{
  "id": 1719932,
  "name": "Laura COKER v. Charles L. DANIELS, Director of Labor and STAPLETON LADDERS COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Coker v. Daniels",
  "decision_date": "1980-01-09",
  "docket_number": "CA 79-296",
  "first_page": "1000",
  "last_page": "1002",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "267 Ark. 1000"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "593 S.W.2d 59"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 285,
    "char_count": 3922,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.906,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.543730651610814e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6734288369708041
    },
    "sha256": "41849b5daa3cb3011597afb35cfb10b548a00d8a778928e3f33d50d0c42c77cd",
    "simhash": "1:80af118a34958c18",
    "word_count": 620
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:49.696704+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Laura COKER v. Charles L. DANIELS, Director of Labor and STAPLETON LADDERS COMPANY"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "George Howard, Jr., Judge.\nAppellant challenges the action of the Board of Review in affirming the denial of unemployment benefits under Section 5(b)(1) of the Employment Security Law which provides:\n. . . [A]n individual shall be disqualified for benefits:\nIf he is discharged from his last work for misconduct in connection with the work . . .\nAppellant testified that her status as an employee with Stapleton Ladders, Respondent, began in February, 1979; that she, her husband and brother, who were also employed by respondent, did not report to work on May 21st and 22nd because her husband\u2019s automobile broke down and she had no means of transportation to work; that on May 23rd she did not report to work because she was ill. Appellant also testified that she was absent from her job on at least two other occasions because her daughter was ill necessitating appellant\u2019s presence at home.\nIt is undisputed that appellant advised her employer, by telephone, that due to the lack of transportation she was unable to report to work on May 21st and 22nd. It is further undisputed that appellant\u2019s husband and brother on May 23rd advised the respondent, when they reported for work, that appellant was ill and wopld not report to work, whereupon appellant, her husband and brother were fired.\nIt is clear that respondent is a small enterprise employing only a few people in the manufacture of ladders. Appellant\u2019s assignment on respondent\u2019s assembly line consisted of placing \u201cbraclets and things on steps for the ladders.\u201d Appellant\u2019s assignment was vital, to the continuity and smooth operation of respondent\u2019s production schedule. It is undisputed that appellant\u2019s absence has interfered materially with respondent\u2019s assembly line production.\nThe force of appellant\u2019s argument for reversal seems to be that respondent \u2014 in a conversation between respondent and appellant\u2019s husband \u2014 terminated appellant on May 21st rather than May 23rd; therefore, the reason for her termination was because of the lack of transportation which w\u00e1s the result of an emergency which appellant had no control over and was in fact an unavoidable situation. Thus, argues appellant, respondent\u2019s action is not based upon good cause.\nRespondent, on the other hand, testified that the termination occurred on May 23rd and that appellant had a rather lengthy absentee record during her relatively short period with its firm.\nIt is crystal clear that during appellant\u2019s twelve weeks of employment, she had been absent at least six times either because of illness in the family or the lack of transportation. The question relative to when appellant was actually terminated presented a fact question for the Agency\u2019s determination. Credibility is a matter to be evaluated and resolved by the administrative tribunal while our responsibility is to determine essentially whether the finding of the Agency is supported by substantial evidence.\nWhile it is generally recognized that an employer has certain obligations and responsibilities to his employees in providing suitable working conditions and hours, it goes without saying that an employer generally has neither an affirmative duty to provide transportation to an employee to and from his place of employment, nor is required to tolerate a mode of conduct pertaining to an employee\u2019s ability or the lack thereof to provide transportation to and from his place of employment which has the effect of reducing the efficiency of the employer\u2019s operations and, if continued, the complete destruction of the employer\u2019s business before the employer can take preventive measures as was done in the instant case.\nWe are convinced that the holding of the Agency is indeed supported by substantial evidence.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "George Howard, Jr., Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Laura COKER v. Charles L. DANIELS, Director of Labor and STAPLETON LADDERS COMPANY\nCA 79-296\n593 S.W. 2d 59\nOpinion delivered January 9, 1980\nReleased for publication January 30, 1980"
  },
  "file_name": "1000-01",
  "first_page_order": 1060,
  "last_page_order": 1062
}