{ "id": 1740711, "name": "George E. MARSHALL v. Charles R. SINGLETON, Director, Alcoholic Beverage Control and The STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Marshall v. Singleton", "decision_date": "1984-04-02", "docket_number": "84-6", "first_page": "167", "last_page": "170", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "282 Ark. 167" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "666 S.W.2d 399" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "107 S.W.2d 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Ark. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8721051 ], "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/194/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ark. 830", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1459760 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/198/0830-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 280, "char_count": 3794, "ocr_confidence": 0.838, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.06531616322032674 }, "sha256": "7959f0837315929363f06b21c76bf184a6b91c2013a0848ff4b6c101e130e673", "simhash": "1:6750a01efc3c10a4", "word_count": 620 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:21:24.101080+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "George E. MARSHALL v. Charles R. SINGLETON, Director, Alcoholic Beverage Control and The STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "P. A. Hollingsworth, Justice.\nOn March 25, 1983, the appellant, George E. Marshall, filed an application for a retail liquor permit in Drew County. Act 812 of 1983 imposing a quota system on liquor permits had been passed by the legislature and submitted to the Governor for his approval. Marshall was advised that if the Bill was signed, with the emergency clause, on March 25, 1983, then his application would be returned to him. The Governor signed the Act on March 25, and the application was subsequently returned to the appellant. Marshall then filed a petition for declaratory judgment with the Pulaski County Chancery Court, attacking the validity of the emergency clause for violating Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution. The trial court denied the Appellant\u2019s petition, and this appeal was filed. Jurisdiction is in this Court under Rule 29 (1) (c).\nThe chancellor found that the emergency clause states sufficient grounds for an emergency and that a retail liquor permit is not within the meaning of Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution which prohibits adoption of emergency clauses dealing with privileges.\nWe reverse.\nAmendment 7 to the Constitution of Arkansas reserves to the voters the power to reject any act of the General Assembly. In order to make this power viable, the amendment provides that an act is not effective until ninety days after adjournment unless immediate operation of the act is essential to preservation of the public peace, health and safety. Amendment 7 further states: \u201cProvided, however, that an emergency shall not be declared on any franchise or special privilege or act creating any vested right or interest or alienating any property of the State.\u201d\nWe omit from consideration the words \u201cvested right\u201d or \u201cinterest\u201d since a liquor license can be revoked at any time. Matthews v. Bailey, 198 Ark. 830, 131 S.W.2d 425 (1939). Furthermore, the Act does not alienate any property of the State of Arkansas. The issue before us then is to determine whether a liquor permit in a \u201cfranchise\u201d or \u201cspecial privilege.\u201d We have previously stated that a license to sell liquor is a privilege. Blum v. Ford, Comm\u2019r of Revenues, 194 Ark. 393, 107 S.W.2d 340 (1937).\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary (4th edition) defines \u201cfranchise\u201d as \u201ca privilege or immunity of a public nature, which cannot be legally exercised without legislative grant;\u201d and \u201cspecial privilege\u201d as \u201ca right, power, franchise, immunity, or privilege granted to, or vested in, a person or class of persons, to the exclusion of others, and in derogation of common right.\u201d\nAct 812 of 1983 expands Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 48-301 (Repl. 1977) by further restricting the issuance of liquor permits. Under the Act, the number of permits in any county or political subdivision may not exceed a ratio of one permit for every 2500 population residing in that county or subdivision. Drew County, where the appellant applied for a permit, already has the maximum number of permits for a county of that size. The effect of the Act, therefore, is to establish a special privilege for people residing in the more populous counties, to the exclusion of others. Therefore, we hold that because a special privilege is created, the emergency clause appended to the Act is unconstitutional. We therefore reverse and instruct the chancellor to grant the appellant\u2019s petition for a declaratory judgment. Our holding makes it unnecessary to reach the appellant\u2019s second argument which concerns the actual content of the emergency clause.\nReversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "P. A. Hollingsworth, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gibson Law Firm, by: John F. Gibson, Jr., for appellant.", "Donald R. Bennett, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "George E. MARSHALL v. Charles R. SINGLETON, Director, Alcoholic Beverage Control and The STATE of Arkansas\n84-6\n666 S.W.2d 399\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 2, 1984\nGibson Law Firm, by: John F. Gibson, Jr., for appellant.\nDonald R. Bennett, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0167-01", "first_page_order": 197, "last_page_order": 200 }