{
  "id": 1750233,
  "name": "Willie BANKS, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Banks v. State",
  "decision_date": "1982-09-20",
  "docket_number": "CR 82-38",
  "first_page": "28",
  "last_page": "32",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "277 Ark. 28"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "639 S.W.2d 509"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "270 Ark. 141",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1709312
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/270/0141-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 472,
    "char_count": 7731,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.796,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 6.041502013137158e-08,
      "percentile": 0.37406466554613804
    },
    "sha256": "98e06513638d60bb65047f769909aaec702e147ef1e8e64dbcbd2bb5edbfc25d",
    "simhash": "1:ef8e4a2e24a40b97",
    "word_count": 1330
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:44:10.927944+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Willie BANKS, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Richard B. Adkisson, Chief Justice.\nAfter a trial by jury, appellant, Willie Banks, Jr., was convicted of rape and sentenced as a habitual offender to 30 years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, we affirm.\nAbout noon on Thursday, May 7, 1981, appellant went to the victim\u2019s apartment asking for the telephone number of the victim\u2019s twin sister. He had previously dated the sister while she was visiting in Little Rock.\nThe victim testified as to what transpired in her apartment: She stated that appellant talked for awhile and then stated \u201cI want to be with you.\u201d She objected and attempted to go around him but he grabbed her, telling her to sit down. He then stated in a loud voice, \u201cYou\u2019re going to be with me or I\u2019m going to get crazy. I can get crazy.\u201d He ordered her to go into the bedroom, and \u201cpull your panties off.\u201d He then forced her to have sexual intercourse twice. He also threatened her about going to the police, telling her that if she did, he would \u201cdo something crazy\u201d to her and \u201cget\u201d her parents and relatives. After the bedroom incident, he followed her around the apartment, continuing to threaten her. At one point she was able to yell out the door for help but he pushed her back inside and pulled her over to the living room couch. At that time she said, \u201cPlease don\u2019t make me do this.\u201d He told her to \u201cShut up ... before I beat you in your head,\u201d and again had sexual intercourse with her. She eventually escaped and locked herself in the bathroom, where she stayed 35-45 minutes. She heard appellant leave shortly before 3:00 p.m. The victim did not have a telephone, so she waited until her next door neighbor came home before telling anyone about the rape. The neighbor\u2019s girlfriend called Rape Crisis about 6:00 p.m.\nAppellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction because of alleged inconsistencies in the victim\u2019s testimony. Appellant first contends that the victim\u2019s testimony as to whether her sundress was on or off is inconsistent. However, a reading of the victim\u2019s entire testimony reveals that she testified that her sundress remained on during the first rape, but that she removed it at appellant\u2019s direction before one of the subsequent rapes.\nAppellant also argues that appellant\u2019s testimony as to the time of the rape is inconsistent, alleging that at one time she said it was about 12:00 p.m. or 12:15 p.m. and another time she said it was around 3:00 p.m. This alleged inconsistency is again resolved by a reading of her entire testimony, which reveals that she was raped at various times, the first occurring around noon and the last occurring at approximately 3:00 p.m.\nAppellant also argues there is insufficient evidence that the rape was committed with the requisite force. Forcible compulsion is an element of rape and is defined by Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1801 (2) (Repl. 1977) as:\n. . . physical force, or a threat, express or implied, of death or physical injury to or kidnapping of any person.\nHere, the victim\u2019s testimony indicates that she was subjected to both express and implied threats of physical injury: The victim testified that when she objected to appellant\u2019s first advance and attempted to get around him, he grabbed her and told her to sit down. He then told her that he could \u201cget crazy.\u201d She testified that she was scared not to go into the bedroom when he told her to go. \u201cI was afraid he might jump on me and beat me up.\u201d She testified that prior to sexual intercourse in the living room appellant did threaten to beat her. She also testified that she was trembling and crying throughout the entire ordeal.\nWe stated in Mills v. State, 270 Ark. 141, 603 S.W.2d 416 (1980) that subjective feelings of fear of physical injury by the victim must be based on some act of the accused that can be reasonably interpreted to warrant such fear. The above testimony is sufficient to show that the requisite force was present and that the victim\u2019s fear was warranted.\nAppellant argues that the trial court erred in proceeding to trial without the presence of two witnesses subpoenaed by appellant. The investigator for the public defender testified that one witness, a cousin of appellant named Carl Banks, was afraid to come to court because there were too many warrants out for him. He stated that the second witness, Tommy Jackson, was served and promised he would come, but had been put in jail, then released, and could not be located.\nThe substance of the witnesses\u2019 testimony was disclosed by defense counsel at a pretrial hearing. He stated that Carl Banks would testify that he had seen appellant and the victim together when they came over to his apartment. However, counsel was unable to say whether the witness could tell the victim and her twin sister apart. The other witness, Tommy Jackson, would testify that he left appellant at the victim\u2019s house while he used appellant\u2019s car for two or three hours. On the day of the trial, defense counsel waived the presence of the witnesses by stating \u201cEven if they [the witnesses] were here, it would be very doubtful if I would use them.\u201d\nAppellant has failed to show how he was prejudiced by the failure of these witnesses to testify. Carl Banks\u2019s testimony that appellant and the victim had come to his apartment would not aid appellant\u2019s defense, since it was not shown that Banks could tell the difference between the victim and her twin sister. Tommy Jackson\u2019s testimony that he had dropped appellant off at the victim\u2019s apartment would not materially help appellant\u2019s case either because it is undisputed that appellant had been to the apartment while dating the victim\u2019s twin sister. Under these circumstances, it was not error for the trial court to proceed to trial without the two witnesses.\nAppellant\u2019s last point for reversal is that a mistrial should have been granted because at trial the prosecutor asked whether appellant had given a statement after he received the Miranda warnings. Appellant\u2019s argument is based upon the following exchange between the prosecutor and a Little Rock police officer:\nQ Did he [appellant] acknowledge whether or not he understood his rights?\nA Yes, sir. He said he understood them.\nQ And, as a result of that, did he give you any statement concerning . . .\nAt that point appellant\u2019s attorney objected and after a bench conference the question was withdrawn. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial after the officer finished testifying, which was denied by the court:\nTHE COURT:\nI don\u2019t think there has been any inference to the jury. . . . Bill, this jury has heard and I have heard Defense Counsel on hundreds of cases where they don\u2019t advise them of their rights just raise Cain because they don\u2019t advise them. And this jury may very well think whether he made a statement or not he should be advised of his rights. And most people think they are from TV.\nThere was no question about a statement, whether he did or didn\u2019t. So, there\u2019s no inference for the jury. And, as far as I\u2019m concerned, there\u2019s ho prejudice to the Defendant. The jury just thinks he was advised of his rights, which they\u2019re supposed to do, whether they took a statement or not. That has no import one way or the other.\nSo, I\u2019ll overrule your motion.\nThe court did not err in overruling the motion. The jury received absolutely no prejudicial information as to whether appellant did or did not give a statement. We cannot presume prejudice from the above exchange.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Richard B. Adkisson, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Harold L. Hall, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Victra L. Fewell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Willie BANKS, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 82-38\n639 S.W.2d 509\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered September 20, 1982\n[Rehearing denied October 25, 1982.]\nHarold L. Hall, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Victra L. Fewell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0028-01",
  "first_page_order": 48,
  "last_page_order": 52
}