{
  "id": 1675873,
  "name": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. William LaSAGE",
  "name_abbreviation": "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. LaSage",
  "decision_date": "1978-01-09",
  "docket_number": "77-297",
  "first_page": "631",
  "last_page": "634",
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      "cite": "262 Ark. 631"
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      "cite": "559 S.W.2d 702"
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      "cite": "237 Mo. App. 1128",
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      "reporter": "Mo. App.",
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      "cite": "170 A. 2d 571",
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      "reporter": "A.2d",
      "year": 1961,
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    {
      "cite": "403 Penn. 603",
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      "reporter": "Penn.",
      "year": 1961,
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    {
      "cite": "374 S.W. 2d 626",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:27:42.068781+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "We agree: Harris, C.J., and Fogleman and Howard, JJ-"
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. William LaSAGE"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Conley Byrd, Justice.\nThe uninsured motorist policy issued by appellant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company limits coverage to a hit and run motor vehicle \u201cwhich causes bodily injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of such vehicle with the insured or with a vehicle which the insured is occupying.\u201d The trial court disagreed with the appellant\u2019s contention that this limited coverage to those situations in which the physical contact was a proximate cause of the injuries and entered a judgment in favor of appellee William LaSage in the amount of $7,500 together with the 12% penalty and a $1500 attorney\u2019s fee. For reversal appellant contends there is no substantial evidence that the physical contact with the hit and run motor vehicle was a proximate cause of appellee\u2019s injuries.\nThe facts giving rise to this litigation show that LaSage was driving his automobile along interstate 30 near the Geyer Springs exit in Little Rock, Arkansas, when he was struck by a hit and run vehicle. When the vehicle failed to stop LaSage gave chase for the purpose of attracting the attention of the police and to identify the license number on the hit and run vehicle. The chase ended in the 1300 block on Hilaro Springs Road when the hit and run vehicle suddenly stopped in the center of the road in such position as to force LaSage to either strike it or run into the ditch. LaSage took the option of going into the ditch and was injured when his vehicle struck a culvert.\nAppellant, in reliance upon some language lifted out of Springer v. Government Employee\u2019s Insurance Company, 311 Southern 2nd, 36 (Louisiana Appeal, 1975), and Allstate Insurance Company v. Basore, (Missouri Appeals, 1963) 374 S.W. 2d 626, argues that in construing the hit and run provisions in uninsured motorist policies the courts in upholding the physical contact requirement have held that such contact must be a proximate cause of the plaintiff\u2019s injuries and not a mere circumstance thereof. We do not read the cases relied upon by appellant as sustaining its position. At any rate since this is a case of first impression in Arkansas we take the position that \u201carising out of\u201d cannot be construed to mean \u201cproximately caused by\u201d. This same contention was made in Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Goodville Mutual Casualty Co., 403 Penn. 603, 170 A. 2d 571 (1961), wherein Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company insured the pick-up truck pulling a trailer and Goodville Mutual Casualty Company insured the trailer being pulled. In dismissing the contention that \u201carising out of\u201d meant \u201cproximately caused by\u201d the court there stated:\n\u201cGoodville contended in the court below, and now here, that this accident was not one \u2018arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of\u2019 the horse trailer. With that contention, the court below agreed, holding that \u2018arising out of\u2019 must be construed to mean \u2018proximately caused by. \u2019 However we do not so interpret the words \u2018arising out of.\u2019\nIn Suburban Service Bus. Co. v. National Mut. Casualty Co., 237 Mo. App. 1128, 183 S.W. 2d 376, 378, St. Louis Ct. of Appeals, Mo., 1944, it was said, \u2018The words \u201carising out of the use of the bus\u201d are very broad, general, and comprehensive terms. The insurer made no attempt to limit the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the term \u201cuse. \u201d We find nothing in the policy requiring that the use of the bus shall be the direct and proximate cause of the injury. The words \u201carising out of the use of the bus\u201d are much broader than words such as \u201cdirectly and proximately caused by the use of the bus.\u201d \u2019\nIn American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 4 Cir. 1954, 214 F. 2d 523, the owner of a Chrysler automobile, while towing his jeep, was involved in an accident with another automobile. Suit was instituted against him by two occupants of the latter vehicle. The Chrysler and the jeep were insured by different companies. Both insurers participated in his defense, but the insurer of the jeep reserved a right to disclaim liability. After settlement of the suits and payment thereof by the insurer of the Chrysler, the insurer of the jeep disclaimed liability. The language of the policy which covered the jeep was identical with the language of the Goodville policy in the present case. The insurer of the Chrysler sued the insurer of the jeep for contribution. The court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, rejecting an argument that the Chrysler was solely responsible for the accident and holding that the accident was one \u2018arising out of the * * * use\u2019 of the jeep.\nWhen the provisions of an insurance policy are vague or ambiguous, they must be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. Had the insurer desired to limit its liability to accidents with such a close causal connection to the ownership, maintenance or use of the trailer as to be encompassed within the scope of proximate causation, it could have and should have so stated in its policy. Construed strictly against the insurer, \u2018a-ising out of\u2019 means causally connected with, not proximately caused by. \u2018But for\u2019 causation, i.e., a cause and result relationship, is enough to satisfy this provision of the policy. ...\u201d\nSee also Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 16 N.C. App. 194, 192 S.E. 2d 113 (1972).\nDuring oral argument appellant attempted to raise the issue, not argued in its brief, that under any definition of \u201carising out of,\u201d the injuries in this case were too remote to be included in the coverage. While it appears to us from the record that the remoteness of the injuries was a fact issue for the trial court we need not definitely decide because that issue was raised too late for determination in this court.\nAppellee is allowed an additional attorney\u2019s fee of $750.00 for his services in this court.\nAffirmed.\nWe agree: Harris, C.J., and Fogleman and Howard, JJ-",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Conley Byrd, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Laser, Sharp, Haley, Young & Huckabay, P.A., for appellant.",
      "Matthews & Sanders, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. William LaSAGE\n77-297\n559 S.W. 2d 702\nOpinion delivered January 9, 1978\nLaser, Sharp, Haley, Young & Huckabay, P.A., for appellant.\nMatthews & Sanders, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0631-01",
  "first_page_order": 667,
  "last_page_order": 670
}