{ "id": 1675878, "name": "Carolyn DAVIS v. Thomas HARE and wife", "name_abbreviation": "Davis v. Hare", "decision_date": "1978-02-20", "docket_number": "77-218", "first_page": "818", "last_page": "820", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "262 Ark. 818" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "561 S.W.2d 321" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "110 S.W. 2d 42", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Ark. 1098", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8726189 ], "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/194/1098-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 Ark. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1616682 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/260/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.W. 2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1678916, 1678871 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/261/0074-01", "/ark/261/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 Ark. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1678871 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/261/0079-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 278, "char_count": 3231, "ocr_confidence": 0.909, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.118148292806475e-08, "percentile": 0.507001759562044 }, "sha256": "f756586b2a73a1facbfe5561aeed3ec4e1dbd9d0dcde6de4f15f56f20defa734", "simhash": "1:02d206f40c34e730", "word_count": 552 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:27:42.068781+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "We agree. Harris, C.J., and Fogleman and Howard, JJ-" ], "parties": [ "Carolyn DAVIS v. Thomas HARE and wife" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nUpon an earlier appeal the appellant, as a pretermitted grandchild, was held to be the testator\u2019s sole heir. Hare v. First Security Bank, 261 Ark. 79, 546 S.W. 2d 427 (1977). While that litigation was pending the appellees filed a claim \u00e1gainst the estate for the value of certain services rendered to the testator shortly before his death. The claim was approved, first by the administrator and then routinely by the probate judge. In response to objections filed by the appellant the probate court conducted a hearing and allowed the claim in part. This is an appeal from that order, three contentions being urged.\nIt is first argued that the trial judge erred in ruling that the appellant had the burden of proving that the claim should not have been allowed. The ruling was correct. In the first instance the administrator acts for the estate in approving, disapproving, or compromising claims. His decision, when approved by the court, makes a prima facie case that must be overcome by one who later objects to his action. See the Committee Comment to Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 62-2612 (Repl. 1971). Here the point is more or less academic, for in reviewing the record de novo we have not found it necessary to attach any importance to the question of where the burden of proof lay.\nSecond, it is argued that the claimant Hare\u2019s testimony about the services rendered was inadmissible under the dead man\u2019s statute. Ark. Const., Schedule, \u00a7 2 (1874). That section of the Constitution recited that it might be repealed by the General Assembly, and it was in fact expressly repealed by the Uniform Rules of Evidence. Ark. Stat. Ann., \u00a7 28-1001, Note to Rule 1102 (Supp. 1977). The dead man\u2019s statute was merely a rule of evidence and was therefore procedural in nature. Since this case was tried after the uniform rules became effective, they were applicable and made Hare\u2019s testimony admissible. Duncan v. State, 260 Ark. 491, 541 S.W. 2d 926 (1976).\nThird, it is argued that the claimants\u2019 services were gratuitous, because there was no express agreement between the claimants and the testator about their compensation. An express agreement, however, is not necessary. It is sufficient to show that both parties understood that the services were to be paid for. Peoples Nat. Bank v. Cohn, 194 Ark. 1098, 110 S.W. 2d 42 (1937). Here Hare was not related by blood to the testator. Hare testified that the testator told him that \u201che had his place fixed\u201d so that Hare would get it if he took care of the testator and his wife. The testimony of the lawyer who prepared the will was to the same effect. The will did leave the testator\u2019s estate to Hare. Thus it is clear that both parties understood that Hare was to be compensated for his services by being made the beneficiary of the testator\u2019s estate. Under our cases that understanding was sufficient to rebut the argument that the services were gratuitous.\nAffirmed.\nWe agree. Harris, C.J., and Fogleman and Howard, JJ-", "type": "majority", "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Guy H. Jones, Phil Stratton, Guy Jones, Jr. and Casey Jones, by: Phil Stratton, for appellant.", "Pollard & Cavaneau, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Carolyn DAVIS v. Thomas HARE and wife\n77-218\n561 S.W. 2d 321\nOpinion delivered February 20, 1978\n(Division I)\nGuy H. Jones, Phil Stratton, Guy Jones, Jr. and Casey Jones, by: Phil Stratton, for appellant.\nPollard & Cavaneau, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0818-01", "first_page_order": 856, "last_page_order": 858 }