{ "id": 1678960, "name": "Lynn BUHR v. ARKANSAS STATE BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC EXAMINERS", "name_abbreviation": "Buhr v. Arkansas State Board of Chiropractic Examiners", "decision_date": "1977-03-21", "docket_number": "76-352", "first_page": "319", "last_page": "323", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "261 Ark. 319" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "547 S.W.2d 762" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "13 Ariz. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 1551611 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/13/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.W. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 Ark. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1421867 ], "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/190/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Kan. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 493590 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/136/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 S.W. 544", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1910, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ark. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1543582 ], "year": 1910, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/95/0511-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 373, "char_count": 5297, "ocr_confidence": 0.859, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.62333923785566e-08, "percentile": 0.4506558104352802 }, "sha256": "ab9ae476c694bb294132242436425b7379a6ba18863094093e7eeae7f0585c9c", "simhash": "1:0d660633e714da7a", "word_count": 860 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:40:25.982646+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Lynn BUHR v. ARKANSAS STATE BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC EXAMINERS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Frank Holt, Justice.\nIn a hearing before the Arkansas State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, appellant was found guilty of violating Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 72-441 (a) (2), (6) and (8) (Supp. 1975), and his license to practice was suspended for a period of six months. The circuit court affirmed. For reversal appellant asserts that \u201cArkansas Statute Annotated \u00a7 72-419, setting forth the qualifications of the members of the Arkansas State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, is unconstitutional as it creates a Board which does not fairly represent the profession of chiropractics and suspension of a license by such a Board constitutes a denial of due process of law.\u201d\nThe power and authority given a Board to exclude from practice an incompetent or unworthy person is a recognized power of the state. \u201cThe constitutionality of such laws, as a valid exercise of the police power, has often been sustained, and indeed rarely questioned.\u201d State Medical Board v. McCary, 95 Ark. 511, 130 S.W. 544 (1910). Here the statute, in addition to certain residency and oath provisions, requires that each member of the Board be a member in good standing with the Arkansas Chiropractic Association, regularly licensed and practicing for at least five years and a graduate of a reputable school or college of chiropractic, with the added provision that no two members of the five member Board be graduates of the same school. The issue raised in appellant\u2019s motion for dismissal and argued here is that the graduates of the Palmer College of Chiropractic (of which appellant is a graduate) are not given equal representation on the five member Board. It is insisted that since 77 (55.4%) of the 148 licensed chiropractors in Arkansas are Palmer College graduates, they are not equally represented on the Board.\nThe record reflects that one of the five member Board, which conducted the hearing, is a graduate of the Palmer College. The licensed chiropractors in the state are graduates of 11 different schools. The Board, created by the legislature, is the sole authority for matters of licensing and revocation of license, \u00a7 77-441 (a). Any infringement of appellant\u2019s rights is preserved through the right of appeal from the Board\u2019s findings to the circuit court. \u00a7 77-441 (b). We hold appellant has not demonstrated any bias or prejudice or a denial of due process of law based upon the assertion that the composition of the Board results in unequal treatment to him as a Palmer College graduate.\nAppellant also argues that the makeup of the Board is not fairly representative of the entire profession (148 members) and, further, there is a possibility of pecuniary gain by the Board and other members of his profession as a result of the suspension of his license. It appears these issues were not raised in his motion to dismiss and are asserted for the first time on appeal. Consequently, we cannot consider them. Further, it appears that appellant is a member of the association and, therefore, is without standing to raise the issue that the Board is unrepresentative of the non-members (approximately one-fourth) of the profession.\nAppellant next contends that \u00a7 72-441 (a) (2), (6) and (8) is unconstitutional because the terms \u201cgross immorality\u201d and \u201cunprofessional conduct\u201d are void for vagueness. We cannot agree. Proof was adduced that appellant and his family, accompanied by a fifteen year old babysitter, were in Little Rock for the annual Arkansas Chiropractic Association convention. The babysitter and her family were patients of his. She was sleeping in the same motel room with him and his family. After retiring one evening, appellant said he was awakened by the young girl\u2019s apparent discomfort and he administered a needed chiropractic adjustment. According to her, however, appellant lay down in the bed with her and made certain sexual advances. The Board found that appellant attempted to engage in sexual intercourse with her without her consent.\nThe term \u201cgross immorality\u201d is commonly interpreted by courts as being equivalent to and coextensive with the term \u201cmoral turpitude.\u201d Brown v. Hassig, 136 Kan. 384, 15 P. 2d 401 (1932); and 61 Am. Jur. 2d, Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers \u00a7 60. The term \u201cmoral turpitude\u201d has been held to be consitutional when used in a statute pertaining to the revocation of a physician\u2019s license. State Medical Board v. Rodgers, 190 Ark. 266, 79 S.W. 2d 83 (1935). The term \u201cgrossly immoral or unprofessional conduct\u201d does not render a statute void for uncertainty since those terms are susceptible to a \u201ccommon\u201d understanding and \u201cgeneral opinion.\u201d Alton v. Board of Medical Examiners, 13 Ariz. 354, 114 Pac. 962 (1911); see also Ballentine, Law Dictionary 2d (1948). Here we hold the terms \u201cgross immorality\u201d and \u201cunprofessional conduct\u201d are readily susceptible to a common understanding especially when applied to this factual situation by members of the profession itself. The statute here is reasonably necessary in the public interest and to assure competency in the profession.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Frank Holt, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Niblock & Odom, for appellant.", "Bill Clinton, Atty. Gen., by: Dave Greenbaum and Peggy O\u2019Neal, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Lynn BUHR v. ARKANSAS STATE BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC EXAMINERS\n76-352\n547 S.W. 2d 762\nOpinion delivered March 21, 1977\n(In Banc)\nNiblock & Odom, for appellant.\nBill Clinton, Atty. Gen., by: Dave Greenbaum and Peggy O\u2019Neal, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0319-01", "first_page_order": 361, "last_page_order": 365 }