{ "id": 8724129, "name": "Roy HILL v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Hill v. State", "decision_date": "1973-12-17", "docket_number": "CR 73-120", "first_page": "720", "last_page": "722", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "255 Ark. 720" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "502 S.W.2d 649" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "246 Ark. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604174 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/246/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 S.W. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ark. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1438536 ], "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/184/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 A.L.R. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ark. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1688414 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/234/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ark. L. Rev. 182", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ark. L. Rev.", "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 S.W. 949", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1914, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ark. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1536316 ], "year": 1914, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/114/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 S.W. 939", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ark. 768", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1369450 ], "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/171/0768-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 356, "char_count": 4810, "ocr_confidence": 0.831, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8595951462695964e-07, "percentile": 0.7246698552695543 }, "sha256": "8bd21b3bf7a534cbb1de664f7bc62fb4993b271da8ed0204347ae7e81f8e0c4b", "simhash": "1:3afa5c765e262be6", "word_count": 822 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:24:11.540726+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Harris, C.J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Roy HILL v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nCharged with first degree murder, the appellant Hill was convicted of second degree murder and was sentenced, as a habitual offender, to imprisonment for 26 years. He argues two points for reversal.\nIt is first contended that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce hearsay evidence. Hill and the decedent, Coy Daniels, had been neighbors in Dallas, Texas. In September, 1972, Hill, with his own family and three of Daniels\u2019 children, moved to North Little Rock, where Hill rented a house. A day or two later Daniels came to North Little Rock and drove to Hill\u2019s house at about four o\u2019clock in the morning. When Daniels was seen, someone turned off the lights inside the house; but Daniels walked in the front door and turned on a light in the living room. Within a few moments Hill shot and killed Daniels, with a shotgun. Hill\u2019s theory of the case was that he acted in self-defense.\nThe State called as a witness Mrs. Joel Lester, who had known the Daniels family in Dallas before she moved to North Little Rock. The court permitted Mrs. Lester to testify that at about 7:30 or 8:00 o\u2019clock on the evening before the homicide Daniels had telephoned Mrs. Lester (apparently from Dallas) and had said that he was going to come and get his children and put them back in school.\nMrs. Lester\u2019s testimony was admissible, as tending to show that Daniels\u2019 mental state was not one of hostility toward Hill when Daniels went to Hill\u2019s house. We have admitted similar statements by the victim of a homicide as part of the res gestae. Sullivan v. State, 171 Ark. 768, 286 S.W. 939 (1926); Spivey v. State, 114 Ark. 267, 169 S.W. 949 (1914). It is really more accurate to say that such statements are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Morgan, Statements Evidencing Mental Condition, 3 Ark. L. Rev. 182 (1949). By analogy, our rule is that when self-defense is in issue, the victim\u2019s uncommunicated threats against the defendant are admissible to show who was the aggressor. Decker v. State, 234 Ark. 518, 353 S.W. 2d 168, 98 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1962); Wilson v. State, 184 Ark. 252, 42 S.W. 2d 378 (1931). Since the accused may prove such uncom-municated statements to show an attitude of hostility, the State may prove uncommunicated statements, such as that made to Mrs. Lester, to indicate a peaceful intention.\nWe pass to the appellant\u2019s second contention. Hill, testifying in his own defense, admitted three earlier felony convictions. The State\u2019s attorney, in responding to an objection made to his cross-examination of Hill, said to the court: \u201cYour Honor, he has testified that he has been convicted of three felonies, and I intend to show quite a few more things.\u201d The court sustained defense counsel\u2019s objection to the State\u2019s line of questioning.\nDefense counsel then asked for a mistrial on the ground that the State\u2019s attorney should not have referred to \u201cquite a few more things.\u201d In denying the motion for a mistrial the court said, apparently to the jury: \u201cI don\u2019t [know] what the statement is that, by the Prosecutor, that he intends to show quite a few more things. You\u2019ll disregard that, because I don\u2019t know what he had in mind. There\u2019s some ambiguity there, but you\u2019ll disregard that statement because it shouldn\u2019t have been made but I don\u2019t think it\u2019s prejudicial because he doesn\u2019t say anything.\u201d When defense counsel pressed his motion for a mistrial the court again made substantially the same statement to the jury.\nIt is now insisted that the court should have granted a mistrial and that the error was compounded by the court\u2019s statement that \u201cI don\u2019t think it\u2019s prejudicial because he doesn\u2019t say anything.\u201d We find no reversible error. A mistrial should not be granted unless the error is so prejudicial that justice could not be served by a continuation of the trial. Back v. Duncan, 246 Ark. 494, 438 S.W. 2d 690 (1969). This case does not fall in that category. Since the prosecutor\u2019s remark conveyed no information to the jury about the other things that counsel intended to show, we think the court\u2019s admonition that the remark be disregarded was sufficient to correct the error. The court\u2019s additional statement was of course not a comment on the evidence, since the incident involved only a statement by counsel. We consider the court\u2019s remark, that the statement was not prejudicial because he doesn\u2019t say anything, to have been an accurate summation and certainly not so detrimental to the accused as to call for a mistrial or a reversal here.\nAffirmed.\nHarris, C.J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Harold L. Hall, for appellant.", "Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by: O. H. Hargraves, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Roy HILL v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 73-120\n502 S.W. 2d 649\nOpinion delivered December 17, 1973\n[Rehearing denied January 21, 1974.]\nHarold L. Hall, for appellant.\nJim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by: O. H. Hargraves, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0720-01", "first_page_order": 742, "last_page_order": 744 }