{ "id": 1751446, "name": "O. Porter HILLARD et al v. J. T. STEPHENS d/b/a STEPHENS PRODUCTION COMPANY et al", "name_abbreviation": "Hillard v. Stephens", "decision_date": "1982-07-12", "docket_number": "81-231", "first_page": "545", "last_page": "558", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "276 Ark. 545" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "637 S.W.2d 581" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "429 S.W.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10147813 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/429/0866-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 So.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9566349 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/401/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 P.2d 1269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10441968 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/630/1269-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3315", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the price specified in the Ark-La gas purchase contracts" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "586 P.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "221 Kan. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 66281 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/kan/221/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 So.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9566349 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/401/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 P.2d 1269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10441968 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/630/1269-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 912, "char_count": 24657, "ocr_confidence": 0.813, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.87723856472003e-07, "percentile": 0.7270997266636009 }, "sha256": "0a0d6e2dbaa7d5d9bb7a3a75cbadd72f2903d817aa4a81f682f87730358dc418", "simhash": "1:833816982403dfc6", "word_count": 4157 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:52:15.988639+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Adkisson, C.J., and Holt, J., not participating.", "George O. Jernigan, Special C. J., joins in the opinion.", "Hickman, J., concurs in part and dissents in part." ], "parties": [ "O. Porter HILLARD et al v. J. T. STEPHENS d/b/a STEPHENS PRODUCTION COMPANY et al" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Milas H. Hale, Special Justice.\nThis case is before the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 29 (1) (n) as it presents issues of first impression regarding gas rights. Appellants, plaintiffs below, the \u201cHillards,\u201d are lessors of seven gas leases in Franklin County, Arkansas. Appellees, \u201cStephens,\u201d are the lessees.\nThe first lease was executed on or about February 6, 1957, and all of the gas produced from the wells, except that part used, retained and/or purchased by the Hillards under the leases and as modified by letter agreements was sold for use off of the premises under long-term gas purchase contracts. Stephens paid appellants over the years based on \u201cnet proceeds\u201d which Stephens received for the sale of the gas under the long-term gas purchase contracts. Appellants contend that royalties have been underpaid.\nAll of the gas leases were on the same oil and gas lease form then in use in the State of Arkansas, and more particularly, the Arkhoma basin of Arkansas, but each such lease contained certain modifications. The first five of these leases provide for a royalty to the lessor as follows:\n3. (b) The Lessee shall pay Lessor as royalty for gas the equal one-eighth (1/8) of the value of such gas calculated at the rate of \u201cfive cents\u201d Prevailing Market Price at Well per thousand cubic feet while the same is being sold or used off the premises, measured according to Standard Measurement Law in the State in which the above described land lays.\nThe term \u201cfive cents\u201d as set out in the foregoing provision was struck out and the term \u201cprevailing market price\u201d was inserted therein. Stephens paid royalty to the Hillards and the Hillards accepted the royalty payments without complaint until this suit was filed on June 28,1979, based on the \u201cnet proceeds\u201d from the Ark-La contracts.\nTwo of the leases provided for a royalty to lessor as follows:\n3. (b) The Lessee shall pay Lessor as royalty for gas the equal one-eighth (1/8) of the value of such gas calculated at the rate of five seven (7) cents per thousand cubic feet while the same is being sold or \u00fcsed off the premises, measured according to the Standard Measurement Law of the State in which the above described land lays.\nThe term \u201cfive\u201d as set out in the foregoing provisions of the two leases was struck out and the term \u201cseven (7)\u201d was inserted therein. Stephens paid royalty to the Hillards under these two leases from the commencement of production of natural gas to July 21,1970, computed on the \u201cnet proceeds\u201d received from the Ark-La contracts. After July 21, 1970, Stephens paid royalty to the Hillards computed at a set amount of approximately $ .16 per MCF and was unable to explain why it did not compute the royalty based on the \u201cnet proceeds\u201d received from the sale of the gas as in the past. The Hillards accepted the royalty payments from Stephens without complaint until this suit was filed on June 28,1979.