{ "id": 1719844, "name": "Billy G. SANDERS v. ARKANSAS-MISSOURI POWER COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Sanders v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co.", "decision_date": "1980-01-09", "docket_number": "CA 79-173", "first_page": "1009", "last_page": "1014", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "267 Ark. 1009" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "593 S.W.2d 56" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "30 Texas L. Rev. 903", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Tex. L. Rev.", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 Ark. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1609114 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/219/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 F. 2d 339", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1204914 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/165/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 S.W. 1057", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ark. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1337126 ], "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/110/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Ark. 1039", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8726146 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/255/1039-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 551, "char_count": 9159, "ocr_confidence": 0.909, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0040101836463524e-07, "percentile": 0.5396882212051745 }, "sha256": "775e0bb12e9a79b8b4428f40d599b7bd754acbf88e0ebfb04e9b714e03dba5d1", "simhash": "1:44d71320c51a0650", "word_count": 1535 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:49.696704+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hays, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "Billy G. SANDERS v. ARKANSAS-MISSOURI POWER COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "David Newbern, Judge.\nThe appellant was seriously injured when he came in contact with a \u201chot\u201d electric line while working as a lineman for the appellee. In his complaint the appellant alleged the appellee\u2019s agents promised he would receive full pay and benefits until he could return to work, in exchange for his promise to return to work when able. He further alleged that in reliance on the appellee\u2019s promise and their performance of it for some eighteen months he built a new home with special wheelchair accommodations. In addition he alleged he was entitled to recover on theories of gift and contract implied in fact. These were alleged as alternative theories to his allegation of breach of the express agreement. In his prayer for relief, the appellant alleged he was totally and permanently disabled and thus was entitled to $675,000, presumably the present value of payments he could expect to receive from the appellee for the remainder of his \u201cworking life.\u2019\u2019\nThe circuit court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the complaint. The findings stated in the dismissal order were:\n1. The Workers\u2019 Compensation Act or claim is not plaintiffs exclusive remedy and therefore not a bar to this action.\n2. The allegations of the Complaint do not establish valid consideration for a binding or enforceable contract; said allegations do not establish a third party beneficiary relationship; nor do they constitute a valid enforceable gift.\n3. Plaintiff s Complaint, therefore, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; therefore, Defendant\u2019s Demurrer and Motion To Dismiss should be granted.\nAlthough there had been some discovery activity which became part of the record in this case, the court\u2019s order clearly was based on the inadequacy of the complaint, and we limit our decision to the propriety of that order..\n1. Gift.\nThe complaint was not sufficient to state a cause of action based upon a gift theory. Although it states there was a \u201cdelivery,\u2019\u2019 such a statement is conclusory only. No facts are stated showing a delivery of that which the appellant claims. A complaint which does not state facts constituting every element of a cause of action is demurrable. Vandevier v. Chapman, 255 Ark. 1039, 505 S.W. 2d 495 (1974); Wood v. Drainage Dist. No. 2 of Conway County, 110 Ark. 416, 161 S.W. 1057 (1913).\n2. Contract Implied in Fact\nWe find no need to discuss at length the paragraph of the complaint which alleges a contract implied in fact, as the allegations of express contract deal with the same exchange of promises we presume the appellant would have us infer from the conduct of the parties.\n3. Mutual Promises\nIn evaluating the complaint, we must assume, as alleged by the appellant, that agents of the appellee promised the appellant he would be paid his full salary and company benefits until he was medically able to return to work. In exchange for that promise, the appellant alleges he promised to resume \u201ca position of employment as soon as medically possible.\u201d We recognize that a promise to hold oneself available to resume work has been held sufficient to constitute consideration for an agreement to pay a monthly salary for life. Abbott v. Arkansas Utilities Co., 165 F. 2d 339 (8th Cir. 1948). We agree with the holding in that case, although it was one based on the \u2018\u2018general law\u201d because no Arkansas Supreme Court case on the point could be found by the Court of Appeals. There, however, the complaint being evaluated contained no indication the plaintiff-employee was incapacitated in any way from performing should the need arise. He had retired from regular employment with the defendant and had agreed to be available for work on call in exchange for a regular reduced salary.