition in the Pulaski Chancery Court to review the appellees\u2019 action in assessing delinquent contributions against the appellants in the sum of $42.80. The appellees demurred to the petition on the ground that the chancery court was without jurisdiction. This appeal is from an order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition.\nThe petition is brief. It identifies the petitioners as the owners of Palmer\u2019s Boutique and the respondents as the Director of the Department of Labor and the Administrator of the Employment Security Division of that department. After reciting the respondents\u2019 assessment of delinquent contributions against the petitioners, the petition goes on to state: \u201cPetitioners are not \u2018employers\u2019 as defined by Arkansas law and are therefore not liable for any contributions required by the state Employment Security Act, and the action of Respondents in filing the Certificate of Assessment is unlawful.\u201d The petitioners pray that the respondents be restrained from collecting the assessment during the pendency of the suit and that the court determine whether petitioners are \u201cemployers\u201d subject to the Employment Security Act.\nThe dispute turns upon which of two sections of the Act is controlling. The petitioners insist that their remedy is to be found in that section of the statute which provides for a review in the chancery court. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1117 (e) (Repl. 1960). The respondents contend that the petitioners should have proceeded under a different section, which provides for an appeal either to the Board, of Review or to the Pulaski Circuit Court. Section 81-1114 (b, 2).\nWe agree with the respondents. The petitioners\u2019 pleading asserts a right to relief upon one ground only, that the petitioners are not employers within the purview of the Act. Such a dispute, however, must arise under Section 81-1114 (b, 2), which provides that the Commissioner may, \u201cupon his own motion, or upon application of an employing unit, . . . make findings of fact and on the basis thereof, determinations whether an employing unit constitutes an employer.\u201d If the employing unit disagrees with the Commissioner\u2019s determination, the section provides for an appeal to the Board of Review or to the Pulaski Circuit Court. That, in our opinion, was the petitioners\u2019 proper remedy in the case at bar.\nThe petitioners are mistaken in their reliance upon Section 81-1117 (e). That section has nothing to do with the determination of whether an employing unit is an employer. Instead, it is concerned with the Administrator\u2019s determination of the amount of contributions, interest, and penalties. The section presupposes that the complaining party is an employer. In fact, the sentence providing for a review in chancery so states: \u201cAn aggrieved, employer [our italics] may have a review of the action of the Administrator ...\u201d The petitioners\u2019 denial of their status as employers takes their dispute out of the scope of Section 81-1117 (e).\nDespite the distinction between the two remedies provided by the statute, the petitioners earnestly insist that they are entitled to an equitable remedy, for the reason that the Commissioner\u2019s determination of the petitioners\u2019 status as employers was made without compliance with the statutory requirement that the employing unit be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. Section 81-1114 (b, 2). It is argued that compliance with the requirement of notice and a hearing is a constitutional prerequisite to the petitioners\u2019 being confined to the circuit court review now insisted upon by the appellees.\nWe cannot reach the merits of the petitioners\u2019 argument, because the point is not properly raised. There is no assertion in the petitioners\u2019 brief pleading that the respondents failed to give the petitioners notice and an opportunity to be heard. There is no assertion of any constitutional issue, such as a denial of due process or the imposition of an illegal exaction. A demurrer does not admit any facts that are not well pleaded. Caldwell v. St. Louis Joint Stock Land Bank, 187 Ark. 832, 62 S.W. 2d 39 (1933). It is presumed that required official acts have been duly performed, until the contrary is shown. Haynes v. Butler, 30 Ark. 69 (1875). It is presumed, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, that all necessary steps have been taken by the officer. West Twelfth St. Imp. Dist. No. 30 v. Kinstley, 188 Ark. 77, 63 S.W. 2d 980 (1933). We must determine the issues upon the record that was made in the trial court. The facts essential to the question now argued were not pleaded in the court below and therefore cannot serve as the basis for a decision in this court.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Hale, Hale, Fincher if Hoof man, P. A., for appellants.",
      "Herrn Northcutt, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "G. R. PALMER et al v. Dale CLINE, Director, Aekansas Department of Labor et al\n73-4\n494 S.W. 2d 112\nOpinion delivered May 7, 1973\nHale, Hale, Fincher if Hoof man, P. A., for appellants.\nHerrn Northcutt, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0393-01",
  "first_page_order": 415,
  "last_page_order": 417
}