{
  "id": 1746993,
  "name": "Dickson FORREST v. Carole Jean FORREST",
  "name_abbreviation": "Forrest v. Forrest",
  "decision_date": "1983-04-25",
  "docket_number": "83-54",
  "first_page": "115",
  "last_page": "117",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "279 Ark. 115"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "649 S.W.2d 173"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "275 Ark. 112",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1753649
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/275/0112-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 3370,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.825,
    "pagerank": {
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    "simhash": "1:9f4c761cfd027137",
    "word_count": 554
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:56.229407+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Dickson FORREST v. Carole Jean FORREST"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Richard B. Adkisson, Chief Justice.\nThe Drew County Chancery Court granted appellee, Carole Jean Forrest, a limited divorce from appellant, Dickson Forrest, and awarded her alimony. On appeal we must decide whether the trial court erred in the amount of alimony awarded and whether the marital property should have been divided at the time of the decree although both parties had agreed that it was not to be divided at that time.\nThe parties separated on April 8, 1981, and shortly thereafter appellant filed for a divorce. Appellee denied that appellant was entitled to a divorce and counterclaimed for separate maintenance. The trial court dismissed appellant\u2019s action for divorce for insufficient evidence and found that appellee should be awarded a limited divorce on her counterclaim. The trial court ordered appellant to pay $522 per month alimony but stated that if he made the house payment of $212 per month he would be credited this amount. At the time of the decree the marital property was not divided, with the court\u2019s order stating that \u201cthe parties have agreed that it would be inappropriate to cause a division of the parties\u2019 properties as a part of this proceeding.\u201d\nAppellant now argues that the trial court erred in not ordering a property division at the time he granted the limited divorce. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 34-1214 (A) (Supp. 1981) provides:\nDivision of property. \u2014 (A) At the time a divorce decree is entered:\n(1) all marital property shall be distributed . . .\nAs the concurring opinion in Spencer v. Spencer, 275 Ark. 112, 627 S.W.2d 550 (1982) points out, the legislature clearly intended that this statute apply not only to absolute divorce but also to limited divorce. See Compiler\u2019s Notes, Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 34-1214. However, we see no reason why, if the parties so desire and specifically agree, that the trial court cannot postpone the division of the property until a later date. Here, the record reflects that both parties did agree that no property division was to be made at the time the decree was entered; therefore, not distributing the property at that time was not error.\nAppellant argues that the $522 alimony award is excessive since appellee, with appellant\u2019s alimony payments, has a monthly income of $1,034 while appellant\u2019s monthly income, after these payments, is only $908. However, appellant ignores the fact that $212 of the $522 alimony payment is for the house payment, which operates to his benefit since one-half of the house is his.\nAppellant also argues that the court improperly considered the parties\u2019 two adult children who lived at home but did not contribute toward their expenses when arriving at the alimony figure. This assertion is not supported by the record. The court specifically disallowed certain expenses which appellee had requested appellant pay because they were expenses because of the two children. The court also stated: \u201cFrankly, the Court\u2019s position is that those two boys ought to either get out, or go to work and pay some rent...\u201d\nWe cannot say the chancellor\u2019s decision in fixing the amount of alimony is clearly erroneous.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Richard B. Adkisson, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Michael W. Lonsberry of Williamson, Ball ir Bird, for appellant.",
      "Charles S. Gibson of Charles S. Gibson Law Office, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Dickson FORREST v. Carole Jean FORREST\n83-54\n649 S.W.2d 173\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 25, 1983\nMichael W. Lonsberry of Williamson, Ball ir Bird, for appellant.\nCharles S. Gibson of Charles S. Gibson Law Office, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0115-01",
  "first_page_order": 139,
  "last_page_order": 141
}