{
  "id": 1621166,
  "name": "Ralph CANTRELL v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Cantrell v. State",
  "decision_date": "1975-11-10",
  "docket_number": "CR 75-135",
  "first_page": "833",
  "last_page": "836",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "258 Ark. 833"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "529 S.W.2d 136"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "247 Ark. 553",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1600787
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/247/0553-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:03:57.275817+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Byrd, J. dissents."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Ralph CANTRELL v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Carleton Harris, Chief Justice.\nThis proceeding to revoke appellant\u2019s probation arises from undisputed facts and presents solely a question of statutory construction. Appellant first came before the trial court on a burglary and grand larceny charge in 1969. The trial court refused to accept appellant\u2019s guilty plea, however, and instead placed him on \u201ccourt probation\u201d for three years. In September, 1970, appellant committed a second burglary, and this offense resulted in the court rendering two separate sentences for appellant. With respect to the 1969 burglary, the trial court revoked appellant\u2019s \u201ccourt probation\u201d by accepting his plea of guilty, and placing him on probation for a period of five years, dating from September, 1970, in accordance with the provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 43-2331 (Supp. 1973). In respect to the 1970 burglary, the trial court sentenced appellant to three years, with two suspended. In April, 1975, appellant was convicted in the Fort Smith Municipal Court of possession of marijuana, driving without a driver\u2019s license, and failure to answer a summons, and the prosecuting attorney petitioned the trial court to revoke appellant\u2019s probation on the 1969 offense. The trial court granted the petition and sentenced appellant to four years in the Department of Correction. From the judgment so entered, appellant brings this appeal, arguing that the length of his probation for the 1969 burglary violated the five-year limit placed on probation by Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 43-2331 (Supp. 1973).\nWe do not agree with appellant in his argument. The controlling Arkansas decision on the question of \u201ccourt probation,\u201d utilized by the Sebastian County Circuit Court on the 1969 charge, is Maddox v. State, 247 Ark. 553, 446 S.W. 2d 210. There, the trial court postponed the acceptance of Maddox\u2019s guilty plea for one year, conditioned upon his good behavior. Within two months, Maddox had committed other crimes, and the trial court revoked the \u201ccourt probation\u201d and accepted his plea of guilty to the initial charge, giving him a twelve year sentence. Maddox appealed, contending that because the trial court had given him a \u201cone year probation,\u201d he could not be sentenced to any period longer than one year. We rejected the argument, holding that the use of \u201ccourt probation\u201d to postpone acceptance of a guilty plea did not limit the trial court\u2019s discretion as Maddox later violated the terms of the probation. This was the principal question in Maddox, i.e., whether the court was limited to its one year probation, or had the authority to render the sentence that was rendered. We said that the controlling fact is when the plea is accepted. Further, from the opinion:\n\u201cWe perceive no language in this statute nor in any case cited to us that limits the power and the discretion of the trial court to delay the acceptance of a plea. In the case at bar we cannot say that one year is an unreasonable length of timeto defer acceptance of a plea. ***\n\u201cShould we accept appellant\u2019s argument we would circumscribe and severely handicap our trial judges in their efforts to determine when their trust and compassion should be exercised for the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant. The future of deserving individuals, especially youthful offenders, who come before our sentencing courts should not be jeopardized by such a narrow construction as urged by the appellant. Nor do we agree with the appellant that the sentence imposed is excessive since it exceeded one year. The sentence was within the statutory limits which are from 1 to 21 years.\u201d\nThe cited language explains clearly the benefits of \u201ccourt probation,\u201d and we observe no reason why we should now render the narrow construction suggested by appellant.\nThe facts in the instant case and Maddox are virtually identical, each case involving the same informal \u201ccourt probation\u201d procedure. Only the statute cited by appellant is different \u2014 \u00a7 43-2331 instead of \u00a7 43-2324. However, Maddox still controls because the applicability of \u00a7 43-2331, limiting probation to five years, is conditioned upon the very first line of that section, \u201cUpon entering a judgment of conviction *** the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best.\u201d [Our emphasis.] No judgment of conviction for the first offense was entered until September, 1970, and the period of probation for that first offense thus commenced in September, 1970. It is readily apparent that the April, 1975 offense was clearly within that five year period.\nAffirmed.\nByrd, J. dissents.\nUnder the \u201ccourt probation\u201d procedure, the trial court retains jurisdiction over one admittedly guilty of a felony, but gives him a chance to rehabilitate himself, by a formal refusal to accept his guilty plea. By retaining jurisdiction, however, the trial court can revoke the \u201cprobation\u201d by accepting the plea at a later time, if the person commits another offense.\nThe court could also have rendered this sentence under Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 43-2324, and actually did not state which section was invoked.\nNor can\u2019we say that three years is an unreasonable length of time.\nActually, it appears that the court had been very lenient with Cantrell. In June, 1973, a petition was filed requesting that probation be set aside because of the fact that Cantrell had been convicted in Municipal Court at Fort Smith for the offense of DWI and no driver\u2019s license, being fined in the sum of $173.00. The court, however, did not revoke the probation. Again, in April, 1974, Cantrell was convicted of disturbing the peace and public drunkenness, fined $75.00 for the former offense and $50.00 for the latter, and the prosecuting attorney sought revocation of the probation. This petition was also denied.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Carleton Harris, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Don Langston, for appellant.",
      "Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by: Gary Isbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Ralph CANTRELL v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 75-135\n529 S.W. 2d 136\nOpinion delivered November 10, 1975\nDon Langston, for appellant.\nJim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by: Gary Isbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0833-01",
  "first_page_order": 881,
  "last_page_order": 884
}