{ "id": 1879930, "name": "Stanley LACKEY and Susan LACKEY v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Lackey v. State", "decision_date": "1984-07-09", "docket_number": "CR 83-161", "first_page": "150", "last_page": "155", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "283 Ark. 150" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "671 S.W.2d 757" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "273 Ark. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8720829 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/273/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ark. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1746920 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/279/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ark. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1633244 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/251/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ark. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1675831 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/262/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ark. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717878 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/266/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 U.S. 923", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6228064, 6230273, 6227138, 6228707, 6227396, 6227721, 6229997, 6229016, 6229369, 6228378, 6226714 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/447/0923-05", "/us/447/0923-11", "/us/447/0923-02", "/us/447/0923-07", "/us/447/0923-03", "/us/447/0923-04", "/us/447/0923-10", "/us/447/0923-08", "/us/447/0923-09", "/us/447/0923-06", "/us/447/0923-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ark. 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1719787 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/267/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 Ark. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1709161 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/270/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ark. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1755004 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/274/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ark. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1650249 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/223/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ark. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1750226 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/277/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.W.2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "254 Ark. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1624177 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/254/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 Ark. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1709165 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/270/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 Ark. 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1619097 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/259/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 Ark. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1744818 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/280/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Ark. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718446 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/255/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 Ark. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1744785 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/280/0291-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 567, "char_count": 8762, "ocr_confidence": 0.867, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.299279470033648e-07, "percentile": 0.7871916470805826 }, "sha256": "0d01f65548b920d86ccbaf92a3292a79e05bafe3645688631763fa5402d27202", "simhash": "1:37ae07a5684cd39a", "word_count": 1485 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:00:41.772495+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hays, J., dissents.", "Dudley, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Stanley LACKEY and Susan LACKEY v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Darrell Hickman, Justice.\nThe convictions of Stanley and Susan Lackey for rape have to be reversed because of the admission of inadmissiable and prejudicial evidence before the jury.\nThe trial judge first permitted the State to elicit evidence that the appellants had given marijuana to three children, aged five, six, and eleven. The judge then decided that the evidence was not admissible and admonished the jury to disregard it. The court should have granted a mistrial. For that reason the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.\nThe testimony of the victim, a sixteen-year-old who knew the appellants, was essentially the State\u2019s case. During her cross-examination she conceded that there had been \u201cfriction\u201d between her family and the appellants. Using this as grounds, the State endeavored to show the cause of the friction through testimony of the victim. The record reads:\nVICTIM: When Stanley Joe gave my two little\u2014\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: I\u2019m going to object, Your Honor.\nPROSECUTING ATTORNEY: He asked about the friction.\n[Counsel approached the bench].\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: What she\u2019s about to say, I\u2019ll have to move for a mistrial. We\u2019ve had a marijuana case pending here and if she goes into the marijuana case, I\u2019m going to move for a mistrial. That\u2019s what its leading up to.\nPROSECUTING ATTORNEY: He asked the question, Judge.\nTHE COURT: You\u2019re going to have to be careful. Go ahead. She can answer the question.\n[Before the jury],\nPROSECUTING ATTORNEY:. . ,[W]hat caused the friction between Mr. Lackey and [victim\u2019s father]?\nVICTIM: Mr. Lackey give my two little cousins and my sister some dope. My cousins were five and six and my sister was eleven.\n# # #\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: I move for a mistrial. That is highly prejudicial. It is not involved in the rape case at all.\nTHE COURT: Denied.\n# # #\n[Before the jury].