{ "id": 1678877, "name": "Patricia BAKRI v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Bakri v. State", "decision_date": "1977-06-06", "docket_number": "CR 77-14", "first_page": "765", "last_page": "768", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "261 Ark. 765" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "551 S.W.2d 215" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "11 Ark. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8727909 ], "year": 1849, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/11/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.W. 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ark. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1568153 ], "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/137/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 Ark. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718029 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/244/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 Ark. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1619047 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/259/0107-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 364, "char_count": 5167, "ocr_confidence": 0.875, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.380125665320789e-08, "percentile": 0.3921570330934352 }, "sha256": "48f2920fb0f1734bfaa32adcb134d76d33fb194df6477f1f220ff5237fddaa46", "simhash": "1:98ca69072b45d1b8", "word_count": 874 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:40:25.982646+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "We agree: Harris, C.J., and Fogleman and Roy, JJ.", "Hickman, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "Patricia BAKRI v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Frank Holt, Justice.\nA jury convicted appellant of the offense of false pretense (Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1901 [Repl. 1964]) and assessed her punishment at one year\u2019s imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Appellant first contends, through court appointed counsel, that she should have been discharged for failure to bring her to trial within three terms of court following her arrest. Appellant was arrested on May 19, 1975, and subsequently charged by information. From the date of arrest until trial, she was at liberty on bail. The terms of the Sebastian County Circuit Court, Fort Smith District, are the first Monday in February, June and October. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 22-310 (Supp. 1975). The third full term of court following appellant\u2019s arrest would be the February 1976 term which ended on June 7, 1976. Appellant was tried on June 3 and 4, 1976. This is within the third full term of court whether measured from the date of arrest or the subsequent information and, therefore, complies with Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 43-1709 (Repl. 1964). State v. Knight, 259 Ark. 107, 533 S.W. 2d 488 (1976). See also Ark. Crim. Proc., Rule 28 (1976) (Act 280 of 1975). That rule changed Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 43-1709 (Repl. 1964) by providing the time for trial commences to run from the date of arrest and not from the filing of the information.\nAppellant next contends that \u201cthe State failed to make a submissible case for the jury in that the only false representation alleged and proved \u2014 that the victim \u2018would be exclusive in this area\u2019 \u2014 related solely to the future and was not a misrepresentation of an existing fact or past event.\u201d It is well settled that to constitute false pretense within the meaning of the statute (\u00a7 41-1901), the misrepresentation must be of some past or existing fact and not a promise of something to occur in the future. Ross v. State, 244 Ark. 103, 424 S.W. 2d 168 (1968); Conner v. State, 137 Ark. 123, 206 S.W. 747 (1918); and McKenzie v. The State, 11 Ark. 594 (1849).\nHere the information charged that the prosecuting witness was induced to pay money in excess of $35 ($11,985) to the appellant by her false representation of an existing fact. The pertinent part of the bill of particulars asserts that the appellant created \u201ca false impression as to the area and exclusivity of the contract. ...\u201d Appellant was a sales representative of a nonresident corporation, MRM Enterprises, Inc. The thrust of the state\u2019s argument is that sufficient proof was adduced that appellant falsely representated an existing fact by selling the prosecuting witness, Parker, an \u201cexclusive\u201d distributorship of Kodak products for a certain area. She mailed Parker\u2019s application along with two others to her employer which accepted all of them as distributors. Parker admitted that appellant told him, in taking his application and check, \u201cthat I would be exclusive in this area of Fort Smith,\u201d and he knew that the proposed purchase agreement was \u201cvalid only upon a signature of an officer of MRM Enterprises, Inc.\u201d He was also aware that he was \u201capplying for a distributorship which might or might not be accepted.\u201d\nIn Conner v. State, supra, we said: \u201cA false representation as an inducement to pay money that something thereafter was to be or was not to be done is not a false pretense. \u201d Here, when all of the evidence is viewed most favorably to the state, we must hold that no submissible issue was presented to the jury as to false representation of a past or existing fact.\nReversed and dismissed.\nWe agree: Harris, C.J., and Fogleman and Roy, JJ.\nHickman, J., dissents.\nThis section is now superseded by Ark. Crim. Code \u00a7 41-2203 (1976).", "type": "majority", "author": "Frank Holt, Justice." }, { "text": "Darrell Hickman, Justice,\ndissenting.\nPatricia Bakri was charged with obtaining $11,985 from Ray Parker by means of false pretense. The state introduced evidence that it was represented to Mr. Parker that he would have an exclusive distributorship for Fort Smith and with that distributorship certain marketing advantages. According to the evidence, Bakri promised two others the same thing at the same time.\nThe majority are holding that because an exclusive dealership was merely promised, there can be no violation of the criminal law of false pretense. It was a matter for the jury to decide whether or not Bakri was guilty of false pretenses. The state made a case and the conviction should be permitted to stand.\nThis was nothing more than a pure and simple con game and the law was designed to protect individuals from this type of larceny. Legal distinctions made by the majority are too fine. Parker was promised an exclusive dealership in the Fort Smith area. At the same time his money was taken, two other individuals paid money for exclusive distributorships in the same area That is pretty strong evidence that the promise of an exclusive distributorship was false.\nI would affirm the judgment of the lower court.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Darrell Hickman, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Rosecan, Kimbrell & Witzel, by: Alan G. Kimbrell, St. Louis, and Sam Goodkin, for appellant.", "Bill Clinton, Atty. Gen., by: Joseph H. Purvis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Patricia BAKRI v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 77-14\n551 S.W. 2d 215\nOpinion delivered June 6, 1977\n(In Banc)\nRosecan, Kimbrell & Witzel, by: Alan G. Kimbrell, St. Louis, and Sam Goodkin, for appellant.\nBill Clinton, Atty. Gen., by: Joseph H. Purvis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0765-01", "first_page_order": 805, "last_page_order": 808 }