{ "id": 1748234, "name": "James David SIMPSON, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Simpson v. State", "decision_date": "1983-02-07", "docket_number": "CR 82-126", "first_page": "334", "last_page": "338", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "278 Ark. 334" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "645 S.W.2d 688" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "386 U.S. 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168882 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 250", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1771609 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ark. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1750178 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/277/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ark. 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1756203 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/271/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ark. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1688447 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/234/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ark. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717704 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/243/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 Ark. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1712466 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/269/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 Ark. 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1174846 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/272/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ark. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1754955 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/274/0188-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 447, "char_count": 6219, "ocr_confidence": 0.838, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.060437437128629e-08, "percentile": 0.4255412188123709 }, "sha256": "42783440b169bb300119a3739b79698c547c158ee2b789ab4982b2cc84514d98", "simhash": "1:175f6009630e9f71", "word_count": 1043 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:48:23.352095+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "James David SIMPSON, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Darrell Hickman, Justice.\nThis is the second appeal of this case. We ordered a new trial the first time because the defense was limited in its cross-examination of a witness. Simpson v. State, 274 Ark. 188, 623 S.W.2d 200 (1981).\nJames David Simpson, Jr. was again convicted, this time on two counts of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole on each count.\nThe evidence of Simpson\u2019s guilt was overwhelming. The State produced an eyewitness to the double execution-style murders. Simpson and another man came to a trailer in North Little Rock on March 4, 1979, where Carl Gilmore, his girl friend, Cecelia Pigg Marks, and Larry Gilmore, Carl\u2019s brother, lived. Carl, Larry, their brother Grealing, and Cecelia were all there. All four were shot by Simpson and the other man. Larry and Grealing Gilmore were killed; Carl survived as did Cecelia Pigg Marks, although she had been shot three times. She was the State\u2019s main witness, and identified Simpson as one of the killers.\nIn this appeal three arguments are raised for reversal. Two of them may be disposed of quickly. The State\u2019s proof of robbery, the underlying felony to the capital murders, is questioned. Marks said she saw one of the men counting money from a billfold and testified that \u201cLarry or Carl one said that Grady [Grealing] didn\u2019t have any more money.\u201d This was sufficient evidence to support the robbery allegation. It is also argued that capital murder and first degree murder charges overlap and the instructions for the similar crimes allow a jury to arbitrarily choose between the two. We adhere to our prior decisions which hold that the statutes are constitutional. Simpson v. State, supra; Earl v. State, 272 Ark. 5, 612 S. W.2d 98 (1981); Cromwell v. State, 269 Ark. 104, 598 S.W.2d 733 (1980).\nThe other argument is that a policeman gave an unresponsive, prejudicial answer to a question during cross-examination. David Jones, a policeman from Memphis, who arrested Simpson, mentioned Simpson\u2019s \u201crap sheet\u201d during cross-examination by Simpson\u2019s counsel. Policemen, prosecution and defense attorneys know that a \u201crap sheet\u201d is a police document that lists the arrests and sometimes the convictions of an individual. See Shaddox v. State, 243 Ark. 55, 418 S.W.2d 780 (1967). A mistrial was requested and denied. The trial court declined to give an admonition finding that counsel had invited the answer.\nWhile the mention of \u201crap sheet\u201d is not per se prejudicial, its mention under certain circumstances has been deemed prejudicial error. For example, in Shaddox v. State, supra, during cross-examination of the defendant by the State, the defendant was questioned about his convictions and arrests. At the same time the prosecuting attorney was examining the defendant he was holding a sheet of paper and repeatedly referred to it. We observed, \u201cThe reference to the notes undoubtedly could influence members of the jury to feel that the State\u2019s attorney was holding irrefutable evidence of previous convictions, and could well have been prejudicial.\u201d\nIn a civil case, a plaintiff\u2019s lawyer mentioned the defendant\u2019s \u201crap sheet\u201d during cross-examination of the defendant. After he asked the defendant whether he kept a room in his hotel available for prostitution, the lawyer said he had a \u201crap sheet\u201d on the defendant. Shroeder v. Johnson, 234 Ark. 443, 352 S.W.2d 570 (1962). Again we ruled that the manner in which the reference was made was prejudicial.\nThe facts in this case are unlike those in Shaddox and Shroeder. Here the defendant\u2019s lawyer was questioning a State\u2019s witness on cross-examination. No reference at all was made as to what a rap sheet is or what it might contain. The transcript of the critical testimony reveals that neither the questions nor answers were models of directness or clarity. Jones had briefly testified that his office had received a telephone number from Arkansas authorities and it led to a residence occupied by Simpson. The residence was placed under surveillance. When two or three men helped Simpson load a U-Haul and Simpson tried to leave, he was arrested. The following exchange occurred in the cross-examination of Jones:\nQ Now, when you use the word surveillance that is j ust kind of a technial term meaning we were watching the house because we were asked to watch the house. Isn\u2019t it?\nA Well, after we had this James David Simpson identified and found that he did have an alias of Little Dave, we did put the residence under surveillance until we could get warrants from Little Rock.\nQ Little Dave?\nA Yes, sir.\nQ You mean that his friends call him Little Dave, also?\nA That was the name that was on his rap sheet from the police department.\nThe appellant argues there were only three possible responsive answers to the last question: Yes, no, or I don\u2019t know. Obviously the officer thought the question meant how he knew Simpson was called \u201cLittle Dave,\u201d and he answered how he knew. The trial court found the answer was invited and that decision has to be discretionary under the circumstances. See Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980); and Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 28-1001, Rule 611 (Repl. 1979).\nIt is suggested that the question which evoked the reference to the rap sheet was an effort by the defense to play-down or diminish the use of the word \u201calias\u201d by the officer in one of his prior answers. No doubt the appellant hoped for a brief answer but he left the door open for the answer given. Watson v. State, 277 Ark. 197, 640 S.W.2d 447 (1982). Certainly the answer was not unquestionably unresponsive as the appellant argues.\nWe cannot say under the circumstances that the trial court clearly abused his discretion or that in view of the evidence of Simpson\u2019s guilt, that the trial court erred. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).\nWe find no other prejudicial errors in the record.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Darrell Hickman, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lessenberry ir Carpenter, by: Thomas M. Carpenter; and Charles L. Carpenter, Jr., for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Matthew Wood Fleming, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "James David SIMPSON, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 82-126\n645 S.W.2d 688\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 7, 1983\nLessenberry ir Carpenter, by: Thomas M. Carpenter; and Charles L. Carpenter, Jr., for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Matthew Wood Fleming, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0334-01", "first_page_order": 358, "last_page_order": 362 }