{
  "id": 1619122,
  "name": "WESTARK SPECIALTIES, INC. & GRANITE STATE INSURANCE CO. v. Michael E. LINDSEY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Westark Specialties, Inc. v. Lindsey",
  "decision_date": "1976-02-23",
  "docket_number": "75-275",
  "first_page": "351",
  "last_page": "354",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "259 Ark. 351"
    },
    {
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      "cite": "532 S.W.2d 757"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    "name_long": "Arkansas",
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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    {
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1600789
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      "year": 1969,
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        "/ark/247/0818-01"
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    {
      "cite": "254 Ark. 1048",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1624073
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/254/1048-01"
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    {
      "cite": "245 Ark. 168",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1606785
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1968,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/245/0168-01"
      ]
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:48:09.193956+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "WESTARK SPECIALTIES, INC. & GRANITE STATE INSURANCE CO. v. Michael E. LINDSEY"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Frank Holt, Justice.\nIn this workmen\u2019s compensation case, the Commission found appellee\u2019s eye injury was compensable and the circuit court affirmed. The sole contention on appeal is that the court and the Commission erred in con-eluding the claimant sustained an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the appellant Westark Specialties, Inc. It is argued that there is no causal connection between the accident-injury and appellee\u2019s employment. Specifically, appellants aver \u201cis such an injury so reasonably incidental to the employment that it meets the requirement of arising out of the employment?\u201d Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1302 (d) (Repl. 1960). Appellants correctly assert that the burden is upon the appellee claimant to prove that his injury arose in the course of his employment and additionally, it grew out of or resulted from his employment. Appellee-claimant responds that he has met the burden of proof by showing the incident, which caused his eye injury, arose out of a work connected quarrel. We agree with the appellee.\nThe law is well settled that in testing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal we view it in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s finding and affirm where any substantial evidence exists to support its action. Wilson Lbr. Co. v. Hughes, 245 Ark. 168, 431 S.W. 2d 487 (1968); and Sneed v. Colson Corp., 254 Ark. 1048, 497 S.W. 2d 673 (1973). Appellant agrees that there is little dispute about the facts and the real issue is one of law.\nAbout the end of the workday, two of appellee\u2019s co-employees, Brown and Yutterman, were observed in an argument by their foreman. Brown was away from his work area and at Yutterman\u2019s station angrily pointing his finger at Yutterman. The foreman fired Brown. The foreman had previously warned Brown about his \u201csmart mouth and popping off.\u201d This dispute arose because Brown was \u201crazzing and kidding\u201d a new co-employee. Yutterman told Brown \u201c . . . let Willie do his work because he needs the work like you do.\u201d After being discharged, Brown waited outside the building for Yutterman \u201cto get off work\u201d and then asked him \u201cwhy he had gotten me fired.\u201d An argument ensued between them. The appellee and his uncle had walked to the uncle\u2019s car where it was parked on a lot, adjacent to the building, regularly used and made available to the employees. They got into the car and were endorsing their pay checks when appellee unexpectedly suffered a bullet wound to one of his eyes from a gun fired by Brown. Appellee and his uncle testified that as they sat in the car endorsing their checks, they observed Brown and Yutterman standing by the corner of the building engaged in an argument. The uncle testified Brown had a gun pointed toward Yutterman\u2019s head. Yutterman slapped at Brown and then the uncle heard the gun fire. The bullet hit his car and he heard appellee exclaim he was \u201chit- in the eye.\u201d There was testimony that Brown was warned on a previous occasion by the foreman about having a gun on the premises.\nIn Townsend Paneling v. Butler, 247 Ark. 818, 448 S.W. 2d 347 (1969), we quoted with approval:\n\u2018It is generally held that injuries resulting from an assault are compensable where the assault is causally related to the employment, but that such injuries are not compensable where the assault arises out of purely personal reasons.\u2019\nThere we upheld the Commission\u2019s finding that the claimant\u2019s injury was causally related to his employment since he was an innocent victim of a work related assault by his co-employee. We think this holding is applicable to the case at bar.\nWe also think Larson, Vol. 1, \u00a7 11, is pertinent here. There it is said:\nAssaults arise out of the employment either if the risk of assault is increased by the nature or setting of the work, or if the reason for the assault was a quarrel having its origin in work. (Emphasis added.)\nFurther, \u00a7 11.12 reads \u201c . . . . causal connection with the employment may be shown by connecting with the employment the subject matter of the dispute leading to the assault.\u201d\nAppellant, however, cites Southland Corp. v. Hester, 253 Ark. 959, 490 S.W. 2d 132 (1973), as controlling in the case at bar. We cannot agree. Suffice it to say that there the accidental death from the discharge of a firearm which the decedent employee had in his possession on the premises was clearly not the result of any dispute or quarrel with a fellow employee as here. In the case at bar, had Yutterman suffered an injury from the hands of his co-employee Brown, then Yutterman would be entitled to compensation. Townsend Paneling v. Butler, supra. It logically and necessarily follows that the appellee here, who was also the innocent victim of a work related assault, is likewise entitled to compensation. Certainly, the evidence is amply substantial that appellee\u2019s injury was the result of a work related quarrel arising out of and causally related to his employment.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Frank Holt, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daily, West, Core & Coffman, for appellants.",
      "Garner, Garner & Cloar, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "WESTARK SPECIALTIES, INC. & GRANITE STATE INSURANCE CO. v. Michael E. LINDSEY\n75-275\n532 S.W. 2d 757\nOpinion delivered February 23, 1976\nDaily, West, Core & Coffman, for appellants.\nGarner, Garner & Cloar, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0351-01",
  "first_page_order": 379,
  "last_page_order": 382
}