{ "id": 1678865, "name": "OZARK SUPPLY COMPANY v. Owen GLASS", "name_abbreviation": "Ozark Supply Co. v. Glass", "decision_date": "1977-06-06", "docket_number": "76-416", "first_page": "750", "last_page": "755", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "261 Ark. 750" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "552 S.W.2d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "249 Ark. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8719277 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/249/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "2502 F, 2506", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 Ark. 799", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724234 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/243/0799-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 Ark. 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1660043 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/220/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 S.W. 2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ark. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1399933 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/176/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 S.W. 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ark. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907324 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/64/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 S.W. 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ark. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1578663 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/131/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ark. 995", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8726234 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/226/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 Ark. 919", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1700074 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/230/0919-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ark. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1684698 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/235/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ark. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1723975 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/241/0452-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 527, "char_count": 8781, "ocr_confidence": 0.867, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4001579565492095e-07, "percentile": 0.7988203173235197 }, "sha256": "7202b3ba4ed9285292074de453c8ecc9829a190a3e625dffb2aade0c2560a46f", "simhash": "1:59c62c6e6e29d350", "word_count": 1515 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:40:25.982646+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "We agree. Harris, C.J., and Byrd and Hickman, JJ." ], "parties": [ "OZARK SUPPLY COMPANY v. Owen GLASS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John A. Fogleman, Justice.\nAppellant Ozark Supply Company sued Dr. Sam Machara, Dr. John Ferguson and appellee Owen Glass, alleging that they, as partners in a general partnership known as Circle T. Cattle Company of Perryville, Arkansas were indebted to appellant for purchases of veterinary supplies made by appellee Glass under authority given him by the other partners. Appellant also alleged that it was an Arkansas corporation with its principal place of business in Benton County; and that Machara was a resident of Los Angeles, California, who had been in Arkansas on numerous occasions for the purpose of raising cattle for commercial purposes, and had expressly assented to the purchase of supplies of the kind described in appellant\u2019s invoices for carrying out partnership purposes. Appellant further alleged that Dr. Ferguson was a resident of Bald Knob, Arkansas and that Owen Glass was a resident of Perryville, Arkansas. Machara and Ferguson filed answer, in which they admitted that Maehara was a resident of California, stated their belief that Owen Glass was a resident of Perry County, Arkansas, and denied that Ferguson was a resident of Arkansas, alleging that he, too, was a resident of California. Appellee Glass filed a motion to quash the summons issued for him and served on him in Perry County, Arkansas. This motion was granted on the ground that venue of the action as to Glass was not properly laid in Benton County, because none of the defendants resided in or were served with process in that county. We agree and affirm.\nAppellant relies upon Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-615 (Repl. 1962) and Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-2501 et seq (Supp. 1975), the Uniform Interstate and International Procedures Act, and argues that \u201csummoned\u201d in Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-615 includes and extends to extrastate service of process to the extent that venue is proper in the county from which the process issued under the \u201clong-arm\u201d act because the party so summoned is summoned in that county. Appellee disagrees and relies upon Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-613 (Repl. 1962) as the basic venue statute, requiring actions on contracts to be brought in a county in which a defendant resides or is summoned, as reinforced by Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-615 (Repl. 1962), citing International Harvester Co. v. Brown, 241 Ark. 452, 408 S.W. 2d 504.\nThe underlying policy as to venue in this state is that every defendant should be liable to suit only in the county of his residence or place of business, unless for other policy reasons there are statutes to the contrary. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Troutt, 235 Ark. 238, 357 S.W. 2d 507. This basic policy has always been considered as primary in construction of venue statutes, and properly so, unless other statutes are clearly in conflict with that basic policy. The convenience of the defendant against whom a judgment may be rendered is usually considered more important than the convenience of the plaintiff. See, Langley, Grounds for Venue in Arkansas \u2014 A Survey, 25 Ark. Law Rev. 468, 479 (1971).