{
  "id": 1744758,
  "name": "Ralph KUBIK v. Joe W. IGLEHEART",
  "name_abbreviation": "Kubik v. Igleheart",
  "decision_date": "1983-09-26",
  "docket_number": "83-91",
  "first_page": "310",
  "last_page": "312",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "280 Ark. 310"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "657 S.W.2d 545"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "236 Ark. 167",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1681339
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1963,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/236/0167-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "231 Ark. 489",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1697210
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1959,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/231/0489-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 274,
    "char_count": 3147,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.876,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 2.608288845451494e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8201910613321471
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    "sha256": "e4662574e4e04b244cd053abb4fd460332dbea027355f3000360a03613efc48b",
    "simhash": "1:f2a635c747aac872",
    "word_count": 535
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:12:47.726191+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Ralph KUBIK v. Joe W. IGLEHEART"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice.\nThe issue in this tort suit is whether an instruction on comparative negligence was properly refused by the trial court. The appellee, plaintiff below, was operating his motorboat in close proximity to appellant\u2019s boat dock on Lake Norfork. Appellee testified that he was running the boat in a prudent manner when the appellant shot him. To the contrary, appellant\u2019s testimony was that the appellee was driving the boat at a fast speed which caused wakes or waves that could cause progressive damage to his dock and that such conduct on the part of the appellee caused him to fire a warning shot which inadvertently struck the appellee in the head. Appellant argues that he was entitled to an instruction on comparative negligence because (1) violation of a safety statute is some evidence of negligence and (2) his testimony was substantial evidence that appellee violated the following statutes:\n(a) No one shall operate a motorboat in a reckless manner so as to endanger the property of another person. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 21-229 (a) (Repl. 1968).\n(b) No one shall operate a motorboat so as to create a hazardous wash or wake. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 21-232 (d) (Repl. 1968).\n(c) No one shall operate a motorboat at more than five miles per hour within 100 feet of a designated area or dock. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 21-232 (e) (Repl. 1968).\nThe trial court refused to give appellant\u2019s requested instruction on comparative negligence. We affirm. Jurisdiction is properly in this Court. Rule 29 (1) (o).\nThe trial court was correct because, even though plaintiff\u2019s action may have been negligent, that negligence was not the proximate cause of his damages. The fault sought to be compared must be a proximate cause of the damages sustained by a party. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 27-1763 (Repl. 1979). In Arkansas proximate cause is defined in terms of direct causation. H. Woods, The Negligence Case \u2014 Comparative Fault, \u00a7 5:4, at 108 (1978); Prosser, Law of Torts, \u00a7 43, at 264 (4th ed. 1971). Proximate cause is a cause which \u201cin a natural and continuous sequence, produces damage.\u201d AMI 501; Collier v. Citizens Coach Co., 231 Ark. 489, 330 S.W.2d 74 (1959). In his book Judge Woods gives the following example of lack of causal negligence: \u201cAssume that D entrusts his car to A, who is almost blind. A has an accident, but his blindness played no part in it. Simple causation is here lacking. Woods, supra, at 92.\nTesting the case at bar by our definition, it is apparent that, even assuming all of appellant\u2019s testimony to be true, appellee\u2019s negligent operation of the boat would not present an issue for the jury, since the act did not lead in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, to the appellant\u2019s intentional act of firing the shotgun which caused the damages. See Hartsock v. Forsgren Inc., 236 Ark. 167, 365 S.W.2d 117 (1963).\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Laser, Sharp, Haley, Young \u00e9r Huckabay, by: Ralph R. Wilson, for appellant.",
      "Gardner \u00bfr Steinsiek, by: Charles J. Gardner, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Ralph KUBIK v. Joe W. IGLEHEART\n83-91\n657 S.W.2d 545\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered September 26, 1983\nLaser, Sharp, Haley, Young \u00e9r Huckabay, by: Ralph R. Wilson, for appellant.\nGardner \u00bfr Steinsiek, by: Charles J. Gardner, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0310-01",
  "first_page_order": 336,
  "last_page_order": 338
}