\nOn June 30, 1981, the trial court held:\n1. That the \u201cprevailing market price at the well\u201d provision of the royalty clause in the first five of the leases requires that Stephens\u2019 royalty obligation be settled on the basis of \u201ccurrent sales\u201d of the gas on a daily basis through November 8,1978, and thereafter by reference to \u00a7 105 of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3315 which fixes the maximum price for such gas at the price specified in the existing contracts under which Ark-La purchased the gas from Stephens; and\n2. That Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 53-511 (Repl. 1971) converted the two leases from the fixed price of $0.07 per MCF leases to \u201cproceeds\u201d leases and required that Stephens\u2019 royalty obligation be settled on the basis of the \u201cnet proceeds\u201d received by Stephens for the sale of the gas to Ark-La under the contract. JThe trial court awarded Hillards a judgment for $193,749.00, with prejudgment interest. Hillards appealed and Stephens cross-appealed.\nThe Hillards contend on appeal:\n1. That with respect to the first five of the leases, they are entitled to a royalty computed on the current market value of the gas in the field determined on a daily basis the moment the gas is produced and/or delivered to Ark-La under the gas purchase contracts;\n2. That with respect to the last two of the leases (the fixed price leases of $0.07 per MCF) they were entitled to a royalty computed on the \u201cnet proceeds\u201d received by Stephens from Ark-La from the sale of the gas under the contracts, because these leases were converted into \u201cproceeds leases\u201d under \u00a7 53-511, and alternatively, they own all of the gas produced under these two leases on and after June 28, 1974, because these two leases were forfeited retroactively by Stephens under Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 53-514 (Repl. 1971).\nStephens contends on cross-appeal:\n1. That the \u201cprevailing market price at the well\u201d under the five leases is determined by the contracts between Stephens and Ark-La, for the sale of the gas and Stephens\u2019 payment to the Hillards of the royalty computed on the price per MCF received by Stephens under the long-term contracts discharges in full its obligation to pay royalty.\n2. That \u00a7 105 of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA), 15 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3315, determines the \u201cmarket value\u201d of the Hillard gas on and after its effective date on November 9, 1978, and Stephens\u2019 payment to the Hillards of the royalty computed pursuant to \u00a7 105 of the NGPA, 15 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3315 (the price specified in the Ark-La gas purchase contracts) discharges in full its obligation to pay royalty.\n3. That payment of royalty to the Hillards computed at the rate of $0.07 per MCF as specified in the last two leases discharges in full its obligation to pay royalty because \u00a7\u00a7 53-511 and 53-514 do not apply to gas leases, since these gas leases constituted a present sale of gas in place with all the title to such gas being vested absolutely in Stephens and none in the Hillards.\n4. That if \u00a7\u00a7 53-511 and 53-514 convert the fixed price leases (the 0.07 per MCF) into proceeds leases, then all the gas leases are converted into proceeds leases by the statute.\n5. Other grounds for relief based on the doctrines of estoppel and laches and Stephens objects to the awarding of pre-judgment interest.\nThe first issue to be decided here is whether the \u201ccontract price\u201d that Stephens receives according to the gas purchase contracts with Ark-La is the \u201cprevailing market price at well\u201d under the five leases. We hold that it is. The gas lease constitutes a present sale of all of the gas in place at the time such lease is executed; and as the gas leaves the well head, the entire ownership thereof is in the lessee, none being reserved in the lessor. Once the lessee-producer drills a well resulting in the commercial production of natural gas on the leased premises, the lessee-producer has the immediate duty to market the gas. In order to market such gas effectively, it is the custom in the industry and is usually necessary for the lessee-producer to sell the gas under a long-term gas purchase contract. In Tara Petroleum Corporation v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1273 (Okla. 1981), the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated:\nWe have recognized this necessity of the market, and we believe that lessors and lessees know and consider it when they negotiate oil and gas leases. Lessors and lessees also know that during the term of a gas purchase contract gas prices may increase, perhaps substantially. During the term a producer\u2019s revenues, fluctuations in the production aside, will not increase. Yet if royalty must be paid on the basis of a \u201ccurrent,\u201d steadily-increasing \u201cprevailing price,\u201d then the lessor\u2019s share will take an even larger and larger proportion of the producer\u2019s revenues.\nFollowing the foregoing quotation, the Tara court considered an example of how the lessor would continue to receive a larger portion of the revenues for the sale of the gas, if the lessor\u2019s contention were followed. Similarly, in this case, on December 1,1981, Stephens would be receiving from Ark-La under the gas purchase contracts the sum of $0.3390 per MCF for the Hillard gas, and the Hillards contend that they are entitled to be paid royalty computed on a \u201cprevailing market price at well\u201d of about $2.40 per MCF with their royalty portion amounting to $0.30 per MCF, while Stephens\u2019 revenues per MCF will remain constant. If this were true, then Stephens will keep only $0.0390 per MCF from the $0.3390 proceeds received. As stated by the Oklahoma court in Tara, supra, p. 1273:\nThis would not be fair to the producers ... We do not believe that the lessors in this case... ever contemplated that the lessors\u2019 royalty could be over half of what the producers... received for the gas. The better rule \u2014 and the one we adopt \u2014 is that when a producer\u2019s lease calls for a royalty on gas based on the market price at the well and the producer enters into an arm\u2019s-length, good faith gas purchase contract with the best price and term available to the producer at the time, that price is the \u201cmarket price\u201d and will discharge the producer\u2019s gas royalty obligation.