{ "id": 1668794, "name": "Bill HILL, d/b/a BILL HILL'S AUTO v. BANK OF NORTHEAST ARKANSAS, A Banking Corporation", "name_abbreviation": "Hill v. Bank of Northeast Arkansas", "decision_date": "1978-10-23", "docket_number": "78-89", "first_page": "412", "last_page": "418", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "264 Ark. 412" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "572 S.W.2d 150" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "244 Ark. 1222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8726070 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/244/1222-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ark. 924", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1478555 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/208/0924-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ark. 750", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1475827 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/209/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ark. 801", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1730584 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/239/0801-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ark. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717896 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/243/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ark. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8721744 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/243/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ark. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1606870 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/245/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 Ark. 864", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604168 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/246/0864-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 536, "char_count": 10404, "ocr_confidence": 0.917, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.06306989326404744 }, "sha256": "28c32cb12f39f5ca071343e16a6246b4b52ca2f13612168f8dadfb212edd9b63", "simhash": "1:405ca47ef646be36", "word_count": 1744 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:22:41.361067+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Byrd and Howard, JJ., dissent." ], "parties": [ "Bill HILL, d/b/a BILL HILL\u2019S AUTO v. BANK OF NORTHEAST ARKANSAS, A Banking Corporation" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John A. Fogleman, Justice.\nThis case involves the question whether a lender may perfect a lien on a motor vehicle under the provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 75-161 (b) (Supp. 1977). The trial court held that it could and we agree.\nOn July 26, 1977, Ronnie Hogan borrowed $3,167.36 from the Bank of Northeast Arkansas. The loan was evidenced by a promissory note providing for repayment in 30 monthly payments of $119.76. It was secured by a security agreement describing a 1975 Chevrolet Monte Carlo, Serial No. 1H57H5D420253. The note and security agreement were mailed to the Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Finance and Administration and filed there on August 22, 1977. Hogan kept the certificate of title to the vehicle, which had been issued in the State of Louisiana. On September 7, 1977, Hogan sold the vehicle to appellant Bill Hill for $2,650, and surrendered this certificate of title, which bore no evidence of any lien on the vehicle.\nHogan defaulted in payment of the note and appellee, on October 11,1977, filed suit to replevy the automobile, which was then in Hill\u2019s possession. Hill defended on the ground that the security interest of the bank had not been perfected as required by law. He asserted that his title was superior to any claim of the bank. The case was tried on a stipulation of fact. The trial judge held that the bank had perfected its lien pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 75-161 (b) and that the filing of the note and security agreement constituted constructive notice of the bank\u2019s lien. The bank was given judgment for possession of the automobile.\nAppellant contends that the court was in error in holding that the bank\u2019s lien had been perfected and that the court also erred in holding that the filing of the note and security agreement constituted constructive notice of its lien. Appellant contends that in order to perfect its lien, the bank was required to comply with Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 75-160 (b) by transmitting the certificate of title to the Department of Finance and Administration, along with the instrument creating the lien. He also contends that the court erred in holding that the filing of appellee\u2019s note and security agreement constituted constructive notice of the bank\u2019s lien.\nAs we view the statutes involved, their legislative history leaves us without any doubt about the correctness of the trial court\u2019s holding. The Uniform Motor Vehicle Administration, Certificate of Title and Antitheft Act [Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 75-101 et seq (Repl. 1957)] was adopted by the General Assembly as Act 142 of 1949. Article V of that act was included as \u00a7\u00a7 60 and 61, and appeared as Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 75-160, -161 (Supp. 1951). As the act was then written, it was necessary, in order to perfect a lien, that the instrument creating it, accompanied by the certificate of title last issued for the vehicle, be deposited with the Title Department of the Motor Vehicle Division. \u00a7 75-160 (b) (Repl. 1957). This filing and issuance of a new title certificate, including a statement of the liens certified to the department, constituted constructive notice of all such liens to subsequent purchasers. \u00a7\u00a7 75-160 (e), 161 (a) (Repl. 1957). This method of giving constructive notice was exclusive. \u00a7 75-161 (b) (Supp. 1951).\nThis legislation created a sort of \u201cTorrens System\u201d of automobile title registration, by which a subsequent purchaser could rely on the certificate of title itself to disclose liens and encumbrances which were not dependent on possession. See 8 Thompson on Real Property (Perm. Ed.) 245 et seq, \u00a7 4405 et seq. This system remained relatively unchanged until the passage of Acts 138 and 805 of 1971. The changes then made clearly indicated that the General Assembly intended to provide for an alternate or optional means of perfecting a lien on a motor vehicle and of giving constructive notice thereof. These acts added what now appears as \u00a7 75-161 (b) (Supp. 1977), viz:\nA lienholder may, at his option, file with the Department a certified copy of the instrument creating and evidencing such lien or encumbrance and shall remit therewith a fee of One Dollar ($1.00) for each lien to be filed, which such filing shall constitute constructive notice of such lien against the vehicle described therein to creditors of the owner, subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers, except such liens as are by law dependent upon possession. [Emphasis ours.]