{
  "id": 1712502,
  "name": "Charles Edward ADAMS v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Adams v. State",
  "decision_date": "1980-05-14",
  "docket_number": "CA CR 80-2",
  "first_page": "601",
  "last_page": "606",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "269 Ark. 601"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "599 S.W.2d 437"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "268 Ark. 263",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1715454
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/268/0263-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "104 S.W. 2d 456",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "year": 1937,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "193 Ark. 1092",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1411063
      ],
      "year": 1937,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/193/1092-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "246 Ark. 644",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1604067
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1969,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/246/0644-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "264 Ark. 723",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1668913
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/264/0723-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "262 Ark. 513",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1675861
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/262/0513-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "589 S.W. 2d 204",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "266 Ark. 363",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 469,
    "char_count": 8090,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.721,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 5.676830387708631e-08,
      "percentile": 0.3547357394195569
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    "sha256": "de70e31aa0c041bf06076b48c70683c9a3ae3175d1fb26ebef52ce6d23866f2c",
    "simhash": "1:cf39c50416025fbe",
    "word_count": 1347
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:52:47.346821+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Charles Edward ADAMS v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Steele Hays, Judge.\nAppellant pleaded guilty to four counts of Obtaining a Controlled Substance by Fraud in violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 82-2619- The trial court sentenced appellant to the Arkansas Department of Corrections for two years on each count. The sentences were suspended, and defendant was placed on probation for two years. During the probation period, appellant was directed to enter and successfully complete the drug rehabilitation program at the Veterans Administration Hospital.\nUpon appellant\u2019s discharge from the program, the prosecuting attorney filed a petition for revocation of the suspended sentence on grounds that appellant did not successfully complete the program. The court granted the petition of revocation and sentenced appellant to three years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Appellant appeals from the lower court.\nAppellant\u2019s first point for reversal is that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence privileged, confidential communications made for the purpose of treatment of drug addiction. With a social worker, psychotherapist, and all the members of the treatment program present, appellant stated that he had made a telephone call from the premises attempting to purchase marijuana.\nRule 504(3) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence states:\nA communication is \u2018confidential\u2019 if not intended to be disclosed to third persons, except persons present to further the interests of the patient in the consultation, examination, or interview, persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist, including members of the patient\u2019s family.\nArk. Stat. \u00a7 71-2822 (Repl. 1979) states that the communications between a social worker and his or her patient are confidential communications.\nThe State contends that the statement made by appellant was not privileged because it was not made during a drug treatment session, but rather a meeting for the purpose of investigating the possible use or sale of drugs by those in the drug treatment program.\nAt the revocation hearing, the testimony was ambiguous and conflicting as to what the actual purpose of the meeting was. Appellant in his testimony stated that the remark was made during \u201cgroup therapy\u201d, and immediately thereafter changed his mind:\n... I mean, in a session with all the members of the program involved, and it was just asked, \u2018What\u2019s going on?\u2019\nThe social worker, Mr. Homer Thayer, when asked whether the statement was made during a \u201cpsychotherapy session\u201d, answered \u201cno\u201d. Then, counsel for appellant asked:\nQ.: \u2014or a treatment session?\nA.: No, sir. It was not.\nQ.: Were there any \u2014 are there any group therapy sessions?\nA.: No, sir.\nQ.: Well, what was it, was it merely recreational?\nA.: No, sir.\nQ.: Well, what was the status of the group, at that time?\nA.: I\u2019m not sure I understand your question, sir.\nQ.: Well, I mean, was it a . . . was this group a part of the program of treatment?\nA.: Yes, sir.\nQ.: This statement occurred during a program of treatment with a psychiatrist or a social worker present?