{ "id": 1616712, "name": "SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. Forrest W. WILLIAMS", "name_abbreviation": "Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance v. Williams", "decision_date": "1976-11-15", "docket_number": "76-68", "first_page": "659", "last_page": "664", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "260 Ark. 659" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "543 S.W.2d 467" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "232 Ark. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1694051 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/232/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Ark. 1060", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8726233 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/255/1060-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 So. 2d 4", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2564034 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala/287/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 N.W. 2d 855", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.W. 2d 886", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.W. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 365464 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/262/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 So. 2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9892400 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/91/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 F. Supp. 620", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 290954 ], "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/92/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 So. 2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1918622 ], "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/miss/206/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.W. 2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ark. 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1467065 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/213/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ark. 749", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1734334 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/238/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ark. 1062", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1633265 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/251/1062-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 Ark. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717897 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/257/0098-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 609, "char_count": 10411, "ocr_confidence": 0.896, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.411111649030192e-07, "percentile": 0.9595598044519198 }, "sha256": "209c05c26a838ae6c4995f0e0651802b08ab529bc94b6181301af1866696a9b7", "simhash": "1:f4a7caa60f2b8cba", "word_count": 1745 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:47:10.616532+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. Forrest W. WILLIAMS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Frank Holt, Justice.\nThis appeal arises from a judgment in favor of appellee in a suit involving the extent of the coverage of an automobile insurance policy issued by appellant to appellee. During the time appellee\u2019s insured vehicle was being repaired, it became necessary for him to borrow his daughter\u2019s and her husband\u2019s car. The daughter was staying with her parents during the time her husband was stationed overseas in the military service. When appellee drove the borrowed car, he struck a pedestrian. As a result a suit was filed by the pedestrian for damages against appellee. Appellee made demand upon appellant to defend the suit pursuant to the terms of his insurance policy. Appellant refused stating that the borrowed automobile was not an insured vehicle under the \u201cTEMPORARY USE OF SUBSTITUTE AUTOMOBILE\u201d clause, since the automobile was owned by and furnished for the regular use of appellee\u2019s daughter who was a member of the appellee\u2019s household. After appellee\u2019s successful defense of the personal injury suit against him, he brought this action to collect his attorney\u2019s fees, expenses and a penalty against appellant for its refusal to defend the suit. At trial the court denied appellant\u2019s motions for a directed verdict. For reversal of the judgment, based on a jury verdict in appellee\u2019s favor, appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.\nIn determining whether a verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we review the evidence in that light which is most favorable to the appellee and indulge all reasonable inferences favoring the support of the jury\u2019s findings. Ark. State Highway Comm. v. Cook, 257 Ark. 98, 514 S.W. 2d 215 (1974); and Fields v. Sugar, 251 Ark. 1062, 476 S.W. 2d 814 (1972). Here appellant argues that no substantial evidence exists from which the jury could have found that the automobile driven by appellee at the time of the accident was a temporary substitute automobile within the meaning of the policy. The relevant provision of the insurance contract provides:\nVII TEMPORARY USE OF SUBSTITUTE AUTOMOBILE While a described automobile is withdrawn from use, such insurance as is afforded by this policy applies to another automobile not owned by or furnished for the regular use of the named insured or spouse, or members of the same household, while temporarily used as a substitute for such automobile. This insuring agreement does not cover as an insured the owner of the substitute automobile or any employee of such owner.\nIt is undisputed that appellee\u2019s daughter and her husband were co-owners of the automobile. The issue then is narrowed to a determination of whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury\u2019s implied finding that appellee\u2019s daughter was not a member of his household.\nAppellee\u2019s daughter, Brenda, was eighteen years of age and living with her parents when she was married to her husband in June, 1968. The couple first lived with his grandmother approximately one month until he was inducted into the military service. Brenda returned \u201cto my mother\u2019s and father\u2019s house.\u201d Before her husband left for overseas duty, he had a three weeks\u2019 furlough during which time they resided with his grandmother. Then in October or November, 1968, she again moved back with her parents and lived with them until July, 1969. At that time, her husband came home for about a one month\u2019s furlough during which time they visited relatives. After that furlough, he returned overseas. Brenda then \u201cwent again to live with [her] mother and father\u201d where she was residing in September, 1969, when her father borrowed her and her husband\u2019s car which was involved in the accident. It appears that Brenda did not drive. During the approximate one year that Brenda lived with her parents, she would occasionally visit relatives. Her parents exercised no control over her. She contributed no money to her maintenance, although she occasionally did some cooking and cleaning. Her parents did not expect her to contribute anything. She had no outside employment and \u201cre [lied] upon [her] father to feed and clothe\u201d her. She received a government allotment check, which originally was $100 a month and eventually raised \u201cto a hundred thirty sometimes or a hundred and forty,\u201d and from which she made the $81 car payment using the balance for her spending money. She testified that her and her husband\u2019s income \u201cwas not enough\u201d to require the filing of a tax return. For the taxable year 1969, the appellee father claimed Brenda as a dependent on his income tax return.