{
  "id": 1174939,
  "name": "Lloyd W. BLACKMON v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Blackmon v. State",
  "decision_date": "1981-03-09",
  "docket_number": "CR 80-228",
  "first_page": "157",
  "last_page": "159",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "272 Ark. 157"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "612 S.W.2d 319"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "248 Ark. 180",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1970,
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      ]
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    {
      "cite": "255 Ark. 204",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8718972
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/255/0204-01"
      ]
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:44:04.069601+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Lloyd W. BLACKMON v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Steele Hays, Justice.\nOn March 14, 1977, the appellant entered guilty pleas to four separate charges of burglary arising out of four separate incidents in Mississippi County, Arkansas. All of the pleas were entered at one hearing; appellant received identical concurrent sentences on each of the four charges.\nOn April 24, 1980, appellant was convicted of robbery and sentenced as a habitual offender under Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1001 (2) (Repl. 1977). Appellant brings this appeal urging that the court below erred in applying the habitual offender statute. He contends that the four guilty pleas entered in 1977 should be treated as one conviction for purposes of \u00a7 41-1001 (2). We disagree. Appellant\u2019s arguments were previously considered under the prior habitual offender statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 43-2328 (Supp. 1973) in Cox v. State, 255 Ark. 204, 499 S.W. 2d 630 (1973). We held there that the trial court properly applied the habitual offender statute where the defendant, at one hearing, pled guilty to three separate counts of burglary and was sentenced to concurrent terms for each of the three offenses:\nCertainly the burglaries ... are all different offenses, and the plea of guilty to each one constituted conviction for a different offense.\nCox at 209\nSee also,Thom v.State, 248 Ark. 180, 450 S.W. 2d 550 (1970).\nOur decision in Cox under the prior statute is squarely on point with the issue in the present case.\nThe appellant contends that the changes made in the habitual offender statute since the Cox decision warrant a different result. He argues that the purpose of the present statute, \u00a7 41-1001 (2), is to impose a more severe punishment only after the defendant has had an opportunity to reform himself \u2014 that his four prior convictions should be treated as only one conviction, since the concurrent sentences imposed offered only one opportunity to reform. Again, we disagree. Although it is true that a new habitual offender statute has been enacted since the Cox decision, the basic purpose of the statute, to subject repeat offenders to a more severe punishment, is unchanged. As the commentary to \u00a7 41-1001(2) makes clear, that section was intended to create a simpler method for determining the sentence to be imposed:\nWhile adhering to the principle that the habitual offender should be subject to more severe penalties, \u00a7 41-1001 sets out a new method of determining the authorized sentencing range in such cases.\nNothing in the commentary indicates that the purpose of the previous habitual offender statute has been altered by the adoption of \u00a7 41-1001 (2).\nWe believe Cox v. State correctly states the law. Each plea of guilty to separate offenses, though the pleas may be entered simultaneously and though concurrent sentences are imposed, constitutes a separate prior conviction for purposes of the habitual offender statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1001 (2).\nFinding no error in the procedure below, we affirm.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Steele Hays, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "E. Alvin Schay, State Appellate Defender, by: Linda Faulkner Boone, Deputy Defender, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Jack W. Dickerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Lloyd W. BLACKMON v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 80-228\n612 S.W. 2d 319\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 9, 1981\nE. Alvin Schay, State Appellate Defender, by: Linda Faulkner Boone, Deputy Defender, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Jack W. Dickerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0157-01",
  "first_page_order": 179,
  "last_page_order": 181
}