\nThe constructive notice shall be effective from the date of the execution of the instrument creating and evidencing the lien or encumbrance if the same is filed as authorized herein within ten (10) days after the date of the execution thereof. If the instrument is filed more than ten (10) days after the execution thereof, the constructive notice shall date from the time of the filing of the instrument. Provided, that the filing of a lien under the provisions of this subsection by the lienholder and the payment of the fee therefor shall in no way relieve any person of the obligation of paying the fee now required by law for filing of a lien to be evidenced on a certificate of title of a motor vehicle.\nThe portion of the statute [Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 75-161 (a)] having to do with constructive notice under the original act was left unimpaired. It reads:\nSuch filing and the issuance of a new certificate of title as provided in this article [\u00a7\u00a7 75-160, 75-161] shall constitute constructive notice of all liens and encumbrances against the vehicle described therein to creditors of the owner, to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers except such liens as may be authorized by law dependent upon possession. In the event the documents referred to in Section 62 [\u00a775-162] are received and filed in the central office of the department within ten [10] days after the date said documents were executed the constructive notice shall date from the time of the execution of said documents. Otherwise constructive notice shall date from the time of receipt and filing of such documents by the department as shown by its indorsement thereon.\nAnother very significant change made by Act 138 appears in \u00a7 75-161 (c) which had previously been \u00a7 75-161 (b). That change may be fully appreciated by reproducing the subsection with the only change in brackets, viz:\nThe method [s] provided in this article of giving constructive notice of a lien or encumbrance upon a registered vehicle shall be exclusive except as to liens dependent upon possession and any said lien or encumbrance or title retention instrument filed as herein provided and any documents evidencing the same are hereby exempted from the provisions of law which otherwise require or relate to the recording or filing of instruments creating or evidencing title retention or other liens or encumbrances upon vehicles of a type subject to registration hereunder.\nThe use of the words \u201cat his option\u201d in \u00a7 75-161 (b) and the pluralization of the word \u201cmethod\u201d in \u00a7 75-161 (c) in the new version clearly indicate a legislative intent to provide alternate methods for perfection of liens and for giving constructive notice. Thus, the lien holder could either have the advantages of the \u201cTorrens System\u201d certificate or use the method that more nearly resembles our recording system, where a real estate mortgage is the lien instrument.\nAppellant would have us ignore these significant changes in the governing statute. He places reliance upon language in \u00a7 75-160 (a) that no lien or encumbrance subject to registration is valid as to subsequent purchasers or encumbrances unless the requirements of \u201cthis article have been complied with\u201d and the language of \u00a7 75-160 (b) that the lien instrument must be \u201caccompanied by the certificate of title last issued for such vehicle.\u201d \u201c [T]his article\u201d is \u00a7 75-160 and \u00a7 75-161. The latter section is quite different since the passage of the 1971 acts, as we have pointed out, and the requirements of \u201cthis article\u201d may be met by either of two methods, one of which does not require that the lien instrument be accompanied by the certificate of title.\nAppellant also argues that the matter of priority is governed by Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 85-9-301 (Supp. 1977). The applicability of that section to motor vehicle liens coming within the purview of the Motor Vehicle Act is questionable to say the least. In any event, as we have pointed out, we take the alternate procedure to provide a method other than that previously existing for perfecting a lien, as well as for giving constructive notice. Appellant also advances the argument that, even if the later acts provide an alternate method for giving constructive notice, the original method for perfecting the lien is exclusive. If this were the case, there would really be no purpose in providing for the alternate method. Compliance with the procedures required under the original act would suffice for both perfection of the lien and the giving of constructive notice. And, in either event, appellant would have constructive notice of the bank\u2019s lien.\nThe advantages of the original system to an innocent prospective purchaser are readily apparent and the arguments in favor of continuing that system exclusively are appealing and persuasive. But the decision as to the merits of the change was a matter addressed to the General Assembly only. The wisdom, advisability, expediency, propriety, and necessity of particular legislation are matters solely for consideration of the legislative department and are not for judicial determination. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Roberts, 246 Ark. 864, 440 S.W. 2d 208; Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W. 2d 753; McCastlain v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 243 Ark. 506, 420 S.W. 2d 893; Haynie v. City of Little Rock, 243 Ark. 86, 418 S.W. 2d 633; Beaumont v. Faubus, 239 Ark. 801, 394 S.W. 2d 478; Cook v. Arkansas Missouri Power Corp., 209 Ark. 750, 192 S.W. 2d 210; Reed v. Hundley, 208 Ark. 924, 188 S.W. 2d 117. When the General Assembly has exercised its discretion in the execution of its powers, such matters are not subject to review by the courts. Poole v. State, 244 Ark. 1222, 428 S.W. 2d 628.\nThe judgment is affirmed.\nByrd and Howard, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "John A. Fogleman, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kelly Webb, for appellant.", "Parker & Henry, by: Mike Walden, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Bill HILL, d/b/a BILL HILL\u2019S AUTO v. BANK OF NORTHEAST ARKANSAS, A Banking Corporation\n78-89\n572 S.W. 2d 150\nOpinion delivered October 23, 1978\n(In Banc)\nKelly Webb, for appellant.\nParker & Henry, by: Mike Walden, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0412-01", "first_page_order": 440, "last_page_order": 446 }