{
  "id": 1754980,
  "name": "CBM OF CENTRAL ARKANSAS, d/b/a COLLECTION CONSULTANTS, INC. v. Geneva York BEMEL",
  "name_abbreviation": "CBM of Central Arkansas v. Bemel",
  "decision_date": "1981-11-09",
  "docket_number": "81-106",
  "first_page": "223",
  "last_page": "226",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "274 Ark. 223"
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      "cite": "623 S.W.2d 518"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    "name": "Ark."
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "cite": "265 Ark. 628",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1665008
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      "year": 1979,
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    {
      "cite": "234 Ark. 495",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1688415
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1962,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/234/0495-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "264 Ark. 683",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1669059
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/264/0683-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:01:13.587143+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "CBM OF CENTRAL ARKANSAS, d/b/a COLLECTION CONSULTANTS, INC. v. Geneva York BEMEL"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nThis is a tort action by the appellee, Mrs. Bemel, against the appellant, Collection Consultants, a company that collects past-due accounts. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant\u2019s unwarranted and overzealous attempts to collect a $402.35 balance on a hospital bill constituted, first, extreme and outrageous conduct causing Mrs. Bemel severe emotional distress, and second, a wrongful invasion of her right of privacy. Both theories were submitted to the jury, which awarded Mrs. Bemel $1,000 compensatory damages and $4,000 punitive damages. Neither award is challenged as being excessive, but three other asserted errors are argued as grounds for reversal.\nFirst, we treat two of the points together, because there was only a general objection to the instructions, presenting no point for appellate review. ARCivP Rule 51; Capital Steel Co. v. Foster & Creighton Co., 264 Ark. 683, 574 S.W. 2d 256 (1978). The same question, however, was raised by the appellant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict, which the court denied. We therefore consider the sufficiency of the evidence to support either theory of recovery.\nMrs. Bemel testified that the bill originated in March, 1975, when her son shot himself in an unsuccessful suicide attempt and was hospitalized. Most of the bill was paid by insurance. The remainder had been reduced by Mrs. Bemel\u2019s payments before it was assigned to the appellant for collection. She testified that she was harassed by Collection Consultants from January to November, 1976, when the creditor brought suit in a municipal court for $272.35. During some ten months she received about 50 collection letters from the appellant. She did not keep any of the letters and does not describe them as having been offensive in any respect except in number.\nHer real grievance arises from about 70 telephone calls she allegedly received during the period. She worked at her job until midnight and usually slept until about 10 a.m., but over her protests the appellant\u2019s employees repeatedly called at her home at 7:00 o\u2019clock or later, awakening her. There were also many calls at her place of employment, also over her objections. She testified that the calls so upset her, by causing flashbacks to her son\u2019s suicidal attempt, that she was unable to work for 15 to 30 minutes at her office or had to go to bed crying at her home. Her son provided some corroboration.\nMrs. Bemel also testified that a person identifying himself as Bill Morgan began calling in late July, saying that he was working out of the prosecuting attorney\u2019s office and was going to garnishee her wages. At times Morgan left his number. When she returned the call the telephone was answered with \u201cCollection Consultants,\u201d and she was connected with a person whose voice was that of Bill Morgan. At first Morgan called four or five times a month, but later he was calling as often as ten times a month.\nThe defendant\u2019s witnesses admitted having sent letters and having made calls to Mrs. Bemel, but their records, purportedly complete, indicated that the letters and calls were comparatively infrequent. They denied any reference to the prosecuting attorney\u2019s office, but did admit that fictitious names were customarily used by the individual collectors to avoid being called at home after working hours \u2014 one of the same harassments that Mrs. Bemel complained about. The conflicting testimony raised questions of fact for the jury to determine.\nWe need not consider the tort of outrageous conduct, discussed fully in the Restatement of Torts (2d), \u00a7 46 (1977), because the jury could have found a wrongful invasion of privacy. We recognized such a cause of action in Olan Mills v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W. 2d 22 (1962). In Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 637, 590 S.W. 2d 840 (1979), we quoted the basic principles stated in \u00a7 652A of the Restatement. This language from Comment d of \u00a7 652B supports the cause of action in the present case:\nThere is likewise no liability unless the interference with the plaintiff\u2019s seclusion is a substantial one, of a kind that would be highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man, as the result of conduct to which the reasonable man would strongly object. Thus there is no liability for knocking at the plaintiff\u2019s door, or calling him to the telephone on one occasion or even two or three, to demand payment of a debt. It is only when the telephone calls are repeated with such persistence and frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff, that becomes a substantial burden to his existence, that his privacy is invaded.\nThe appellant\u2019s remaining contention is that Mrs. Bemel\u2019s lawyer made an impermissible \u201cgolden-rule\u201d argument to the jury. The appellant\u2019s motion for a new trial submitted a transcript of the opening paragraphs of opposing counsel\u2019s closing argument, the record ending with this language:\nNow to decide this lawsuit, I think you\u2019re going to have to put yourself in the shoes of Geneva York Bemel\nDefense Counsel: Your Honor, I hate to interrupt, but Counsel\u2019s well aware that that type of argument is improper.\nThe Court: Your objection will be overruled at this point. Go ahead.\nThere is no indication of how counsel\u2019s argument proceeded from that point on.\nWe have recognized the impropriety of a golden-rule argument such as counsel\u2019s urging the jurors to award what they themselves would take for the life of their father or husband or wife. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. McDaniel, 252 Ark. 586, 483 S.W. 2d 569 (1972). Here, however, the argument was cut off after counsel had merely said that he thought the jurors were going to have to put themselves in the plaintiff\u2019s shoes. That bare remark falls decidedly short of being reversible error.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Donald H. Bacon, for appellant.",
      "James R. Cromwell, of Central Arkansas Legal Services, Inc., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CBM OF CENTRAL ARKANSAS, d/b/a COLLECTION CONSULTANTS, INC. v. Geneva York BEMEL\n81-106\n623 S.W. 2d 518\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered November 9, 1981\nDonald H. Bacon, for appellant.\nJames R. Cromwell, of Central Arkansas Legal Services, Inc., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0223-01",
  "first_page_order": 247,
  "last_page_order": 250
}