{
  "id": 1672652,
  "name": "Joseph DELRIO, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Delrio v. State",
  "decision_date": "1978-07-03",
  "docket_number": "CR 78-28",
  "first_page": "888",
  "last_page": "891",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "263 Ark. 888"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "568 S.W.2d 15"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "259 Ark. 96",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1619240
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1976,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/259/0096-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:12:30.639178+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Byrd and Hickman, JJ., dissent."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Joseph DELRIO, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Frank Holt, Justice.\nA jury found appellant not guilty of driving while intoxicated; however, he was found guilty of interference with a law enforcement officer in the performance of his official duties and his punishment assessed at five months\u2019 imprisonment and a $400 fine. Appellant asserts that the evidence does not justify conviction of the offense of interference with a law enforcement officer in the performance of his official duties.\nArk. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-2803 (a) (Repl. 1977) provides:\nA person commits the offense of interference with a law enforcement officer if he knowingly employs or threatens to employ physical force against a law enforcement officer engaged in performing his official duties.\nIt appears that appellant doe? not argue on appeal the applicability of the statute. In arguing there is insubstantial evidence to support his conviction, he asserts that excessive force was used on him by the officers and any interference by him with the officers was an attempt to prevent them from inflicting upon him an unlawful beating. He asserts he merely exercised his right to resist an illegal beating, citing the Commentary to Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-2803 (Repl. 1977). The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee, which we must do on appeal, shows that the police were responding to a call from the proprietor of a drive-in concerning a disturbance there when they spotted a car which met the description given them. One of the arresting officers testified that appellant was driving in an erratic manner and they stopped him. The officer detected \u201ca strong odor of alcohol about [appellant\u2019s] person,\u201d \u201c[h]e was unsteady on his feet,\u201d \u201cwalked in a weaving manner,\u201d and \u201c[h]is speech was slurred.\u201d Appellant was arrested, handcuffed and put in the back seat of the patrol car along with a companion. While waiting there for a tow truck, appellant and his passenger \u201cbecame very abusive, using profane language. At one time, the [appellant] spit on my back and on the back seat.\u201d When the wrecker arrived, they proceeded to the jail. There appellant \u201cstepped out [of the patrol car], made a profane abusive remark, [and] ripped the radar cord.\u201d Appellant kicked the officer \u201cin the groin.\u201d Appellant tried to kick the officer several other times. The officers had to forcibly carry appellant up the steps to the jail. Appellant \u201ckicked and fought all the way up.\u201d The jailer \u201ccame to the door and bent over, at that time [appellant] kicked [the jailer] right in the face, just under his eye. \u201d The arresting officer substantially corroborated this testimony. As indicated previously, appellant argues that the reason he resisted and kicked the officers was to prevent an unlawful beating. It was for the jury to reconcile the conflicting evidence. There is ample substantial evidence to support the verdict.\nAppellant also contends the court erred in not declaring a mistrial when evidence of other arrests and wrongdoings was introduced at trial. Appellant first moved for a mistrial when an officer was asked on direct examination why appellant was handcuffed upon his arrest. The officer stated he handcuffed appellant because he had arrested appellant approximately twenty days before. Appellant\u2019s counsel objected and after the state withdrew the question, the objection was sustained. Further, appellant did not request that the trial judge admonish the jury regarding this testimony, and, therefore, he is in no position to argue that the judge\u2019s failure to do so was reversible error. Gammel & Spann v. State, 259 Ark. 96, 531 S.W. 2d 474 (1976). Certainly, here no abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion is demonstrated.\nAppellant also moved for a mistrial after one of the arresting officers testified that appellant was placed under arrest for DWI and possession of a controlled substance. The court sustained appellant\u2019s objection and admonished the jury to \u201cdisregard the last statement of the witness.\u201d The judge reminded the jury that \u201cI have advised you of what the defendant is on trial for here today, and ask that you [confine] your determination to that and that alone. \u201d Further, the court allowed appellant\u2019s counsel to show that appellant was tried and acquitted \u201cof anything dealing with a controlled substance.\u201d In the circumstances, we find no abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion in denying appellant\u2019s motion for a mistrial.\nAppellant finally contends that the transcript of a hearing in chancery court concerning the issuance of a court order directing his commitment until the posting of a $1,000 bond guaranteeing his compliance with the court\u2019s child support order was not submitted to the jury. Instead it was filed by the state in response to appellant\u2019s motion for a new trial some two months after the trial. Appellant insists there was no \u201cpickup\u201d warrant, based on this proceeding, in existence. The only mention of the chancery proceeding was the testimony of one of the arresting officers. The officer was explaining they were looking for appellant due to the disturbance complaint and, also, because \u201c [we] also had a pickup warrant on [appellant] out of Chancery Court.\u201d After objecting to this testimony and before a ruling by the court, the appellant\u2019s counsel asked the officer if appellant \u201cwas arrested for DWI and suspicion of disturbance or was he arrested on a Chancery Court order.\u201d The court then, after overruling the objection, instructed the jury \u201cto disregard the substance of anything else that they may have been looking for him for\u201d to which the jury responded they would. There is no prejudicial error demonstrated.\nAffirmed.\nByrd and Hickman, JJ., dissent.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Frank Holt, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Robert E. Irwin, for appellant.",
      "Bill Clinton, Atty. Gen., by: Jesse L. Kearney, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Joseph DELRIO, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 78-28\n568 S.W. 2d 15\nOpinion delivered July 3, 1978\n(In Banc)\nRobert E. Irwin, for appellant.\nBill Clinton, Atty. Gen., by: Jesse L. Kearney, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0888-01",
  "first_page_order": 920,
  "last_page_order": 923
}