\nWe turn now to the law applicable to the recited facts. In American Homestead Ins. Co. v. Denny, 238 Ark. 749, 384 S.W. 2d 492 (1964), we reiterated:\n\u2018It is the duty of the Courts to construe the language [in an insurance contract] used by the parties and such construction is performed by considering the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties have used as they are taken and understood in their plain ordinary and popular sense.\u201d\nIn the case at bar the policy provision is referred to by the courts as a restricted \u201cdrive other cars\u201d clause which is found in liability insurance policies. It does not appear that we have previously construed this particular provision. Here, as indicated, we must determine if there is any substantial evidence that appellee\u2019s daughter was not a member of his \u201chousehold.\u201d If she was a member, then the policy excludes coverage. We have had occasion to interpret the term \u201chousehold\u201d in a theft insurance policy which excluded coverage if it was found that the plaintiff\u2019s son, serving in the military, was not a \u201chousehold\u201d member. In affirming a finding that he was a member, we said in Central Manufacturer\u2019s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 213 Ark. 9, 209 S.W. 2d 102 (1948), in pertinent part:\nWe think the word \u2018household\u2019 as used in this section of the policy, supra, meant domicile, residence or place of abode. \u2018Household\u2019 is defined in Bouvier\u2019s Law Dictionary, Rawle\u2019s Third Revision, vol. 2., page 1462, as follows: \u2018Those who dwell under the same roof and constitute a family.\u2019\nIn Lontkowski v. Ignarski, 95 N.W. 2d 230 (Wis. 1959), the court defined the word \u201chousehold\u201d as follows:\n\u2018Household\u2019 is defined by Webster as \u2018those who dwell under the same roof and constitute a family.\u2019 That definition corresponds with the common and approved usage of the term and is supported by judicial authority. \u2018Persons who dweli together as a family constitute a household. \u2019\nSee also Fleming v. Traveler\u2019s Ins., 39 So. 2d 885 (Miss. 1949); Aler v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 92 F. Supp. 620 (D. Maryland 1950); Leteff v. Maryland Casualty Co., 91 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 1956); Simon v. Milwaukee Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., 115 N.W. 2d 40 (Wis. 1962); Giese v. Karstedt, 141 N.W. 2d 886 (Wis. 1966); Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 58 N.W. 2d 855 (Minn. 1953); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Preston, 253 So. 2d 4 (Ala. 1971). The appellee has cited us no authority to the contrary.\nIn Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Preston, supra, the insured\u2019s daughter lived with her parents during the time her husband was overseas in the armed service. Her father was involved in a collision while driving her and her husband\u2019s car. The court addressed itself to the question as to \u201cwhether Carol [the daughter] was a resident of Preston\u2019s [the father] household at the time of the collision within the exclusion provision of his policies with the insurer.\u201d In holding that she was a resident of the insured\u2019s household at the time of the collision within the meaning of the policy and denying coverage, the court said:\nUnder the undisputed facts, Carol came to \u2018stay\u2019 with her parents while her husband was overseas. While she did not intend to stay permanently with her parents, nevertheless her stay was to extend for an indefinite time. She was not a mere temporary visitor. Actually, she did remain in her parents\u2019 home for over a year. It was during this time that Mr. Preston had the collision while driving the Dodge automobile. We hold that under the undisputed facts the conclusion is dictated that Carol was residing in her father\u2019s home at the time of the collision. The language of the policy here involved is not legally ambiguous. Such language excludes liability of the insurer under the facts shown.\nThe rationale expressed there is applicable in the case at bar.\nThe justification of the exclusionary clause here, which is characterized as the \u201cdrive other cars\u201d provision, is well stated in Fleming v. Traveler\u2019s Ins., supra:\nWe are dealing with a contract of insurance. We must inquire what the parties thereto meant. Practical consideration must be given play, interpreted in the light of the purpose of the policy provision. This provision has repeatedly held to reveal an obvious purpose to avoid a multiple coverage of several vehicles owned by members of the same family, who, by their close intimacy may be expected to use the car of each other without hindrance and without permission, thus increasing the liability of the insurer who has a right to expect each owner to contract for his own coverage.\nAppeMee argues that the exclusion clause here is ambiguous and should, therefore, be construed most strongly against the insurer. Life and Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. Gilkey, 255 Ark. 1060, 505 S.W. 2d 200 (1974). We are of the view that the exclusionary provision of the policy is clear and legally unambiguous. It is unnecessary to resort to rules of construction in order to ascertain the meaning of an insurance policy when no ambiguity exists. McKinnon, Admx. v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 232 Ark. 282, 335 S.W. 2d 709 (1960). The terms of an insurance contract are not to be rewritten under the rule of strict construction against the company issuing it so as to bind the insurer to a risk which is plainly excluded and for which it was not paid.\nIn the case at bar, we hold that the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the appellee, is not substantially sufficient to support the jury\u2019s finding that appellee\u2019s daughter was not a member of his household at the time he borrowed and was driving her automobile.\nReversed and dismissed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Frank Holt, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hardin, Jesson & Dawson, for appellant.", "Turner & Clift and Tates & Tates, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. Forrest W. WILLIAMS\n76-68\n543 S.W. 2d 467\nOpinion delivered November 15, 1976\nHardin, Jesson & Dawson, for appellant.\nTurner & Clift and Tates & Tates, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0659-01", "first_page_order": 689, "last_page_order": 694 }