{
  "id": 1709231,
  "name": "Felix Allen CLARK v. Bill FITZGERALD",
  "name_abbreviation": "Clark v. Fitzgerald",
  "decision_date": "1980-09-15",
  "docket_number": "80-43",
  "first_page": "240",
  "last_page": "242",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "270 Ark. 240"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "605 S.W.2d 1"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
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    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
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    {
      "cite": "250 Ark. 766",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1636818
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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      ]
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    {
      "cite": "475 F. 2d 1220",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        281608
      ],
      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/f2d/475/1220-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "521 F. 2d 1260",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        616173
      ],
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/f2d/521/1260-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "357 F. 2d 801",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        835928
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1966,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/f2d/357/0801-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "266 Ark. 237",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8718022
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/266/0237-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 4620,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.724,
    "pagerank": {
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      "percentile": 0.7847297274860426
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    "sha256": "4cf340b70b17cb339d785595526193932627b082621a6039252195648b32ad23",
    "simhash": "1:0fed101629a6bff0",
    "word_count": 772
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:40:39.197564+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Felix Allen CLARK v. Bill FITZGERALD"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Frank Holt, Justice.\nFollowing our reversal and remand in Newton & Fitzgerald v. Clark, 266 Ark. 237, 582 S.W. 2d 955 (1979), the trial court held a \u201chearing on mandate.\u201d Afterwards, the court issued an \u201corder on mandate\u201d dismissing appellant\u2019s cause of action as to Fitzgerald. Clark appeals contending that since we \u201creversed and 'remanded\u201d without further directions, he is entitled to a new trial as to Fitzgerald.\nIn the original action, Clark brought suit against Newton and Fitzgerald for injuries sustained when Clark drove into the rear of Newton\u2019s loaded log truck which had stalled on a bridge. Fitzgerald, a contractor or timber dealer for Georgia Pacific Corporation, was found liable by the jury on the theory appellant was an independent contractor working for him. On appeal, after reviewing the evidence, we said that the trial court should have directed a verdict for Fitzgerald, because the evidence did not establish that Newton was an independent contractor; i.e., Newton was a log supplier as far as Fitzgerald was concerned and, even if he were an independent contractor, there was no evidence he was an incompetent contractor.\nUpon our reversal, it appears that the trial court interpreted our opinion to require a dismissal as to Fitzgerald. Appellant argues this was error citing cases that upon a reversal and remand, as here, the entire matter goes back for a new trial on all issues. The appellee responds correctly that the trial court\u2019s order is no longer an appealable order citing A. R. Civ. P. 54(b), effective July 1, 1979, or before this proceeding. The Rule in pertinent part provides:\nWhen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim or third party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.\nHere the trial court, as indicated, in its \u201corder on mandate,\u201d found the case against Fitzgerald had been fully developed and dismissed it as to him and, by a supplemental order, awarded a judgment for the costs against the appellant. The court did not expressly direct an entry of a final judgment nor make an express determination there was no just reason for delay.\nOur Rule 54 (b) is identical to F. R. Civ. P. 54 (b). The purpose of the Rule is \u201cto strike a balance between the undesirability of piecemeal appeals and the problems of timing of review, which have been accentuated by the Rules\u2019 liberalized procedure for joinder, crossclaims and counterclaims.\u201d RePass v. Vreeland, 357 F. 2d 801 (3rd Cir. 1966). In observing the salutary purpose of Rule 54 (b), the court said in Sargent v.Johnson, 521 F. 2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1975): \u201cThe efficient administration of justice requires avoidance of piecemeal appeal and interlocutory adjudication.\u201d See also Reporter\u2019s Note to A. R. Civ P. 54 (b). The trial court\u2019s express determination that there is no just reason for delay and its express direction to enter judgment, are essential prerequisites to finality, and without them, the appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Sargent v. Johnson, supra; RePass v. Vreeland, supra; Oak Construction Company v. Huron Cement Company, 475 F. 2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1973); and Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil \u00a7 2660. Thus, regardless of the state of the law prior to the adoption of Rule 54 (b) (see Little Adm\u2019 v. McGraw, 250 Ark. 766, 467 S.W. 2d 163 [1971]), this rule now controls the finality and appealability of a judgment when an action, as here, involves more than one party. Consequently, in the absence of the trial court\u2019s certification in compliance with Rule 54 (b), we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.\nAppeal dismissed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Frank Holt, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Griffin, Rainwater & Draper, Crossett, for appellant.",
      "Shackleford, Shackleford & Phillips, P.A., El Dorado, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Felix Allen CLARK v. Bill FITZGERALD\n80-43\n605 S.W. 2d 1\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered September 15, 1980\nGriffin, Rainwater & Draper, Crossett, for appellant.\nShackleford, Shackleford & Phillips, P.A., El Dorado, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0240-01",
  "first_page_order": 268,
  "last_page_order": 270
}