{
  "id": 1678971,
  "name": "CITY OF NORTH LITTLE ROCK v. Monte MONTGOMERY",
  "name_abbreviation": "City of North Little Rock v. Montgomery",
  "decision_date": "1977-01-31",
  "docket_number": "76-229",
  "first_page": "16",
  "last_page": "19",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "261 Ark. 16"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "546 S.W.2d 154"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "254 Ark. 847",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1624116
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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      ]
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    {
      "cite": "239 Ark. 367",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1730866
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1965,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/239/0367-01"
      ]
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:40:25.982646+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "We agree: Harris, C.J., and George Rose Smith, and Byrd, JJ."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "CITY OF NORTH LITTLE ROCK v. Monte MONTGOMERY"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Frank Holt, Justice.\nAppellee was indefinitely suspended without pay by the chief of police from his position as a sergeant with the North Little Rock Police Department pending an investigation into certain criminal offenses involving appellee. The commission upheld the appellee\u2019s suspension and he appealed to the circuit court seeking to recover his loss of wages from the date of his suspension until his resignation approximately eleven months later. The record before us does not reflect the ultimate disposition of the investigation. The court limited the appellee\u2019s suspension to thirty days without pay on the basis that Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 19-1603 (Repl. 1968) prohibits a suspension without pay in excess of that time period. The court then rendered judgment for appellee in the amount of his back pay less the offsets from appellee\u2019s pay during his thirty day suspension and his outside earnings during the entire suspension. For reversal appellant contends that the court erred in its interpretation of the statute. It is argued that the statute should be \u201cliberally\u201d construed to permit a longer suspension than thirty days \u201cwhere exigent circumstances so demand,\u201d and, further, the commission\u2019s power to discharge an employee impliedly gives it the incidental power to suspend for more than thirty days.\n\u00a7 19-1603 provides:\nRules and regulations. \u2014 The Board of Civil Service Commissioners herein provided shall prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations governing the fire and police departments of their respective cities, and said rules and regulations shall have the same force and effect of law. ****\nThese rules shall provide: ****\n10th. For suspension for not longer than 30 days ****\nThe Commission shall adopt such rules not inconsistent with the act for the necessary enforcement of the act.\nIt appears that the appellart\u2019s Civil Service and Police Department Rules also expressly limit a suspension of an officer or fireman to a definite period of thirty days as one form of disciplinary action.\nEven so, appellant argues that exigent circumstances existed here since there was a pending invesitgation, in which appellee failed to properly assist and cooperate, with reference to appellee\u2019s alleged criminal misconduct involving burglary and attempted rape. Therefore, a liberal construction of the statute and rules justified the indefinite suspension without pay. Appellant points out that its Civil Service Rules provide that \u201cit shall be the duty of the authorities to take such action as the circumstances may warrant to maintain the standards of effective service.\u201d The Police Department Rules and Regulations are of similar tenor. However, these rules as to Civil Service employees are subject to the restrictions imposed by the legislature. \u00a7\u00a7 19-1603 and 19-1604.\nWe have held that \u201c[T]he meaning of a statute must be determined from the natural and obvious import of the language used by the legislature without resorting to subtle and forced construction for the purpose of limiting or extending the meaning. **** It is our duty to construe a legislative enactment just as it reads.\u201d Black v. Cockrill, Judge, 239 Ark. 367, 389 S.W. 2d 881 (1965). We have also said \u201c[I]n construing statutes in the absence of any indication of a different legislative intent, we give words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language.\u201d Phillips Petroleum v. Heath, 254 Ark. 847, 497 S.W. 2d 30 (1973).\nIn the case at bar the legislature, in plain and ordinary words, expressly limited a suspension of a policeman or fireman to a period of thirty days and then directed the appellant \u201c[t]o adopt such rules not inconsistent with the act.\u201d Therefore, the trial court was correct in its interpretation of the act. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the obvious and unambiguous intent of the legislature. That forum and not the courts is the proper place to urge a change in this legislative enactment.\nAppellant finally contends that the court\u2019s judgment was a summary judgment which was improper \u201cas there was a genuine issue of material fact in regard to any set-off due to the city.\u201d We cannot agree. The trial court awarded appellee judgment for the wages lost during the entire suspension period less the outside income he had earned and the sum of his salary for one month. The latter amount represents the thirty day suspension which was found to be justified by the court. See Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 19-1605.1 (Repl. 1968). In response to appellee\u2019s motion for a summary judgment, appellant replied that the issues of fact in appellee\u2019s affidavit were uncontroverted except as to whether appellee\u2019s indefinite suspension was justified. We have just said, as a matter of law, that the statute forbids it. The appellant made no request for any offset to which it might have been entitled and neither party requested permission to present additional evidence to the court in the de novo proceeding.\nAffirmed.\nWe agree: Harris, C.J., and George Rose Smith, and Byrd, JJ.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Frank Holt, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Sam Hilburn, City Atty., for appellant.",
      "Hugh F. Spinks, Jr., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CITY OF NORTH LITTLE ROCK v. Monte MONTGOMERY\n76-229\n546 S.W. 2d 154\nOpinion delivered January 31, 1977\n(Division I)\nSam Hilburn, City Atty., for appellant.\nHugh F. Spinks, Jr., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0016-01",
  "first_page_order": 42,
  "last_page_order": 45
}