{
  "id": 1753632,
  "name": "Leon DILLARD v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Dillard v. State",
  "decision_date": "1982-03-15",
  "docket_number": "CR 81-118",
  "first_page": "320",
  "last_page": "324",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "275 Ark. 320"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "629 S.W.2d 291"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "401 U.S. 222",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        11712077
      ],
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/401/0222-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "274 Ark. 134",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1755062
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1981,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/274/0134-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "446 U.S. 291",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        6182222
      ],
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/446/0291-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "451 U.S. 477",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        6187603
      ],
      "year": 1981,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/451/0477-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "384 U.S. 436",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        12046400
      ],
      "year": 1966,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/384/0436-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 329,
    "char_count": 4769,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.827,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.9799715881425009e-07,
      "percentile": 0.7404545593198677
    },
    "sha256": "7992dd06df9e01278a2eadc96b84587b9c288e1c775131f37b9aa5f495ab95b6",
    "simhash": "1:2bba4403194ecbe6",
    "word_count": 844
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:26:14.502720+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Leon DILLARD v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Darrell Hickman, Justice.\nThe narrow issue in this case is whether the appellant waived his right to a lawyer before he gave an incriminating statement. Leon Dillard, the appellant and city treasurer of Glenwood, Arkansas, was suspected of stealing city funds. On February 28, 1980, several law enforcement officials met with Dillard and informed him that he was suspected of theft. He signed a form acknowledging that he had received the Miranda warnings and later signed a statement admitting, \u201cI have taken some money, but I also believe that some money is missing in which I have had no part. . . Amount of money that I took that I remember is about $3,000.00.\u201d\nDillard was convicted and on appeal challenges the trial court\u2019s finding that his statement was admissible. He cites Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Edwards v, Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) as controlling.\nThe prosecuting attorney\u2019s investigator, Joe White, and the sheriff were present when Dillard made his statement. They both conceded that Dillard said he wanted a lawyer when informed of his rights. But both insisted that Dillard continued the conversation, asking them questions, and, thus, waived hjs right to counsel. The exact testimony is important,\nWhite testified:\n... I told him then that his rights statement that he signed was not a waiver of his rights. I had to ask him the question, \u2018Did he want to talk to us?\u2019 And he said, \u2018Well, I better get a lawyer.\u2019 I said, \u2018Fine. You need to go get a lawyer.\u2019 And he said, \u2018But I want to know what this is all about.\u2019 We told him there was some money missing at Glenwood, and he continued the conversation. We told him then, again; in fact, he was told several times he shouldn\u2019t say any more if he was going to get a lawyer to leave, but he continued his conversation. We didn\u2019t feel like that we were obligated to run off ourself. [Emphasis added.]\nQ. All right.\nA. But after he said he was going to get a lawyer, he himself waived again and said, \u2018Well, I will talk to you without one right now, and I can quit when I want to.'\nThe sheriff testified:\nQ. What was done by you and Mr. White and anybody else that might have been there at that time about that; what was said about that, if you remember?\nA. If I recall the conversation, I believe you were present at that time; and if I recall your statement that possibly he might ought to go ahead and get an attorney.\nQ. Did he choose to do it?\nA. Well, he continued to ask questions of us, you know, at that time.\nQ. Did he then proceed to make a voluntary statement without being interrogated any further?\nA. Sure did.\nQ. In other words, after he mentioned that he thought that he might should talk to an attorney, was there any interrogation as such continued \u2014 that continued?\nA. There might have been some questions asked, but I don\u2019t recall if there was.\nQ. Well, you already testified that after he indicated that he might should talk to a lawyer that he was told that he probably should?\nA. I know that he had asked some questions, and we tried to provide answers for them, and we may have asked some questions, but I don\u2019t recall.\nQ. At any rate, after he indicated that he thought maybe he should talk to a lawyer, he was given every opportunity to do so; is that correct?\nA. Yes, sir.\nEdwards v. Arizona, supra, held that once a suspect requests counsel, questioning must cease and cannot be reinitiated by the police. Therefore, the question is whether the police initiated the further questioning or was the conversation begun by Dillard; in other words, what action amounts to \u201cinterrogation\u201d by the police after a suspect has requested counsel? See Rhode Island v. McInnis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). Undoubtedly it is purely a fact question in some instances, as it is in this case. On appeal we review such matters independently, considering the totality of the circumstances and do not reverse the trial court unless the ruling was clearly erroneous. Coble v. State, 274 Ark. 134, 624 S.W. 2d 421 (1981). On the record in this case we cannot reverse the finding.\nThe appellant in passing argues that two other statements given by Dillard used to impeach him were tainted because they were a result of his first statement. Those two statements were given without a prior Miranda warning. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) held that statements which are given voluntarily but without a prior Miranda warning can be used to impeach the credibility of a defendant who testifies in his own behalf.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Darrell Hickman, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Wayne R. Williams, of Williams ir Williams, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Arnold M. Jochums, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Leon DILLARD v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 81-118\n629 S.W. 2d 291\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 15, 1982\nWayne R. Williams, of Williams ir Williams, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Arnold M. Jochums, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0320-01",
  "first_page_order": 330,
  "last_page_order": 334
}