{
  "id": 1672701,
  "name": "NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Shelia QUILANTAN",
  "name_abbreviation": "New Hampshire Insurance v. Quilantan",
  "decision_date": "1978-07-03",
  "docket_number": "78-24",
  "first_page": "892",
  "last_page": "896",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "263 Ark. 892"
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    {
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      "cite": "569 S.W.2d 102"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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  "jurisdiction": {
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    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
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      "year": 1937,
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    {
      "cite": "237 Ark. 500",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1737983
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1964,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/237/0500-01"
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    {
      "cite": "240 Ark. 458",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1727416
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1966,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/240/0458-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:12:30.639178+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Harris, C.J., and Byrd and Hickman, JJ."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Shelia QUILANTAN"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "George Howard, Jr., Justice.\nThe central question for resolution is whether the trial court erred in granting a summary judgment in favor of appellee-insured on her claim for fire loss, under an insurance policy issued by appellant-insurer where the insurer asserted the defense of arson to the insured\u2019s claim. Also appellant has challenged the attorney\u2019s fee awarded by the trial court as excessive.\nThe pertinent facts for a determination of the issue raised are:\nOn September 26, 1976, appellee-insured\u2019s personal dwelling and the contents therein were totally destroyed by a fire of unknown origin. At the time, appellee had insurance coverage with appellant-insurer in the sum of $23,000.00 on the dwelling house, $11,500.00 on the contents and the policy also provided for a sum not to exceed $4,000.00 as additional living expenses that might be incurred in case of fire damage.\nNotice of the loss was duly communicated to appellant. On December 6, 1976, appellee instituted an action in the Circuit Court of Garland County against appellant, after appellant had failed to respond affirmatively to appellee\u2019s claim. Appellee prayed judgment for $38,500.00 plus 12 percent penalty, reasonable attorney\u2019s fee, plus 6 percent interest from September 24, 1976.\nAppellant-insurer filed responsive pleadings contending, among other things, \u201cthat the fire loss in question was the result of arson knowingly caused by plaintiff and that defendant is thereby relieved of any obligations to make payment under its policy.\u201d\nAppellee-insured immediately undertook extensive discovery in order to establish the existence or nonexistence of appellant\u2019s defense of arson by taking depositions, submitting interrogatories and request for admissions of fact to individuals whom appellant had designated as witnesses to be called to establish the defense of arson. Moreover, affidavits were submitted in behalf of appellee.\nPursuant to appellee\u2019s motion for summary judgment, after all discovery had been completed, and appellant\u2019s response to appellee\u2019s motion for summary judgment was duly filed, the trial court made the following finding:\n\u201c. . . [T]he court finds that there is no substantial issue of fact existing in this case and that plaintiff\u2019s allegation of arson is not supported by any evidence but speculates on possible motives.\u201d\nA judgment was entered in behalf of appellee in the following sums: $23,000.00 for the total loss of appellee\u2019s dwelling house, $11,500.00 for the loss of the contents, $4,-000.00 for living expenses, 12 percent penalty on the total sum of $38,500.00 and cost together with interest at 6 percent per annum on the sum of $38,500.00 commencing with September 24, 1976. The trial court awarded appellee\u2019s attorney a fee in the sum of $12,500.00.\nFor reversal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting appellee\u2019s request for summary judgment and that the attorney\u2019s fee awarded by the trial court is excessive.\nIn Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 29-211 (Repl. 1962 and Supp. 1977) pertaining to summary judgment proceedings, it is provided in relevant part as follows:\n\u201c. . . [T]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d\nSee: Universal Life Insurance Co. v. Howlett, 240 Ark. 458, 400 S.W. 2d 294 (1966); Jones v. Comer, 237 Ark. 500, 374 S.W. 2d 465 (1964).\nIt is universally recognized that in reviewing the record on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must review it in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion with all doubts and inferences being resolved against the moving party.\nIn reviewing the entire record submitted in this cause, we cannot conclude or hold that the trial court committed reversible error. We are persuaded that the tria] court was correct in holding that appellee was entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law on appellant\u2019s defense of arson.\nBy way of summary, the evidence accumulated by discovery on the part of appellee shows that the evidence that appellant contemplated using in order to establish arson as a defense is speculative. For example, the Hot Springs Fire Marshal testified that he had no evidence as to who caused the fire and obviously had no evidence identifying appellee as the responsible party for the fire; Dan W. Hickman, Jr., Claims Manager for appellant, could not offer any evidence as to the cause of the fire. An affidavit filed in behalf of appellee specified that the Arkansas State Police had not conducted an investigation in regards to the alleged arson defense. Consequently, the trial court was justified in con-eluding that no genuine issue as to any material fact existed and that appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\nRelative to appellant\u2019s contention that the trial court\u2019s award of $12,500.00 to appellee\u2019s attorney, as an attorney\u2019s fee, is excessive, we are persuaded that appellant has asserted a meritorious claim. Consequently, if a remittitur is entered within 17 calendar days for $6,000.00, this action will be affirmed, otherwise, this action will be reversed, so far as the attorney\u2019s fees are concerned, and remanded to the trial court.\nIn Federal Life Insurance Co. v. Hase, 193 Ark. 816, 102 S.W. 2d 841 (1937), we stated that there is no fixed formula in considering an attorney\u2019s fees in cases such as we have here, other than that discretion must not be abused in awarding an attorney\u2019s fees. In summary, this action was disposed of by way of motions for summary judgments, thus, eliminating the necessity for a full scale trial of the issues. Moreover, as emphasized by appellant in its brief, there was no attempt on the part of counsel for appellee to submit an itemized statement of the hours he actually spent in preparation of his client\u2019s case so that the fees could be determined in an objective and rational manner. In reivewing the record before us and considering the amount of the recovery involved, we conclude that the fee, as awarded by the trial court, was excessive.\nModified and affirmed, providing a remittitur is entered in the sum of $6,000.00 relative to the award of attorney\u2019s fee for appellee\u2019s attorney.\nWe agree.\nHarris, C.J., and Byrd and Hickman, JJ.\nOther issues, not material to a resolution of the issue before us, were raised by appellant-insurer\u2019s pleadings, but were resolved against appellant by the trial court pursuant to a motion for summary judgment filed by appellee. However, the trial court held \u201c. . .[Tjhere is only one issue of fact now existing between the parties and this question of fact is as to whether or not the plaintiff herein knowingly, by arson, caused the fire loss in question and the Court further finds if the sole defense now existing consisting of arson on the part of the plaintiff is not sustained that judgment will then be entered in this cause in the following sums: $23,000.00 for total destruction of plaintiff\u2019s home; $11,500.00 for the contents of said home; $4,000.00 living expenses; plus 12% penalty on the total, sum of $38,500.00 from all of sixty days after 24th day of September, 1976 at six per cent per annum.\u201d",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "George Howard, Jr., Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Laser, Sharp, Haley, Young & Huckabay, P.A., for appellant.",
      "Hobbs & Longinotti, by: Richard W. Hobbs, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Shelia QUILANTAN\n78-24\n569 S.W. 2d 102\nOpinion delivered July 3, 1978\n(Division II)\n[Rehearing denied September 11, 1978.]\nLaser, Sharp, Haley, Young & Huckabay, P.A., for appellant.\nHobbs & Longinotti, by: Richard W. Hobbs, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0892-01",
  "first_page_order": 924,
  "last_page_order": 928
}