\nSee also, Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 401 So.2d 600 (La. Ct. Appeals, 1981). We recognize that the Texas courts have taken a Afferent approach, see Texas Oil if Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Texas 1968) and other Texas cases that followed it.\nHere, the gas purchase contracts under which the Hillard gas was sold to Ark-La were effective as long as natural gas was produced from the Hillard wells. At the time these contracts were executed, all natural gas produced in Arkansas was then being sold to either Ark-La, or Arkansas Western Gas Company, or Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Company under long-term contracts. None of Arkansas production was sold or used outside the State of Arkansas. Stephens placed in evidence a substantial number of such gas purchase contracts that accounted for the sale of substantially all of the production in Arkansas with computerized graphs reflecting the comparison of the price per MCF of the Hillard gas received by Stephens under its contract with the price per MCF under the other Stephens gas purchase contracts, and in each such case the price per MCF of Stephens gas was substantially greater than the price per MCF received by the other producers in the field. In this respect, the circuit court found as a matter of fact that Stephens had fulfilled its obligations to market the Hillard gas and stated:\nThe Court, however, is of the opinion that the gas sale contracts entered into between Stephens Production Company and Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company were negotiated at arms-length and in good faith. Although there was no testimony introduced, questions were raised in the interrogatories to establish the percentage of interest of Stephens in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company. The Court cannot conceive of businessmen of the caliber of the Stephens accepting a lesser amount for the sale of gas, the total of which would come directly to them, than they would receive as stockholders in a large gas distribution company which they would have to share with other stockholders and after additional distribution and administrative expense would reduce it further. The Court finds nothing in the record by which anyone in the early 1960s could have anticipated or predicted the inordinate increase in gas prices that has occurred in the 1970s.\nWe believe that this interpretation of \u201cprevailing market price at the well\u201d is consistent with the intent and understanding of both Homer Hillard, the Hillards\u2019 predecessor in title, and Stephens, and it is the only interpretation that operates fairly for the producer. It is not unfair to the Hillards. As long as the gas purchase contracts were reasonable when entered into, and as long as the law recognizes long-term gas purchase contracts as binding in the face of escalating prices, the law should not penalize Stephens who was forced into the gas purchase contracts in a large measure by its duty to the Hillards to market the gas efficiently and effectively. However, if the long-term gas purchase contracts executed by Stephens and Ark-La were not reasonable when entered into, if they are not at a minimum fair and representative of other contracts negotiated at the time in the field, then a different result obtains, because Stephens has not then protected its lessors (the Hillards) in discharging its duty to market the gas efficiently and effectively and there is no policy in the law requiring the courts to protect the lessee (Stephens) in interpreting the leases. But here the evidence contained in the record makes it abundantly clear and the trial court so found, that the Stephens and Ark-La purchase contracts were fair and reasonable and that Stephens had discharged its obligation to the Hillards to market the gas efficiently and effectively. In any event, the burden of proving that the gas purchase contracts between Stephens and Ark-La were unfair or unreasonable at the time they were entered into is on the Hillards, Tara, supra, and in this case there is no hint that the contracts were unfair or unreasonable. Nor is it fair for the trial court to impose its own methodology and interpretation.\nSince here the Stephens-Ark-La contract price per MCF of gas is the \u201cprevailing market price at well,\u201d the lessors (the Hillards) were not entitled to any additional royalties from the producer (Stephens). In this respect the j udgment is reversed on cross-appeal.\nThe last two leases provide for a royalty per MCF to the lessor (Hillards) as follows:\n3. (b) The Lessee shall pay Lessor as royalty for gas the equal one-eighth (1/8) of the value of such gas calculated at the rate of five seven (7) cents per thousand cubic feet while the same is being sold or used off the premises, measured according to the Standard Measurement Law of the State in which the above described land lays.