{ "id": 1712562, "name": "Robert Lee FAIRCHILD v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Fairchild v. State", "decision_date": "1980-06-16", "docket_number": "CR 80-53", "first_page": "273", "last_page": "277", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "269 Ark. 273" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "600 S.W.2d 16" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "259 Ark. 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1619097 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/259/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 S.E. 2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "134 W. Va. 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "W. Va.", "case_ids": [ 8582407 ], "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/w-va/134/0771-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 F. 2d 899", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 901965 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/566/0899-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ark. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1664827 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/265/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ark. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717682 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/266/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ark. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1719866 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/267/0006-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 484, "char_count": 7506, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.1858841672951974e-07, "percentile": 0.9127230969836465 }, "sha256": "89d21f8dfb886bd1f9f2a38ad03d08b83c8e38973c0a925d6c14f7969f3a04df", "simhash": "1:3aa8c6106c2eaf73", "word_count": 1290 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:52:47.346821+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Fogleman, C.J., and Stroud, J., dissent." ], "parties": [ "Robert Lee FAIRCHILD v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Richard L. Mays, Justice.\nAppellant, Robert Lee Fairchild, was convicted of aggravated robbery by a court sitting without a jury and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. The only question raised by appellant on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Although we find sufficient evidence to support a conviction of robbery, we find insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of aggravated robbery. We, therefore, modify the judgment below by reducing it to the lesser included offense of robbery and impose a sentence of three years imprisonment, that being the minimum prison sentence prescribed by law for a conviction of robbery.\nThe evidence indicates that on July 27, 1979, between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, appellant saw Mrs. Frances Calva, the prosecuting witness, near a double-door back entrance of the Checkmate Club in North Little Rock, rushed over and jerked the outer door open which she was holding and, with his right hand under his shirt, said, \u201cGive me your money!\u201d When Mrs. Calva denied that she had any money, appellant grabbed her dress lightly and insisted that she was lying. As she turned and tried to go in the inner back door, displaying only car keys in her hands, appellant retreated. He was later apprehended outside the club and taken to the police station for interrogation where he volunteered to a police officer that he had tried to induce Mrs. Calva to believe that he had a gun by holding his hand under his shirt.\nA person commits robbery if with the purpose of committing a theft or resisting apprehension immediately thereafter, he employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force upon another. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-2103 (Repl. 1977). Physical force means any bodily impact, restraint, or confinement or the threat thereof. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-2101 (Repl. 1977). A person commits aggravated robbery if he commits robbery armed with a deadly weapon, or represents by word or conduct that he is so armed. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-2102 (Repl. 1977).\nIn reviewing the record of appellant\u2019s conviction, we are obliged to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. Cary v. State, 259 Ark. 510, 534 S.W. 2d 230 (1976). Although appellant first contends that there was insufficient evidence to show that he employed physical force against Mrs. Calva, we find that jerking the door from her, cornering her in the back hallway and grabbing her dress is sufficient restraint and bodily impact to constitute physical force. Appellant\u2019s next argument, however, that the evidence fails to establish that he represented by word or conduct that he was armed with a deadly weapon has merit. We are not persuaded that appellant\u2019s hand under his shirt, even with the admitted intention of conveying to the victim that he was armed, is sufficient representation to satisfy the requirements of aggravated robbery in the absence of the victim\u2019s appreciation that he was armed. It is clear from Mrs. Calvas testimony that she did not attach any special significance to this conduct and certainly did not perceive it to be in any way threatening. In fact, she did not even mention this particular conduct during her testimony until the prosecutor specially raised it by a leading question. Since the appellant\u2019s subjective intent does not control what is objectively conveyed to another, a hand under a shirt has no meaning in the context of the aggravated robbery statute unless the victim at least perceives it to be menacing.\nAffirmed as modified.\nFogleman, C.J., and Stroud, J., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "Richard L. Mays, Justice." }, { "text": "John A. Fogleman, Chief Justice,\ndissenting. I respectfully disagree with the majority. I would affirm the judgment. I submit that there is substantial evidence to support the trial judge\u2019s finding of fact that Fairchild represented by conduct that he was armed with a deadly weapon. In making the determination we jnrust view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. Chaviers v. State, 267 Ark. 6, 588 S.W. 2d 434 (1979); Thomas v. State, 266 Ark. 162, 583 S.W. 2d 32. We must draw from the testimony all reasonable inferences favorable to the trial court\u2019s judgment. Core v. State, 265 Ark. 409, 578 S.W. 2d 581. We should not reverse the trial court\u2019s fact-finding unless we find that a reasonable mind could not infer from the evidence that Fairchild\u2019s conduct was a representation that he was armed with a deadly weapon. Core v. State, supra. I submit that this cannot be said.\nViewed in the light in which we must view it, the evidence showed:\nFairchild approached Mrs. Calva in the parking lot of the Checkmate Club at about 11:00 p.m. As she turned to go to the back door of the club, he ran toward her, jerked the door open, stepped inside and said, \u201cGive me your money.\u201d Mrs. Calva said, \u201cI don\u2019t have anything but my keys\u201d and showed him her hands and keys and turned to go into the inside of the club. When Fairchild first approached Mrs. Calva, he had one hand \u201cup under his shirt\u201d and kept it there during the entire confrontation. His shirt was \u201cout at the bottom.\u201d Fairchild made a statement to the police after he was arrested in which he stated that he had tried to make Mrs. Calva believe he had a gun by holding his hand under his shirt.\n\u25a0 I find the majority\u2019s explanation of its disregard of appellant\u2019s statement baffling, to say the least. If appellant really intended his conduct to be a representation that he was armed with a deadly weapon, how can an appellate court on review say that the trier of fact has no reasonable basis for an inference that he engaged in conduct that was a representation that he was so armed? When the testimony of Mrs. Calva is considered, along with the statement, I submit that the trial court\u2019s drawing of the inference was reasonable and the majority\u2019s unreasonable.\nIn a closely analogous case, it has been held that evidence that one accused of robbery entered a bank with his hand in his pocket, instructed the bank manager not to sound the alarm and the tellers to hand over the money was sufficient to establish conduct reasonably calculated to produce fear. United States v. Amos, 566 F. 2d 899 (4 Cir., 1977). Obviously, the basis of the fear was that the hand in the pocket was a representation that the robber was armed with a deadly weapon. In State v. Young, 134 W. Va. 771, 61 S.E. 2d 734 (1950), it was held that when a man entered a room, found a defenseless woman alone, put his hand into his hip pocket and commanded her to take a certain position and then committed a robbery, he was guilty of armed robbery. The West Virginia Supreme Court equated the conduct with a \u201cthreat of firearms.\u201d Certainly, the conclusions of these courts are those of reasonable minds. The same reasoning would support the finding of fact here.\nIt seems to me that the majority is, in reality, displeased with the language of the statute. If this is the case, it should say so and, perhaps, the General Assembly would change it. Until it is changed, the courts shall not nullify it by deciding what inference a fact finder should have drawn from the conduct of the accused in a case like this one.\nI am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Stroud joins in this opinion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "John A. Fogleman, Chief Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "John W. Achor, Public Defender, by: James H. Phillips, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Catherine Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Robert Lee FAIRCHILD v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 80-53\n600 S.W. 2d 16\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 16, 1980\nJohn W. Achor, Public Defender, by: James H. Phillips, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Catherine Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0273-01", "first_page_order": 303, "last_page_order": 307 }