\nAppellant contends, however, that when we consider Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 27-619, 620 (Supp. 1975) permitting contract actions against a non-resident of this state or a foreign corporation to be brought in the county of the plaintiff\u2019s residence at the time the cause of action arose, we must conclude that venue was properly laid as to Glass. We must disagree, however, with appellant\u2019s contention that \u201clong-arm\u201d service on a non-resident of the state is sufficient to fix venue, so as to permit the \u201cdragging\u201d of a resident of one county to another to defend that action. It is quite true that the \u201clong-arm\u201d statute may affect venue because of its provisions relating to jurisdiction and service of process. See Langley, supra, 25 Ark. Law Rev. at 484. But it is not a statute which controls venue. It is basically a statute giving jurisdiction to local courts in local causes of action, even though the defendant is not subject to service of process locally. Leflar, Conflict of Law, Arkansas, 18 Ark. Law Rev. 135, 136 (1964); Langley, supra, 25 Ark. Law Rev. at 484. In this connection, we must remember that jurisdiction and venue are two separate and distinct concepts, although they are sufficiently interrelated to cause some confusion. Langley, supra, at 469, 471; Gland-O-Lac Co. v. Creekmore, 230 Ark. 919, 327 S.W. 2d 558. See also, Arkansas State Racing Commission v. Southland Racing Corp., 226 Ark. 995, 295 S.W. 2d 617. The confusion usually arises when venue is erroneously equated with jurisdiction of the person. Jurisdiction of the person is the power of the court to hear and determine the subject matter of a controversy between the parties to a suit, i.e., to adjudicate or exercise judicial power over them. Lamb & Rhodes v. Howton, 131 Ark. 211, 198 S.W. 521. It is the power to render a personal judgment in a particular case or to subject the parties to the court\u2019s decisions and rulings. 21 C.J.S. Courts \u00a7 15, p. 32; Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 992. It is based upon appearance of the person or the issuance and service or proper process upon him in the manner required by law. 1 Bouvier\u2019s Law Dictionary, Lawle\u2019s Third Ed., p. 1761; Stevenson v. Christie, 64 Ark. 72, 42 S.W. 418; Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Gladish, 176 Ark. 267, 2 S.W. 2d 696; Healey & Roth v. Huie, 220 Ark. 16, 245 S.W. 2d 813; 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts \u00a7 106, p. 465.\nThe fact that our \u201clong-arm\u201d statute is basically a jurisdiction-giving statute rather than a venue-fixing one is clearly demonstrated by the provision that the court in which the action is filed has broad powers under the forum non conveniens provision of the act, [Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-2502 E (Supp. 1975); Bowsher v. Digby, 243 Ark. 799, 422 S.W. 2d 671] and in the fact that it is a cumulative provision for jurisdiction. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 27-2502 F, 2506 (Supp. 1975). It is also obvious that there was no intention to make the county from which the summons issues, in an action in which jurisdiction is based on the act, the county of service. Sec. 27-2502 D provides that service may be made outside the state. We have said that the statute was designed to authorize extrastate service of process. International Harvester Co. v. Hendrickson Mfg. Co., 249 Ark. 298, 459 S.W. 2d 62.\nWe must then look to Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 27-619, 620 (Act 142 of 1973) for possible venue in Benton County. If Maehara and Ferguson were the only defendants in the case, venue could be in Benton County under the allegations of the complaint and the provisions of the act. Although this statute provides \u201ccumulative\u201d venue, that venue is limited by the language that \u201cthis Act shall in no way repeal or modify any other existing venue statute.\u201d Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-620. In order for the act to have the effect given it by appellant, it would modify Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 27-613 and 27-615. We would then be compelled to read \u00a7 27-613 as if it said, \u201cEvery other action, except for contract actions against a nonresident of this state or a foreign corporation, may be brought in any county in which the defendant or one of several defendants, resides, or is summoned;\u201d or \u00a7 27-615 would have to be modified to read \u201cWhere any action embraced in \u00a7 96 (\u00a7 27-613) is against several defendants, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to judgment on the service of summons in another county than that in which the action is brought, where no one of the defendants who reside in Arkansas is summoned in that county, or resided therein at the commencement of the action ...\u201d \u201cIssuance of summons\u201d and \u201cservice of summons\u201d are by no means synonymous.\nBasic policy reasons can be found for the exceptions from \u201cevery other action\u201d in other venue statutes. For, e.g., the reasons for requiring actions pertaining to real property to be brought in the county in which it is located are obvious. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-601 (Repl. 1962). The same may be said of the requirement that certain actions be brought in the county in which the seat of government is situated. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-603 (Repl. 1962). No basis for an exception to the overriding policy as to venue in this situation is apparent here.\nWe are of the firm opinion that the General Assembly would have spoken in language clear enough to leave no doubt about its intention to override the state\u2019s primary policy in fixing venue, if it had intended to do so. We read nothing in any of the acts relied upon by appellants to indicate that intention.\nThe judgment is affirmed.\nWe agree. Harris, C.J., and Byrd and Hickman, JJ.", "type": "majority", "author": "John A. Fogleman, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Adams & Wilson, by: Douglas L. Wilson, for appellant.", "Laster & Lane, by: James F. Lane, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "OZARK SUPPLY COMPANY v. Owen GLASS\n76-416\n552 S.W. 2d 1\nOpinion delivered June 6, 1977\n(Division II)\nAdams & Wilson, by: Douglas L. Wilson, for appellant.\nLaster & Lane, by: James F. Lane, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0750-01", "first_page_order": 790, "last_page_order": 795 }