\nThe Hillards contend and the trial court held that the Hillards were entitled to have their royalty payments due them under these $0.07 per MCF leases computed on the \u201cproceeds\u201d received by Stephens under the long-term gas purchase contracts between Stephens and Ark-La because \u00a7 53-511 converted these last two leases from \u201cfixed price\u201d leases into \u201cproceeds\u201d leases. Section 53-511 provides:\nIt shall be the duty of both the lessee, or his assignee, and any pipe line company, corporation or individual contracting for the purchase of oil or gas under any oil, gas or mineral lease to protect the royalty or lessors interest by paying to such lessor or his assignees the same price including such premiums, steaming charges, and bonuses of whatever name, for royalty oil or gas that is paid such operator or lessee under such lease for the working interest thereunder.\nAlthough the foregoing statute has been in effect since 1929, no cases were found where the statute was interpreted insofar as it applies to the production and marketing of natural gas.\nIf, as the trial court held, \u00a7 53-511 converts all \u201cfixed price\u201d gas leases into \u201cproceeds\u201d leases, it follows that fixed prices favorable to a lessor or higher \u201cfixed price\u201d leases would be converted into \u201cproceeds\u201d leases. That is not the intent of the statute. Nor is it to prohibit fixed price contracts for oil and gas leases. Absent indications previously referenced, it is clear that \u00a7\u00a7 53-511 and 53-514 are inapplicable in this case and could not under the circumstances cause Stephens to forfeit the leases to the Hillards.\nWe hold that Stephens\u2019 payment of royalty to the Hillards computed at the rate of $0.07 per MCF discharges its obligation to pay royalty under these leases.\nStephens contends that it is entitled to a judgment against the Hillards for the excessive payment of royalty under these $0.07 per MCF leases because it paid excess royalties. The record disclosed that Stephens did pay the Hillards additional royalties but the record fails to disclose evidence that such royalty paid was due to a \u201cmutual mistake of fact\u201d on the part of both Stephens and the Hillards. We hold that Stephens is not entitled to a judgment against the Hillards for the excessive royalty payments under the $0.07 per MCF leases.\nI\nSeveral other issues were raised on appeal. Holding as we have, we find it unnecessary to decide those questions.\nThe trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.\nAdkisson, C.J., and Holt, J., not participating.\nGeorge O. Jernigan, Special C. J., joins in the opinion.\nHickman, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "Milas H. Hale, Special Justice." }, { "text": "Darrell Hickman, Justice,\nconcurring in part, dissenting in part. The trial judge in a comprehensive and detailed set of findings meticulously gave his reasons for his decision in this complicated lawsuit. The majority has reversed those findings in every respect.\nThis is an oil and gas case and essentially there were two kinds of leases in question. The leases were signed by Homer Hillard and his wife as landowners and Stephens Production Company as lessee. Homer Hillard died and his heirs pursued this lawsuit to interpret and enforce the leases according to the law.\nThe first set of leases in question contained a clause which read:\nThe lessee shall pay lessor as royalty for the gas equal one-eighth of the value of such gas calculated at the rate of prevailing market price at well per thousand cubic feet...\u201d [Emphasis added.]\nThe threshold question concerning the interpretation of this italicized language, which is largely ignored by the majority, is whether the language is plain and unambiguous. The trial court found that it was and, therefore, did not consider the abundant testimony offered by the Hillards and Stephens as to what the parties actually meant; or what \u201cprevailing market price at well\u201d meant to the oil and gas business community in the Arkhoma Basin where the land is located. So, to the trial court, the issue was not what the parties may have actually intended but whether the parties should be bound by the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in the lease. The trial court found:\n... This court is not convinced that these words should not be considered in their ordinary and commonly understood meaning.\nEven though the witnesses who testified and who were handling the day-to-day business for Stephens Production Company may have had in mind that the amount which Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company was willing to pay for the gas at that time constituted the prevailing market price, it may have been an unfortunate selection of words which did not in reality express Stephens\u2019 real intent.\nThe words \u2018market price\u2019 have a very common and ordinary meaning with which all of us are familiar. They are used in various transactions and simply refer to what the commodity will bring when placed on the market. And, of course, the word \u2018prevailing\u2019 refers to the conditions in existence at any given time and are changeable from day-to-day or at other given periods.\nIt is my view, therefore, that the testimony as to the intent of the parties was not necessary to arrive at an interpretation of the words used in the lease with reference to the rate of royalty payments and, even though the Court heard this testimony, it has not influenced this finding.\nWhy does the majority find that \u2018\u2018prevailing market price at well\u201d cannot have a commonly understood meaning? The majority simply does not satisfactorily answer that question but considers only what it determines to be the real intent of the parties. Necessarily this means that careful consideration should be given to all evidence presented to the trial court during this lengthy trial. That the majority has not done.