{
  "id": 8721071,
  "name": "STANDARD LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE Company v. W. OWENS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Standard Life & Accident Insurance v. Owens",
  "decision_date": "1974-04-15",
  "docket_number": "73-301",
  "first_page": "392",
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      "cite": "507 S.W.2d 704"
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      "year": 1929,
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      "cite": "107 W. Va. 574",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:44:14.527021+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STANDARD LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE Company v. W. OWENS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nThis is an action by the appellee Owens upon a mortgage protection policy which provided monthly benefits for total disability caused by \u201csickness commencing more than thirty (30) days after the effective date of the insurance.\u201d The jury returned a verdict for Owens in a sum somewhat less than the amount sued for. The insurer\u2019s only contention for reversal is that it was entitled to a directed verdict on the ground that Owens\u2019 sickness antedated the policy, which became effective on January 1, 1970.\nUpon the evidence the trial judge, correctly submitted the case to the jury. In November, 1961, Owens suffered a heart attack (myocardial infarction), which disabled him for three months. He then returned to work on full duty as an auditor for an oil company. In that capacity he drove from 35,000 to 50,000 miles a year, covering parts of eleven states. During those years Owens had routine medical checkups, took medication for his heart condition, and carried nitroglycerin as a precautionary measure.\nOn February 28, 1971, more than a year after the effective date of the policy in issue, Owens suffered a second myocardial infarction, affecting a different part of his heart. His doctor testified that February, 1971, was the first time when Owens\u2019 symptoms were such as to allow a reasonably accurate diagnosis of total and permanent disability based upon the patient\u2019s myocardial insufficiency. The doctor said that \u201cthe precipitating event of his existent disability is the second myocardial infarction which, \u00e1s I would say, added insult to injury. Arteriosclerotic heart disease is a condition which many millions of people possess, and he demonstrated the ability to walk away from one infarction, but could not function after the second infarction.\u201d The insurer\u2019s expert medical witness, a pathologist, testified that the first infarction caused permanent damage to the heart muscle and that the basic disease, arteriosclerosis, had existed for a number of years.\nThe issue turns upon the word \u201csickness,\u201d which was used in the policy without further explanation. According to what appears to be the uniform trend of the cases, the term does not encompass a non-disabling condition such as that which Owens had for more than nine years after his first heart attack. A typical statement appears in Milam v. Norwich Union Indemnity Co., 107 W. Va. 574, 149 S.E. 668 (1929):\n\u201cWhile the word \u2018sickness\u2019 is technically synonymous with such words as \u2018disease,\u2019 it is popularly differentiated in this way: One is not ordinarily considered sick who performs his usual occupation, though some organ of the body may be affected; he is regarded as sick, when that diseased condition has advanced far enough to incapacitate him. ... A liberal construction of the term \u2018sickness contracted,\u2019 as used in this policy, requires that it be applied to the time when the malady was sufficiently active to disable the patient, and not to the time when it originated.\u201d\nTo the same effect are World Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Pipes, 255 F. 2d 464 (5th Cir. 1958); United Security Life Ins. Co. v. Sikes, 40 Ala. App. 677, 122 So. 2d 289 (1960); Price v. State Capital Life Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 152, 134 S.E. 2d 171 (1964); Fuchs v. Old Line Life Ins. Co., 46 Wis. 2d 67, 174 N.W. 2d 273 (1970).\nUnder the many decisions construing language similar to that in the policy now before us, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Owens was sick for a period of nine years after his first myocardial infarction or that the sickness which totally and permanently disabled him did not commence more than thirty days after the effective date of the insurance. The insurer\u2019s motion for a directed verdict was correctly denied.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Brown, Compton & Prewelt, by; William /. Prewetl, for appellant.",
      "Shackleford & Shackleford, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STANDARD LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE Company v. W. OWENS\n73-301\n507 S.W. 2d 704\nOpinion delivered April 15, 1974\nBrown, Compton & Prewelt, by; William /. Prewetl, for appellant.\nShackleford & Shackleford, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0392-01",
  "first_page_order": 428,
  "last_page_order": 430
}