{
  "id": 1742315,
  "name": "Judy C. PETTY v. Charlotte S. CHANEY, Executrix",
  "name_abbreviation": "Petty v. Chaney",
  "decision_date": "1983-12-12",
  "docket_number": "83-173",
  "first_page": "72",
  "last_page": "76",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "281 Ark. 72"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "661 S.W.2d 373"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "271 Ark. 818",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1756232
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1981,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/271/0818-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "112 S.W. 373",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
      "year": 1908,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "86 Ark. 368",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1521476
      ],
      "year": 1908,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/86/0368-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "206 Ark. 875",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1485078
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1944,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/206/0875-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "31 Ark. 580",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1879225
      ],
      "year": 1876,
      "opinion_index": 1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/31/0580-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "271 Ark. 818",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1756232
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1981,
      "opinion_index": 1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/271/0818-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 442,
    "char_count": 7878,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.827,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.3399644609087052e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6309329231163671
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    "sha256": "ea0a1a5080b5bd3ca4a7381bc7b8b3f687c3933c727adb8a8e63fae4fa169807",
    "simhash": "1:f33f1603601f9b8a",
    "word_count": 1347
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:39:06.319855+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Adkisson, C.J., and Purtle, J., dissent.",
      "Adkisson, C.J., joins in this dissent."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Judy C. PETTY v. Charlotte S. CHANEY, Executrix"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nThe appellant\u2019s father, John T. Chaney, died testate in 1981. The appellant, who was not mentioned or provided for by name in her father\u2019s will, seeks to share in the estate as a child whom the testator omitted \u201cto mention or profide for, either specifically or as a member of a class.\u201d Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 60-507 (b) (Repl. 1971). We agree with the probate judge\u2019s conclusion that the appellant was sufficiently mentioned or provided for in that paragraph of the will creating a trust for the testator\u2019s \u201cdescendants.\u201d Our jurisdiction is under Rule 29 (1) (c) and (P).\nChaney was survived by his wife and her three children (his stepchildren), and by one son and one daughter, the appellant. Chaney\u2019s will first left to his wife certain personal property and enough other property to qualify for the marital deduction under the estate tax laws. The rest of the estate was left in trust, with the trustee to distribute \u201cto my wife and my descendants from the income and pricipal of the trust such amounts as are necessary, when added to the funds reasonably available to them ... to provide for their health, support and maintenance, to the extent reasonably possible, in accordance with the standard of living they enjoyed at the time of my death.\u201d Upon the widow\u2019s death the trust is to terminate and the trust property to be distributed in equal shares to the testator\u2019s son, his granddaughter (the appellant\u2019s daughter), and the three stepchildren, all those distributees being named somewhere in the will.\nBefore the enactment of the Probate Code in 1949, our statute required the testator \u201cto mention the name of a child, if living.\u201d Pope\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 14525 (1937). Under that statute we said that the only requirement was that the testator mention the name of his child, the object of the statute not being to secure equality of distribution of the estate or to compel the testator to make a substantial provision for his children. Culp v. Culp, 206 Ark. 875, 178 S.W.2d 52 (1944). We went on to say that the object of the statute was \u201cto prevent injustice to a child or descendant from occurring by reason of the forgetfulness of a testator who might, at the time of making his will, overlook the fact he had such child or descendant.\u201d In an earlier case we had held it to be enough for the testator to refer to his children as a class. Brown v. Nelms, 86 Ark. 368, 112 S.W. 373 (1908).\nThe Probate Code clarified the statute and widened the testator\u2019s choices by stating that he might mention or provide for the child, either specifically or as a member of a class. \u00a7 60-507 (c), supra. The appellant was not mentioned by name, but she concedes in her brief that as a descendant of the testator she will be entitled to assistance from the income and principal of the trust if she suffers financial reverses during the lifetime of her father\u2019s widow.