\nIn the case before us, however, the appellant has pleaded total and permanent disability, and it becomes obvious he has made a promise it is impossible for him to perform. We cannot say this complaint states a cause of action for breach of contract based on mutual promises where it alleges one of the promises is impossible of performance. We cannot countenance the appellant\u2019s statement he is \u201cholding himself ready\u201d to perform when in the next breath he alleges his inability to do so. These statements cancel each other and make the appellant\u2019s alleged promise illusory at best..\nAt the time the alleged promise to pay was made by the appellee and the alleged promise to go back to work when able was made by the appellant, there may have been some doubt as to the appellant\u2019s prospective ability to. work. The complaint says the appellee paid the appellant\u2019s salary for approximately eighteen months and then ceased. The employer was under no obligation to continue this employment agreement when it became clear the appellant would not be able to work again, as admitted in the complaint before us. See, 6 Williston, Contracts, \u00a7 877, pp. 350-357 (3d Ed. 1962).\n4. Detrimental Reliance or Promissory Estoppel\nPerhaps the broadest statement of the doctrine of detrimental reliance or promissory estoppel is that found in 1 Corbin, Contracts, \u00a7 119, p. 515 (1963):\n... [I]f a promisee acts in such reasonable reliance upon a promise, that promise may be held enforceable even though the promisor did not in fact know of such action and so did not regard it as consideration or as anything else. Even the promisee who acts in reliance may not regard his action as any reason for enforcing the promise; he may perform the action because he believes the promise will be kept without the necessity of any enforcement.\nThat language seems to indicate that as long as the action in reliance, on a promise is reasonable it matters not that the action taken was not directly induced by the promise sought to be enforced. We recognize this, however, as a problem of semantics. We prefer to state the problem as one of applying an objective standard in determining the reasonableness of an act in reliance.\nWe do not propose here to enter, other than lightly, the further semantic struggle between the doctrines of detrimental reliance- and promissory estoppel. The Arkansas Supreme Court examined the history and the broad bases of the promissory estoppel doctrine in Peoples National Bank of Little Rock v. Linebarger Construction Co., 219 Ark. 11, 240 S.W. 2d 12 (1951). There the plaintiff had loaned money, at the behest of a contractor, to one of the latter\u2019s subcontractors in reliance upon, a promise of the contractor to repay the amount of the loan. This, was part of a continuing arrangement whereby each week the contractor would tell the Bank the approximate amount of the subcontractor\u2019s payroll, and the Bank would make that amount available to the subcontractor with the contractor\u2019s guarantee of repayment. The amount thus loaned on the occasion which gave rise to the lawsuit was $16,000. The contractor was held liable to repay the bank, but only to the extent of $11,996.07. The court said, \u201c[i]f special circumstances had not indicated a particular purpose for the use of the money, then the estoppel might well have extended to the full amount stated in the representation. [219 Ark. at 19]\u201d Thus, the court held the contractor was not \u201cestopped\u201d with respect to his entire promise although he might have been but for the \u201cspecial circumstances.\u201d At least the case makes it clear that some such doctrine has been applied, and apparently consistently so, in Arkansas over the years. We tend to agree with the author of the note on that case at 30 Texas L. Rev. 903 (1952), that the term \u201cestoppel\u201d is not very accurately used there, although we cannot say whether there would have been a different result or even different considerations had the concept of detrimental reliance sufficient to warrant enforcement been used instead.\nWe hold the complaint before us stated facts sufficient to state a cause of action in that the appellant alleged he had built a new home especially equipped for a wheelchair user in reliance on the promise of the appellee. Of course, the appellant will have to prove to the trier of fact that his action was indeed based upon that reliance and that it was reasonable, but we find it sufficiently stated.\nAlthough we recognize we should not apply the new rules of pleading, recently adopted in Arkansas, we find even the old, more formal pleading code must be applied with some reference to the reasons behind it. Here there is no doubt the complaint is sufficient to let the court and the appellee know the precise nature of the appellant\u2019s claim of an enforceable promise based on detrimental reliance. The defendant-appellee will have no trouble drafting an answer which sufficiently defines issues for the court\u2019s resolution.\nReversed and remanded.\nHays, J., dissents.\nThe order dismissing this complaint was filed before the new Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, supplanting Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 27-1113 and 27-1115 (Repl. 1962), came into effect.", "type": "majority", "author": "David Newbern, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Duncan & Davis, for appellant.", "Reid, Burge & Prevallet, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Billy G. SANDERS v. ARKANSAS-MISSOURI POWER COMPANY\nCA 79-173\n593 S.W. 2d 56\nOpinion delivered January 9, 1980\nReleased for publication January 30, 1980\nDuncan & Davis, for appellant.\nReid, Burge & Prevallet, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1009-01", "first_page_order": 1069, "last_page_order": 1074 }