{
  "id": 1712541,
  "name": "Leroy VIAR v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Viar v. State",
  "decision_date": "1980-06-18",
  "docket_number": "CA CR 80-12",
  "first_page": "772",
  "last_page": "774",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "269 Ark. 772"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "601 S.W.2d 579"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "259 Ark. 81",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1619139
      ],
      "year": 1976,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/259/0081-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "261 Ark. 263",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1678891
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/261/0263-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 243,
    "char_count": 3358,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.715,
    "pagerank": {
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      "percentile": 0.06457905460897527
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    "sha256": "10fc6319448541c4cb8311f6e6ea4de1bc7917d4e95d470a08a1ba81a9f420bf",
    "simhash": "1:aad6cd4ffcf5d02a",
    "word_count": 568
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:52:47.346821+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Leroy VIAR v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Ernie E. Wright, Chief Judge.\nThe appellant Leroy Viar was charged with battery in the first degree, and at trial was convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of battery in the second degree, and a $2,000.00 fine was imposed. He appeals contending only for reversal the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the meaning of the word recklessly.\nThe court\u2019s instruction on battery in the second degree included the following:\nA person commits Battery in the Second Degree if for the purpose of causing physical injury to another person; he causes serious physical injury to any person; or with the purpose of causing physical injury to another person, he causes physical injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon; or, he recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon.\nThereafter, the court\u2019s instructions defined the terms serious physical injury and deadly weapon, but did not define the word recklessly. No request was made by appellant for an instruction defining recklessly.\nAppellant argues it was error not to instruct the jury on the meaning of the word recklessly because it is a key element in the offense of battery in the second degree, and the word is defined in Ark. Star. Ann. \u00a7 41-203 (3) (Repl. 1977), the definition being as follows:\nA person acts recklessly with respect to attendant circumstances or as a result of his conduct when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor\u2019s situation.\nWe find no valid basis for appellant\u2019s contention. The instruction given properly set forth three sets of acts and circumstances any one of which constitutes battery in the second degree. Only one of these sets of acts and circumstances involve the word recklessly. There is no showing here that the jury necessarily found the appellant guilty under the section of the statute requiring the action to be done recklessly. Second, the word recklessly is not an obscure, vague or technical word outside the scope of the common understanding of the ordinary individual or juror. Therefore, even though there is a statutory definition in the Criminal Code we are not persuaded the precise definition is essential for the jury\u2019s understanding of the charge of battery in the second degree. We believe an average individual or juror would ascribe substantially the same meaning for the word as contained in the statutory definition. Finally, if appellant desired that the word be defined in the instructions it was his duty to request such instructions. Bousquet v. State, 261 Ark. 263, 548 S.W. 2d 125 (1977); Hilliard v. State, 259 Ark. 81 (1976).\nWhile it would have been in order for the court to define recklessly, we hold it was not reversible error for the court to fail to do so absent a request for such instruction.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Ernie E. Wright, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Jeff Duty and Charles E. Hanks and Wyman R. Wade, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Mary Davies Scott, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Leroy VIAR v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 80-12\n601 S.W. 2d 579\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 18, 1980\nReleased for publication July 8, 1980\nJeff Duty and Charles E. Hanks and Wyman R. Wade, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Mary Davies Scott, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0772-01",
  "first_page_order": 810,
  "last_page_order": 812
}