{
  "id": 8719663,
  "name": "Chester KING Sr v. Clyde LOVELL, Jr. et ux",
  "name_abbreviation": "King v. Lovell",
  "decision_date": "1973-10-15",
  "docket_number": "73-106",
  "first_page": "264",
  "last_page": "266",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "255 Ark. 264"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "499 S.W.2d 859"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "267 S.W. 2d 768",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        1650191
      ],
      "year": 1954,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/223/0660-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "223 Ark. 660",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1650309,
        1650191
      ],
      "year": 1954,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/223/0638-01",
        "/ark/223/0660-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "217 Ark. 826",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8724689
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1950,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/217/0826-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 4484,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:24:11.540726+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Chester KING Sr v. Clyde LOVELL, Jr. et ux"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nThe outcome of this litigation between neighbors turns upon whether Tread-way Road, in Pulaski county, is a public road or a private road. The chancellor found it to be private and entered a decree allowing the appellees to maintain at its entrance a sign reading: \u201cPrivate Road \u2014 Use Only By Permission or Right.\u201d The appellant insists that Treadway Road is actually a public road and that therefore the sign should be taken down.\nThe road in question, only 669 feet long, runs north from Faulkner Road, an east-west county road. The appellees\u2019 property is on the west side of Tread-way Road, a little more than 200 feet north of Faulkner Road. The appellant\u2019s property lies slightly -farther to the north and about 500 feet east of Treadway Road. For a number of years Treadway Road has provided access to the houses owned and occupied by the parties.\nIn 1967 the appellant King and three other landowners brought this suit to enjoin various defendants from obstructing Treadway Road. The appellee Lovell, joined as a defendant, filed an answer asserting that Treadway Road was in fact a private driveway in which the plaintiffs had no \u201crights of egress and ingress.\u201d The appellant King, as a plaintiff, then filed a reply stating that \u201cin truth and in fact the-said Treadway Road is a private driveway, and plaintiff [King] has no rights arising by virtue of prescription.\u201d Apparently the other three plaintiffs did not join in King\u2019s concession that the road was a private driveway.\nOn March 18, 1968, the chancellor entered a decree dismissing the suit as to Lovell\u2019s codefendants and making this finding with respect to Lovell and King: \u201cThat under the evidence in this case the defendant, Clyde Lovell, Jr., should be permanently restrained and enjoined from interfering with the use by Chester King, Sr., (and his successors in title) of the road known as Treadway Road as a means of egress and ingress from and to his property to and from Faulkner Road, and he is hereby -so restrained from interfering with such use.\u201d There was no appeal from that decree.\nIn 1972 King filed the present petition, asserting that Lovell was interfering with King\u2019s use of Tread-way Road and asking that Lovell be held in contempt of court and be enjoined from further interference with King\u2019s rights. At a hearing the parties introduced testimony -bearing upon the public or private character of Treadway Road. The chancellor, as we have said, found the road to be a private one and permitted the Lovells to erect a sign so stating.\nWe agree with the chancellor. In the first place, the 1968 decree appears to be conclusive as between King and Lovell. The binding effect of a judgment is to be determined by the pleadings as well as by the judgment itself. Webb v. Herpin, 217 Ark. 826, 233 S.W. 2d 385 (1950). Here both King and Lovell had filed pleadings averring that Treadway Road was a private driveway. The chancellor evidently adopted that view, because the decree recognized king\u2019s rights in the road only as a means of egress and ingress from and to his property. That limitation in the decree is not in harmony with King\u2019s present assertion that Treadway Road is a public thoroughfare in which he has unlimited rights.\nIn the second place, the chancellor again found, in the supplementary decree now before us, that Tread-way 4s a private road. That finding is not contrary to the weight of the evidence. The fee title to the strip occupied by the road is privately owned. There has been no formal dedication of a right of way to the public. It does not clearly appear that the road has been used by the public in general other than as a means of access to a few homes in the vicinity. Such a restricted user could be regarded as giving rise to a private easement rather than to a public one. See Barbee v. Carpenter, 223 Ark. 660, 267 S.W. 2d 768 (1954). Although certain witnesses living on Lawson Road testified that they used Treadway Road as a means of access to the upper Hot Springs highway, the relationship of the three roads to one another -is so inadequately described that we are unable to follow the appellant\u2019s argument in this respect. Upon the record as a whole the decree does not clearly appear to be against the preponderance of the proof.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "/. Harrod Berry, for appellant.",
      "Matthews, Purtle, Osterloh ir Weber, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Chester KING Sr v. Clyde LOVELL, Jr. et ux\n73-106\n499 S.W. 2d 859\nOpinion delivered October 15, 1973\n/. Harrod Berry, for appellant.\nMatthews, Purtle, Osterloh ir Weber, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0264-01",
  "first_page_order": 286,
  "last_page_order": 288
}