{
  "id": 1719959,
  "name": "Dana WILLIAMS v. ARKANSAS OAK FLOORING CO. and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Williams v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co.",
  "decision_date": "1979-11-28",
  "docket_number": "CA 79-65",
  "first_page": "810",
  "last_page": "813",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "267 Ark. 810"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "590 S.W.2d 328"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "266 Ark. 802",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8722919
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/266/0802-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "simhash": "1:a2bd2c973710db89",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:49.696704+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Howard and Penix did not participate."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Dana WILLIAMS v. ARKANSAS OAK FLOORING CO. and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "David Newbern, Judge.\nIn this workers\u2019 compensation case, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission denied compensation for the claimed temporary total disability on the basis the claimant had failed to produce substantial evidence of his disability. Over the objection of the appellees, the commission permitted the appellant to recover costs of consultation with a chiropractor from whom he has recently begun to receive treatment. The appellees cross-appeal, contending these costs should be denied the claimant. We affirm the commission\u2019s decision.\nThe appellant was injured January 12, 1977, suffering a strained or sprained back while working for the appellee Arkansas Oak Flooring Co. He returned to work for the appellee January 17, 1977, and worked there until February 7, 1977, when he was discharged because of a dispute over his time card. He has held two jobs since he left the employ of the appellee. His claim is that pain from the injury was a reason for his losing at least one job. He claims temporary total disability for the following periods: February 7, 1977, through February 25, 1977; June 6, 1977, to June 26, 1977; and August 1, 1978 to the present. The commission concluded these dates were more representative of \u201ctime off between jobs . . . than recurring disability.\u201d\nThe appellant\u2019s first contention on appeal is that the commission made a \u201cfinding\u201d that the report of a physician, Dr. Wilkins, who treated the appellant, was not in the record. Although there was some confusing language in the \u201cconclusions\u201d section of the commission\u2019s decision, it is clear the commission had before it a report by Dr. Wilkins who treated the claimant, apparently at the instance of the appellees, at the time of the injury. The commission\u2019s decision was, in fact, b\u00e1sed on the failure of the appellant, with one exception, to seek treatment.for the allegedly painful condition he contends to have been the cause of his disability during the one and one half years between Dr. Wilkins\u2019 examination and one by a Dr. Bierman, who is a chiropractor. Thus, as the commission bases its decision, in part, upon a date established by Dr. Wilkins\u2019 examination, and makes reference to Dr. Wilkins\u2019 report in its \u201cstatement of the case,\u201d we cannot say there was a finding the report was not before the commission. The confusion evident in the commission\u2019s opinion is at most harmless error.\nThe second point raised by the appellant is that his claim should have been allowed because he proved his case. We affirm the commission if there is substantial evidence to support its action. Ryan v. NAPA, 266 Ark. 802, 586 S.W. 2d 6 (Ark. App. 1979). In cases in which the commission has denied a claim because of a failure to show entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence, this standard can be translated as follows: we will affirm if the commission\u2019s opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief.\nHere, the basis of the denial was that, despite his allegations of pain causing disability, the claimant admittedly saw only one physician between January 12, 1977, and August 28, 1978, the date he consulted Dr. Bierman. The one physician he saw in addition to Dr. Wilkins was an orthopedist, Dr. Logue, who found some \u201cstrain and sprain\u201d but made no statement with respect to disability. Neither Dr. Wilkins nor Dr. Bierman, the chiropractor, stated any finding of disability. There was a substantial basis for the commission to deny the claim.\nThe appellee\u2019s cross-appeal urges the appellee be found not responsible for payment for the treatments by Dr. Bier-man. Dr. Bierman has proposed a plan of treatment for the appellant which the appellant apparently wishes to pursue. The ground urged by the appellee (cross-appellant) is the appellant\u2019s failure to comply with Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission Rule 21. That rule provides:\nThe employer and/or insurance carrier has the right and duty in the first instance to provide prompt medical care to injuried employees through physicians and hospit\u00e1is of the respondents\u2019 choice. A claimant, subsequently, may obtain a change in treating physicians to a physician of the claimant\u2019s choice, the costs of such treatment to be borne by the employer or the employer\u2019s insurance carrier, provided (1) the claimant\u2019s healing period shall not have ended; (2) the claimant is not seeking to change physicians from one of his own choice, previously selected by the claimant; (3) the physician to whom the claimant wishes to change is qualified in the particular field of medicine needed for claimant\u2019s particular difficulties; (4) the claimant files with the Commission a petition for a change in physicians, gives the name of the physician to whom he wishes to change and asserts that the physician to whom he wishes to change is competent to treat his particular ailment; (5) rio unresolved issue exists over whether claimant is legally entitled to medical care at the expense of respondents.\nWe find no fault with the commission\u2019s determination. We assume the commission was aware of and operating pursuant to its own rule. It apparently found all the conditions permitting a change of doctors. We may regard their determination as satisfying the requirement of subsection (4) of Rule 21 to the effect that the permission of the commission must be obtained. We note the commission made no order that the appellee pay the bill for Dr. Logue\u2019s examination, and thus the disqualification of Rule 21 (2) should not apply. That subsection should apply only when the insurer or employer is paying a physician selected by the claimant who then seeks to change to another physician of his choice. Although there is some qustion whether a chiropractor qualifies as a \u201cphysician\u2019 \u2019 under the Rule, that point has not been argued.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Howard and Penix did not participate.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "David Newbern, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Brockman & Brockman, by: E. W. Brockman, Jr., for appellant.",
      "Coleman, Gantt, Ramsay & Cox, by: Martin G. Gilbert, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Dana WILLIAMS v. ARKANSAS OAK FLOORING CO. and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY\nCA 79-65\n590 S.W. 2d 328\nOpinion delivered November 28, 1979\nReleased for publication December 19, 1979\nBrockman & Brockman, by: E. W. Brockman, Jr., for appellant.\nColeman, Gantt, Ramsay & Cox, by: Martin G. Gilbert, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0810-01",
  "first_page_order": 870,
  "last_page_order": 873
}
