{
  "id": 1742332,
  "name": "Carolyn Ann RUSSELL v. James Edgar RUSSELL",
  "name_abbreviation": "Russell v. Russell",
  "decision_date": "1984-03-05",
  "docket_number": "83-277",
  "first_page": "473",
  "last_page": "475",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "281 Ark. 473"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "665 S.W.2d 271"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "275 Ark. 193",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1753625
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/275/0193-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 279,
    "char_count": 3451,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.877,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08,
      "percentile": 0.43633605665812947
    },
    "sha256": "1ead7e9492255a37c0ceb4a741a700eaf83a0d11fc8dee43f8a913957ff42e43",
    "simhash": "1:0142502f3828d1d1",
    "word_count": 570
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:39:06.319855+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Hickman, J., not participating."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Carolyn Ann RUSSELL v. James Edgar RUSSELL"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nIn this case the chancellor granted the husband a divorce, divided the marital property and permitted the wife to occupy the family home until the couple\u2019s 16-year-old son reached 18. The chancellor awarded the wife alimony until then, at which time the home was to be sold, the proceeds divided, and the alimony discontinued. At the original trial Mrs. Russell contended that she was completely unemployable, but the chancellor rejected that contention and stated that the period of alimony before the sale of the house \u201cshould be ample time for her to rehabilitate herself in order to secure employment.\u201d On the first appeal we affirmed the decree except for an increase in the amount of alimony and said: \u201cIn the event Mrs. Russell\u2019s physical and financial circumstances at the time of the sale of the home are different from what the Chancellor anticipated in his Memorandum Opinion, our law is sufficiently flexible to permit the Chancellor to modify the alimony awardat that time.\u201d Russell v. Russell, 275 Ark. 193, 628 S.W.2d 315 (1982).\nWhen the son reached 18 it was not necessary to sell the house, as Mrs. Russell had purchased her former husband\u2019s half interest. After a hearing upon Mrs. Russell\u2019s request that her alimony be continued indefinitely, the chancellor reviewed the facts in detail in a memorandum opinion, stated that Mrs. Russell\u2019s financial circumstances were about as he had expected, noted that she had made no effort to rehabilitate herself, adhered to his earlier view that she is employable, and found no material change in her physical condition since the decree. This appeal from the chancellor\u2019s denial of further alimony comes to this court under Rule 29 (1) (j), as a second appeal.\nThe only argument for reversal is that the chancellor should have modified the decree by continuing the allowance of alimony. Since the trial court\u2019s findings were explained in detail and the facts in a case of this kind are of negligible precedential importance, we need not discuss the proof at length. Mrs. Russell had the burden of proof. She was her own chief witness. She testified that her main complaint, pain in her neck and upper back, had worsened since the trial in 1980. Her family physician, although still of the opinion that she is unemployable, testified that the condition of her neck is about the same as it was. On the other hand, the two physicians testifying for Russell had both had experience in evaluating patients for social security disability benefits. They were of the opinion Mrs. Russell can be gainfully employed. Dr. Barnett mentioned possible jobs. The chancellor noted in his opinion that Dr. Barnett had said that during the course of his examination Mrs. Russell had said she could not look to her left with full range of motion, but she actually did so many times when he was not performing the examination itself. To reverse the chancellor\u2019s decision we would have to weigh the conflicting testimony of the doctors without having heard them testify and disregard the detailed findings of the chancellor. In these circumstances we cannot say that the trial judge\u2019s decision is clearly erroneous.\nAffirmed.\nHickman, J., not participating.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Howell, Price & Trice, for appellant.",
      "Lightle, Beebe, Raney \u00e9r Bell, by: A. Watson Bell, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Carolyn Ann RUSSELL v. James Edgar RUSSELL\n83-277\n665 S.W.2d 271\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 5, 1984\nHowell, Price & Trice, for appellant.\nLightle, Beebe, Raney \u00e9r Bell, by: A. Watson Bell, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0473-01",
  "first_page_order": 505,
  "last_page_order": 507
}