{
  "id": 1616722,
  "name": "BANK of GLENWOOD v. ARKANSAS STATE BANKING BOARD et al",
  "name_abbreviation": "Bank of Glenwood v. Arkansas State Banking Board",
  "decision_date": "1976-11-22",
  "docket_number": "76-157",
  "first_page": "677",
  "last_page": "681",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "260 Ark. 677"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "543 S.W.2d 761"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "251 Ark. 395",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1633280
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/251/0395-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.908,
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    "simhash": "1:da87448aef48ece5",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:47:10.616532+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Byrd, J., not participating.",
      "Jones, J., dissents."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "BANK of GLENWOOD v. ARKANSAS STATE BANKING BOARD et al"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nIn July of 1975 an application was filed with the State Bank Commissioner for a charter for a new bank, to be named Caddo State Bank and to be located in the city of Glenwood. The application was resisted by the Bank of Glenwood, the only bank in the city. After the submission of extensive proof by both parties the State Banking Board entered an order granting the application upon the basis of detailed findings of fact. The Board\u2019s action was sustained by the circuit court. Four points for reversal are argued here.\nWe find no merit in the appellant\u2019s first argument, that the Bank Commissioner arbitrarily and capriciously limited the appellant\u2019s pre-hearing discovery. To begin with, the appellant succeeded in obtaining access to almost everything that it sought to examine. It was particularly interested in loans made by two escrow banks to subscribers to stock in the proposed bank. Eventually all those subscribers agreed to the appellant\u2019s request to see their individual files. There remained one master filed to which the appellant was at first denied access. The Bank Commissioner later ruled, we think correctly, that certain information in that file, with respect to proposed officers of the new bank, was confidential, and that the release of certain other data would give the Bank of Glenwood an unfair competitive advantage over the new bank. The Commissioner directed that information pertinent to those two matters be removed from the file, with the remaining contents of the file being made available to the appellant. We are not convinced either that the Commissioner created a \u201cbanker\u2019s privilege,\u201d as the appellant argues, or that any information relevant to the basic application was arbitrarily or capriciously withheld. No abuse of discretion is shown.\nThe appellant also argues that the limitation upon discovery prevented its attorney from adequately preparing to cross-examine an adverse expert witness, James Becknell. Rickett v. Hayes, 251 Ark. 395, 473 S.W. 2d 446 (1971). It is asserted that Becknell testified that \u201cthe bank would be economically feasible and would show a profit after two years.\u201d It is then asserted that Becknell\u2019s projections were based upon expense figures supplied by Twin City Bank and that the appellant\u2019s inability to obtain those figures \u201cseverely restricted appellant\u2019s ability to cross-examine\u201d Becknell.\nThe proof simply does not sustain this argument. If Becknell made any projections involving expenses over a two-year period or any other period, it must have been in a discovery deposition that is not in the record before us. In actuality, BecknelPs testimony had to do with such matters as population growth in the Glenwood area, the influx of new business enterprises, dissatisfaction on the part of some people with the Bank of Glenwood, the \u201cleakage\u201d of potential deposits from the Glenwood area, and similar statistics that were offered to buttress BecknelPs conclusion that the overall situation would support another bank in Glenwood. BecknelPs direct examination included no projections about the new bank\u2019s income or expenses, nor was he cross-examined on that subject. Moreover, the Board relied primarily upon the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation\u2019s computations in finding that the proposed bank\u2019s future earning prospects were favorable. We find no basis in the record for the appellant\u2019s argument that its ability to cross-examine Becknell was restricted.\nAs its second point for reversal the appellant argues that the Bank Commissioner acted unlawfully in assuming the supervision and enforcement of the Arkansas Securities Act with respect to the stock in the proposed bank. If so, the only persons who might be hurt would be the subscribers to the stock. We cannot see how the appellant has any standing to complain about this matter, even if it be assumed that its assertions are correct.\nThirdly, the appellant argues that the circuit court denied the appellant\u2019s constitutional and statutory right to judicial review. This argument is based upon Section 13 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which contains this provision: \u201cThe [circuit] court shall, upon request, hear oral argument and receive written briefs.\u201d Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 5-713 (g) (Repl. 1976).\nPerhaps the appellant has a basis for complaint, but we are unwilling to remand the cause upon this ground. At the outset, we are not certain that the point was brought to the trial court\u2019s attention. The appellant first filed in the circuit court its \u201cNotice of Appeal and Petition for Judicial Review,\u201d a two-page typewritten pleading. The prayer for relief asked the court to hear additional evidence, to hear oral argument and receive written briefs, and to reverse the decision of the Board. After several other pleadings had been filed by the parties the court entered its order, \u201cbeing well and sufficiently advised,\u201d affirming the action of the Board. There is no indication that any request for oral argument or for the submission of briefs was actually presented to the court or that any such objection was made after the entry of the court\u2019s order, if we assume that it was made without notice to counsel. In the absence of any such request or objection, we are unwilling to say that the court should have invited oral argument or written briefs merely because those matters were included in the appellant\u2019s first pleading. (We note that no complaint is made about the trial court\u2019s failure to hear additional evidence, which was also mentioned in the same pleading.) Moreover, the appellant has had the opportunity to file written briefs and to ask for oral argument in our court. We do not imply that in no instance would we remand a case to the circuit court upon the ground now argued, but that action is not appropriate here.\nThe appellant\u2019s final contention is that the Board\u2019s decision to grant the new charter is not supported by substantial evidence. We find no merit in this contention, especially in the light of the supplemental abstract of the record, submitted by counsel for the applicants. The Board made unusually detailed and specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. We are convinced that the applicants\u2019 testimony, especially that of H. J. Lig\u00f3n, John E. Cook, and Becknell, supports the Board\u2019s decision. Nothing would be accomplished by a narration of the evidence.\nAffirmed.\nByrd, J., not participating.\nJones, J., dissents.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice."
      },
      {
        "text": "John A. Fogleman, Justice,\ndissenting to denial of petition for rehearing. I would grant the petition for rehearing because of denial of discovery of Twin City Bank\u2019s calculation of estimated operating expenses.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "John A. Fogleman, Justice,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, for appellant.",
      "Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by: Fred Frawley, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Harry E. Meek, for appellees.",
      "Stubblefield & Matthews, for Intervenor, Caddo State Bank."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BANK of GLENWOOD v. ARKANSAS STATE BANKING BOARD et al\n76-157\n543 S.W. 2d 761\nOpinion delivered November 22, 1976 (In Banc)\n[Rehearing denied December 20, 1976.]\nWright, Lindsey & Jennings, for appellant.\nJim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by: Fred Frawley, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Harry E. Meek, for appellees.\nStubblefield & Matthews, for Intervenor, Caddo State Bank."
  },
  "file_name": "0677-01",
  "first_page_order": 707,
  "last_page_order": 711
}