\nA.: All but a psychiatrist.\nQ.: Okay. And this was an official part of the program of treatment at your facility, when this statement was made?\nA.: If I might take a little liberty, not a scheduled part of the program, but a part of the program.\nQ.: Okay. It was a part of the program, though?\nA.: It was a reaction to the situation.\nFrom the testimony above, it is impossible to determine whether the meeting in question would invoke Rule 503, of the Uniform Rules of Evidence regarding confidential communications. However, we find it unnecessary to render judgment on the issue since the trial judge had made appellant\u2019s probation conditional upon appellant\u2019s successful completion of the drug rehabilitation program. The trial judge expressly recognized this fact when addressing counsel for appellant after he objected to Mr. Thayer\u2019s testimony:\nOn the other hand, if you want to invoke this privilege, the court may permit you to do so. But this man can say, without violating the privilege, that he is no longer a patient there. . . . And my records would show that if he is not a patient there, he is in contempt of court and he is violating the rules and regulations that I permitted him to go there.\nThe trial judge has the authority to grant a conditional probation under Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 4l-1203(2)(3):\n(2) If the court suspends imposition of sentence on a defendant or places him on probation, it may, as a condition of its order, require that the defendant:\n... (e) participate in a community-based rehabilitation program.\nAn appellate court will not overturn a trial judge\u2019s granting of a petition of revocation unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Cureton v. State, 266 Ark. 363, 589 S.W. 2d 204 (Ark. App. 1979); Pearson v. State, 262 Ark. 513, 558 S.W. 2d 149 (1977); Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1208(4). In the instant case, we can not say that the trial judge\u2019s findings were clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. The suspended sentence was expressly conditioned upon the successful completion of the drug rehabilitation program. Appellant did not complete the program, and absent a showing that appellant was arbitrarily dismissed from the program, then the trial judge could justifiably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had failed to comply with a condition of his suspension or probation.\nAppellant\u2019s second point is that the trial court erred in sentencing appellant to a term of years greater than that originally imposed. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1208(6) provides:\n(6) If the court revokes a suspension or probation, it may enter a judgment of conviction and may impose any sentence on defendant that might have been imposed originally for the offense of which he was found guilty, provided that any sentence to pay a fine or to imprisonment when combined with any previous fine or imprisonment imposed for the same offense shall not exceed the limits of sections 901 [\u00a7 41-901] or 1101 [\u00a7 41-1101, or, if applicable, section 1001 [\u00a7 41-1001]. [Acts 1975, No. 280, \u00a7 1203, p. 500.]\nAppellant argues that Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 43-2326 is a distinct method of sentencing, and when mere execution of a sentence is suspended and is thereafter revoked, the trial judge is restricted to the original sentence imposed, citing Cureton v. State, 266 Ark. 363, 589 S.W. 2d 204 (Ark. App. 1979); Hughes v. State, 264 Ark. 723, 574 S.W. 2d 888 (1979). In each of these cases, the court was unable to review the issue for the reason that it was raised for the first time on appeal. However, appellant requests that we review the issue since it is an error which is plain on the face of the record. State v. Lawrence, 246 Ark. 644, 439 S.W. 2d 819 (1969); Wells v. State, 193 Ark. 1092, 104 S.W. 2d 456 (1937).\nWe believe the trial judge did not have the authority to impose a greater sentence than was originally imposed pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-803 (Repl. 1977). [See also Culpepper v. state, 268 Ark. 263, 595 S.W. 2d 220 (1980) ]. Under this section of the Criminal Code, a trial judge is only authorized to suspend imposition of a sentence or place the defendant on probation. The suspension of the execution of sentence is no longer authorized and Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 43-2326 (Repl. 1977) is repealed by implication. Culpepper, supra. Consequently, since the trial judge had already executed the sentence, he could not thereafter impose a greater sentence than was originally imposed.\nThe decision of the trial court is accordingly modified and the sentence of appellant is reduced from three years to two years.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Steele Hays, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John W. Achor, Public Defender, by: Sandra T. Beavers, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Mary Davies Scott, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Charles Edward ADAMS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 80-2\n599 S.W. 2d 437\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 14, 1980\nReleased for publication June 4, 1980\nJohn W. Achor, Public Defender, by: Sandra T. Beavers, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Mary Davies Scott, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0601-01",
  "first_page_order": 639,
  "last_page_order": 644
}