\nStephens argued to the trial court, and on appeal, that the language is ambiguous and that it was actually meant to create a \u201cproceeds\u201d lease; that is, the Hillards were to be paid a royalty from the proceeds Stephens received from a long term sale agreement it had made with Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company. There was evidence that officers of Stephens knew what a \u201cproceeds\u201d lease was and they could have easily inserted that term but chose not to. Instead, Stephens prepared and signed the lease which contained the common phrase \u201cmarket price.\u201d I would submit Stephens knew exactly what it was doing. As the court stated in Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1 (1977), when it considered similar leases: \u201cThere are two commonly recognized types of leases employed in the gas industry, \u2018proceeds\u2019 leases and \u2018market value\u2019 leases.\u201d There is no doubt there were lengthy negotiations between Hillard and Stephens and there is evidence that unless Stephens had signed such a favorable lease agreement with Hillard, he would have gone to a competitor. In that regard, the court made this finding:\nBoth parties admit that Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company, Arkansas Western Gas Company, and Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Company were all three buying and transporting gas intrastate from or in the Arkhoma Basin during this period although not a highly competitive situation. And, yet, there was testimony that Arkansas Western Gas Company maintained a pipeline not more than one mile from some of the Hillard Wells. This clearly could have constituted a competitive situation for the purchase of the Hillard gas; and since Mr. Walker testified that the negotiations between Stephens and Arkla were arms length and resulted from lengthy and extended conferences, it is the Court\u2019s opinion that Mr. Walker would not have hesitated to have gone to Arkansas Western had there been a substantial price differential.\nSeveral states have considered the effect of similar language in natural gas leases. Generally Oklahoma and Louisiana have sided with the producers and the lessees in determining that the phrase \u201cmarket value at well\u201d actually means \u201cproceeds.\u201d Tara Petroleum Corporation v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981); Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 401 So.2d 600 (La. Ct. Appeals, 1981). The leading authorities for the other position, and that adopted by the trial court, are the states of Texas, Montana, and Kansas. Texas Oil & Gas Corporation, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981); Montana Power Company v. Kravik, 586 P.2d 298 (Mont. 1978); Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corporation, supra.\nFinding that the language of the lease should be given its ordinary meaning, the trial court proceeded to determine the market price. In doing so, the court, in my judgment, correctly rejected the exaggerated claims of both the lessors and the lessees, finding a reasonable middle ground. The lessors essentially wanted the trial court to consider interstate sales in determining the market value; the lessees wanted the court to make the lease over into a \u201cproc\u00e9eds\u201d lease, or at least limit the market to Franklin County. The trial court recognized the peculiar matter of the market in the Arkhoma Basin, there being essentially no strong competition between buyers and, as the finder of fact, used the available evidence to determine a fair market value. In doing so, the trial court considered the \"fair field price\u201d, which is a price determined by the Arkansas Public Service Commission. Certainly, I would not agree that the fair field price would always be the controlling factor of the market value, but it was a factor to be considered and because of the peculiar nature of the market in that area, I cannot say the trial court was clearly wrong in its finding regarding the market value.\nI agree with the majority that Act 222, Acts of Arkansas, 1929, [Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 53-509 \u2014 514] does not void the second types of leases. The Act is penal in nature and must be strictly construed. It only allows for three remedies: Forfeiture of rights, treble damages, or criminal sanctions. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 53-514 and 53-515. There are no provisions in the Act to revise the lease as the trial court did. Furthermore, the Act was obviously designed to penalize lessees that received kickbacks, or otherwise dealt improperly to deny a lessor his usual minimum royalty. There is no evidence at all Stephens acted in any way improperly. In fact, to the contrary, it appears the leases were entered into at arms length in every respect.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Darrell Hickman, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Putman, Gallman it Dickson, by: James W. Gallman; and Niblock ir Odom, by: Walter R. Niblock and Priscilla Karen Pope, for appellants/cross-appellees.", "Spence A. Leamons and Ball, Mourton \u00bfr Adams, by: E. J. Ball, for appellees/cross-appellants.", "Warner & Smith, by: Gerald L. DeLung and G. Alan Wooten, for amicus curiae Tenneco Oil Co. and Shell Oil Co." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "O. Porter HILLARD et al v. J. T. STEPHENS d/b/a STEPHENS PRODUCTION COMPANY et al\n81-231\n637 S.W.2d 581\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinions delivered July 12, 1982\n[Rehearing denied September 13, 1982.]\nPutman, Gallman it Dickson, by: James W. Gallman; and Niblock ir Odom, by: Walter R. Niblock and Priscilla Karen Pope, for appellants/cross-appellees.\nSpence A. Leamons and Ball, Mourton \u00bfr Adams, by: E. J. Ball, for appellees/cross-appellants.\nWarner & Smith, by: Gerald L. DeLung and G. Alan Wooten, for amicus curiae Tenneco Oil Co. and Shell Oil Co." }, "file_name": "0545-01", "first_page_order": 575, "last_page_order": 588 }