\nWhether the word \u201cdescendants\u201d as a description of the beneficiaries of the trust sufficiently describes a class within the meaning of the statute is to be determined by a consideration of the will as a whole. The appellant cites our recent holding in Robinson v. Mays, 271 Ark. 818, 610 S.W.2d 885 (1981), as being \u201cdirectly in point,\u201d but we find little similarity between that case and this one. There the will made no possible reference to the testatrix\u2019s two sons except in a residuary provision that if the testatrix\u2019s four named recipients of the estate did not survive her, then the estate would pass to the persons entitled to it under the laws of descent and distribution of the State of Missouri. We held that such a general reference to undesignated persons did not show that the testatrix had her sons in mind. Here, by contrast, the will specifically referred to the testator\u2019s descendants, a limited class consisting, as far as the record shows, of only three persons: Chaney\u2019s son, daughter, and granddaughter. Moreover, the will referred to the trust as the John T. Chaney Family Trust, and it was a family trust, providing assistance only for Chaney\u2019s wife and his own descendants, to the exclusion of his stepchildren. Thus it cannot be doubted that Chaney understood the difference between his descendants and his stepchildren.\nFinally, the Probate Code, unlike our earlier statute, excludes from the definition of a pretermitted child one who has been \u201cprovided for\u201d in the will, either specifically or as a member of a class. It cannot be doubted that the appellant was provided for as a member of the class of descendants, as she concedes. That means that if the adverse circumstances contemplated by the will should occur she might conceivably be entitled to all the trust property, to the exclusion of the other beneficiaries. Thus we cannot sustain the appellant\u2019s argument without disregarding the change made by the Probate Code. We conclude that the probate judge properly construed the Code and in doing so reached a just result.\nAffirmed.\nAdkisson, C.J., and Purtle, J., dissent.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice."
      },
      {
        "text": "John I. Purtle, Justice,\ndissenting. I agree with the majority in interpreting the law in this case but I disagree as to the conclusions reached based upon the particular facts of this case. A paragraph in the decedent\u2019s will is entitled identification. In the identification article the decedent identifies his wife, his son and his daughter\u2019s child (granddaughter). There is absolutely no reference to the appellant. The will subsequently established a family trust during the widow\u2019s lifetime. The trustee was granted authority to make funds available from the family trust to any of decedent\u2019s descendants as necessary to enable the descendants to maintain their status in accordance with the standard of living enjoyed by them at the time of decedent\u2019s death. Upon the death of the widow the proceeds of the trust would be distributed to decedent\u2019s named child and stepchildren as well as his granddaughter (appellant\u2019s daughter).\nThe trust was not established for the benefit of any class. Appellant was not mentioned as a beneficiary or as a contingent beneficiary. The likelihood of appellant receiving any benefits from the trust was apparently remote. In fact she has not received any benefits from the trust. Being neither entitled to benefits from the trust nor named in the will I am of the opinion that she is clearly a pretermitted child.\nI agree with appellant that Robinson, Adm\u2019r v. Mays, 271 Ark. 818, 610 S.W.2d 885 (1981) is dispositive of this case. In Robinson there was a contingency that the pretermitted children would inherit if none of the devisees survived. That contingency is no more probable than is the one in the present case. We upheld the ruling of the trial court that the two sons in Robinson were pretermitted in accordance with Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 60-507 (b) (Repl. 1971). In Robinson we stated:\nThus, where the testator fails to mention children or provide for them as members of a class, it will be presumed that the omission was unintentional, no contrary intent appearing in the will itself. In Cockrill v. Armstrong, 31 Ark. 580 (1876), the presumption is described in these terms:\nSo strong is the presumption that a father would not intentionally omit to provide for all his children, that in case the name of one or more of the children is left out of the will, by statute it is held to be an unintentional oversight, and the law brings them within the provisions of the will, and makes them joint heirs in the inheritance.\nIf Cockrill was the law when we decided Robinson in 1981, it is still the law. Therefore, I would hold that the appellant is a pretermitted child.\nAdkisson, C.J., joins in this dissent.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "John I. Purtle, Justice,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Howell, Price ir Trice, P.A., by: Ronald A. Hope, for appellant.",
      "H. Clay Moore, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Judy C. PETTY v. Charlotte S. CHANEY, Executrix\n83-173\n661 S.W.2d 373\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 12, 1983\nHowell, Price ir Trice, P.A., by: Ronald A. Hope, for appellant.\nH. Clay Moore, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0072-01",
  "first_page_order": 96,
  "last_page_order": 100
}