{
  "id": 1756064,
  "name": "Rex CAMP v. Gerald ELMORE and FIREMAN'S INSURANCE CO.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Camp v. Elmore",
  "decision_date": "1980-12-10",
  "docket_number": "CA 80-294",
  "first_page": "407",
  "last_page": "409",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "271 Ark. 407"
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    {
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      "cite": "609 S.W.2d 86"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
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    "name_long": "Arkansas",
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    {
      "cite": "277 App. Div. 483",
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      "year": 1950,
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  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 221,
    "char_count": 2517,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.75,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:30.070289+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Rex CAMP v. Gerald ELMORE and FIREMAN\u2019S INSURANCE CO."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "David Newbern, Judge.\nThe question here is whether the trial court should have granted a summary judgment because he found the appellant\u2019s property which was destroyed by fire did not come within the description \u201cusual or incidental to the occupancy of the [insured] premises as a dwelling.\u201d We hold no summary judgment should have been granted, as this language contained in the homeowner\u2019s insurance policy in question was ambiguous, and thus a material question of fact remained outstanding.\nThe appellant had left some of his personal property in a barn adjacent to the dwelling of Gerald Elmore who had his premises insured under a homeowner\u2019s policy issued by the appellee Fireman\u2019s Insurance Co. A fire occurred, and the appellant\u2019s property was destroyed. The appellant\u2019s property thus destroyed consisted of a wide variety of personalty, including items such as fishing equipment, a cement mixer, wrenches and motors. No facts were disputed except that the appellant wanted an opportunity to have a jury decide whether the appellant\u2019s property was covered. The trial court denied that opportunity by deciding the property \u201cwas not property that was usual or incidental to the premises as a dwelling\u201d and thus, on that basis alone, granted summary judgment.\nAlthough his order does not say so, the judgment must have determined these words in the insurance contract were, as a matter of law, unambiguous. We disagree, as we consider the words highly ambiguous. What is or is not \u201cusual\u201d is a much more open question than, for example, the question where a \u201clow boy\u201d trailer comes within an insurance policy covering \u201cmotor trucks.\u201d In a case where that was the issue, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division held that summary judgment interpreting that term was improper, as it was a question of fact. Utica Carting, Storage & Contracting Co. v. World Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 277 App. Div. 483, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 941 (1950), reh. and app. den., 278 App. Div. 629, 102 N.Y.S. 2d 637 (1951).\nWhen the intent of the parties as to the meaning of a contract is in issue, summary judgment is particularly inappropriate. Porter v. Deeter Real Estate, 255 Ark. 1057, 505 S.W. 2d 18 (1964); Peoples Outfitting Co. v. General Electric Credit Corp., 549 F. 2d 42 (CA7, 1977).\nReversed and remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "David Newbern, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Robert R. Cloar, for appellant.",
      "Jones, Gilbreath & Jones, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Rex CAMP v. Gerald ELMORE and FIREMAN\u2019S INSURANCE CO.\nCA 80-294\n609 S.W. 2d 86\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 10, 1980\nRobert R. Cloar, for appellant.\nJones, Gilbreath & Jones, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0407-01",
  "first_page_order": 437,
  "last_page_order": 439
}