{ "id": 1756254, "name": "Leona LANOY v. Charles L. DANIELS, Director of Labor for the State of Arkansas et al", "name_abbreviation": "Lanoy v. Daniels", "decision_date": "1981-02-16", "docket_number": "80-205", "first_page": "922", "last_page": "926", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "271 Ark. 922" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "611 S.W.2d 524" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "239 Ark. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1730667 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/239/0603-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 370, "char_count": 6114, "ocr_confidence": 0.707, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7499929532571203 }, "sha256": "64dd71e680123ee2b97d289ff3e4c2d89084540248da3719200d257dd4b546a3", "simhash": "1:d24058fe4d29dc3f", "word_count": 1037 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:30.070289+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Purtle and Hays, JJ., dissent.", "Hays, J., joins in this dissent." ], "parties": [ "Leona LANOY v. Charles L. DANIELS, Director of Labor for the State of Arkansas et al" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Darrell Hickman, Justice.\nThis is an Employment Security Division case that was certified to us by the Arkansas Court of Appeals because it concerns interpretation of an Arkansas statute.\nThere is only one issue presented in this appeal and it is purely a question of law. Does Arkansas law provide for partial unemployment benefits where a worker is unemployed for part of the work week and is unavailable for work when work is offered during the remainder of that week? The Board of Review found that partial payments were not authorized because the employee was not \u201cavailable\u201d for.work the rest of the week. The circuit court agreed and we affirm the judgment.\nThe facts are not in dispute. Leona Lanoy was employed by the Morrilton Plastics Company in Morrilton, Arkansas, where her regular work week was five days. The first four days of the week in question Lanoy was available for work but was laid off due to a lack of work. On Friday, October 6th, she reported for work but after an hour and forty-five minutes received a telephone call regarding the death of her brother and she left work.\nLanoy argues that Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1103(m)(l)(B) made her eligible to draw unemployment compensation for the week ending October 7th regardless of whether she was \u201cavailable\u201d for work on Friday or not. The appellee, Charles L. Daniels, Director of Labor, relies on Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 Sill 05 (c) and argues that partial payments are not authorized by Arkansas law where the worker is not \u201cavailable\u201d for work during an entire week. Since Lanoy was not available for work on Friday, it is argued that she was not entitled to that week\u2019s unemployment benefits.\nThis is presented to us as a purely legal question. The Central Arkansas Legal Services has filed an amicus curiae brief supporting Lanoy\u2019s appeal. It is not disputed that responsible state agencies have consistently interpreted the availability provision of the Arkansas law as requiring that claimants be available for work or in the labor market during the entire work week for which they claim benefits in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits for that week.\nWhether Lanoy had good reason for leaving her job Friday is not in issue. The appellant concedes for purposes of appeal that the question is not what happened on Friday but whether benefits may be paid for the four days of unemployment.\nWe conclude that the Arkansas law does not provide for partial benefits under these circumstances. Throughout the Arkansas statutes a week is referred to -as the measuring time for benefits. For example, \u00a7 81-1105 says, \u201cAn insured worker shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the director finds that . . .\u201d [Emphasis added.] Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1104(c) is styled, \u201cWeekly benefits for unemployment\u201d [Emphasis added] and states: \u201cFor all claims filed on and after July 1, 1971, any insured worker who is unemployed in any week as defined in Section 2 (m) [\u00a7 81-1103(m)] and who meets the eligibility requirements of Section 4 [\u00a7 81-1105] shall be paid with respect to such week . . .\u201d [Emphasis added.] The next paragraph, styled \u201cDuration of benefits,\u201d, also speaks of weekly benefit amount.\nThe appellee argues that \u00a7 81-1105(c) controls because it says \u201cSuch worker is unemployed, physically and mentally able to perform suitable work and is available for such work.\u201d [Emphasis added.] The appellant concedes that she was not available on Friday but argues that this situation is not controlling because Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1103(m)(l) reads:\n[A]n individual shall be deemed \u2018unemployed\u2019 with respect to any week during which he performs no services and with respect to which no wages are payable to him, or with respect to any week of less than full time work if the wages payable to him with respect to such week are less than 140% of his weekly benefit amount.\nWe cannot read out of the statute the availability requirement. Even though a worker can get compensation for a week during which the worker performed some work under some circumstances, a worker is not \u201cunemployed\u201d by law unless available for work. The appellant argues Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1103(m)(l) and a liberal interpretation of the statute would permit us to order at least pro-rata benefits.\nWe conclude that the situation cannot be stretched, even with a liberal interpretation, to fit the appellant\u2019s case. This is especially true in view of a long-standing policy against such a practice.\nAffirmed.\nPurtle and Hays, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "Darrell Hickman, Justice." }, { "text": "John I. Purtle, Justice,\ndissenting. I cannot agree with the majority because they read into the Employment Security Act (Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 81-1101 - 81-1108, \u00a7\u00a7 81-1111 - 81-1121) a requirement that an employee who is involuntarily out of work must remain so for a period of one full week before becoming eligible for benefits. I cannot find any prohibition in the act against eligibility for a partial week. There is no dispute in the present case that the appellant was out of work for four days, and it was because her employer did not have work for her. The claim is for four days.\nIt is our practice to interpret such statutes as this in a liberal manner favoring the employee. In fact, a narrow construction, which I think the majority gives, of the act would defeat the very purpose for which it was established. Harmon v. Laney, 239 Ark. 603, 393 S.W. 2d 273 (1965). In Harmon the court interpreted the Arkansas Employment Security Act and Title 3 of the Social Security Act of the United States as being established for the purpose of \u201calleviating economic insecurity\u201d and for the benefit of those \u201cunemployed through no fault of their own.\u201d Therefore, I would allow a partial week\u2019s unemployment benefits to the appellant.\nHays, J., joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "John I. Purtle, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Youngdahl & Larrison, by: Deborah S. Groban, for appellant.", "Thelma Lorenzo, for appellees.", "James R. Cromwell, for amicus curiae, Central Arkansas Legal Services." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Leona LANOY v. Charles L. DANIELS, Director of Labor for the State of Arkansas et al\n80-205\n611 S.W. 2d 524\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 16, 1981\nYoungdahl & Larrison, by: Deborah S. Groban, for appellant.\nThelma Lorenzo, for appellees.\nJames R. Cromwell, for amicus curiae, Central Arkansas Legal Services." }, "file_name": "0922-01", "first_page_order": 984, "last_page_order": 988 }