\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: This information is based on solely on hearsay. I renew my motion of a mistrial.\nTHE COURT: Your motion for mistrial will be denied.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: I would like to ask the court to give the jury a precautionary warning to disregard the testimony of [victim] since it was based on hearsay and its not personal knowledge. It has no bearing on the rape case.\nPROSECUTING ATTORNEY: We don\u2019t have any objection to that, Judge.\nTHE COURT: I think I should.\nPROSECUTING ATTORNEY: I have no objection to that.\nTHE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, there has been certain testimony just presented to you involving friction between one of the defendants and [victim\u2019s father]. I\u2019m going to advise you at this time that that testimony should be disregarded by you. What may have happened between [victim\u2019s father] and the defendant previously has no bearing on the charge of rape. It should not be considered by you at all. Just wipe it out of your minds and disregard it.\nThe trial court undoubtedly realized that the evidence was totally irrelevant and prejudicial and tried to correct the error with an admonition. Evidence of other crimes has long been considered the type that has no place in a trial. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 28-1001, Rule 404(b) (Repl. 1979). Since Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 266 S.W.2d 804 (1954), we have consistently held that admission of such evidence is cause for a new trial. Jones v. State, 274 Ark. 379, 625 S.W.2d 471 (1981); McCoy v. State, 270 Ark. 145, 603 S.W.2d 418 (1980); Patterson v. State, 267 Ark. 436, 591 S.W.2d 356 (1979), cert denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980); Moser v. State, 266 Ark. 200, 583 S.W.2d 15 (1979); Rios v. State, 262 Ark. 407, 557 S.W.2d 198 (1977); Sweatt v. State, 251 Ark. 650, 473 S.W.2d 913 (1971). The admonition in this case was useless, the damage having been done. See Maxwell v. State, 279 Ark. 423, 652 S.W.2d 31 (1983). The mere mention of \u201cfriction\u201d by the defense was no reason to allow this type of evidence before the jury. The trial judge recognized that after the fact. The error can only be cured by a new trial.\nThe other arguments are obviously meritless. The victim\u2019s testimony provided substantial evidence of guilt. Corroboration of the victim\u2019s testimony is not required in a rape case. Urquhart v. State, 273 Ark. 486, 621 S.W.2d 218 (1981).\nThe attempt by the defense to introduce evidence that the victim had sexual intercourse with a third person within five days before the incident was merely an attempt to avoid the purpose of the Rape Shield Act. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 41-1810.1 et seq. (Repl. 1977 and Supp. 1983). The issue arose when the defense attempted to show that the victim had lied about such intercourse. A medical witness testified that sperm might live for several days, the inference being that the sperm found in the victim might not be Stanley Lackey\u2019s. Consent was not an issue, nor was the evidence admissible for purposes of impeachment. To allow it would simply mean that the Rape Shield Act could be circumvented. The defense was merely trying to manufacture a colloquy whereby it could introduce evidence of the victim\u2019s prior sexual experience. The relevance of that evidence to the issues of the case was questionable and its probative value was minimal in comparison to its prejudicial character. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1810. 2. The argument that the trial judge initially ruled one way with respect to the proof and later reversed himself is of no consequence. At first he allowed the victim to testify whether she had had intercourse shortly before the incident. Subsequently he ruled fhat if she answered, \u201cno.\u201d then no further inquiry could be made. The judge\u2019s first ruling was right; it was not relevant evidence.\nReversed and remanded.\nHays, J., dissents.\nDudley, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "Darrell Hickman, Justice." }, { "text": "Steele Hays, Justice,\ndissenting. There are several reasons why the trial court should not be reversed in this instance: first, because the defense initiated the issue of hard feelings between the defendant, Stanley Lackey, and the victim\u2019s father by specifically asking if there was \u201cfriction\u201d between them. This opened the door for some response by the prosecution and we have said that that is a matter for the trial court\u2019s discretion. Walls v. State, 280 Ark. 291, 658 S.W.2d 362 (1983) and Decker v. State, 255 Ark. 138, 499 S.W.2d 612 (1973). Second, the court admonished the jury to disregard the evidence and we have held, with rare exceptions, that an admonition to the jury to disregard improper, and even prejudicial matters cures such mistakes. Of necessity, the trial court has broad discretion in these areas and we will not disturb his ruling where that discretion is not abused. Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 659 S.W.2d 168 (1983) and Cary v. State, 259 Ark. 510, 534 S.W.2d 230 (1976).\nThird, we have said repeatedly a mistrial is an extreme, drastic measure and to be appropriate the error must not only be irreparable, but so prejudicial that the trial cannot in justice continue. Combs v. State, 270 Ark. 496, 606 S.W.2d 61 (1980); Johnson v. State, 254 Ark. 293, 495 S.W.2d 115 (1973). Here, we are holding that the prejudice is so overwhelming that an admonition, given promptly at the request of the defense, is not sufficient and a mistrial should have been declared simply because the victim had \u201cheard\u201d that the defendant, Stanley Lackey, had given marijuana to her younger sister and cousins. In that connection, we ought to give the jury more credit than to think it would convict a married couple of an unspeakable crime not because it believed them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance with the court\u2019s instructions, but because of a single comment admittedly based on hearsay that one of them had given marijuana to children, notwithstanding the judge\u2019s instructions to disregard it! There seems to be a lack of consistency in our approach. We have held in similar cases that an admonition is sufficient. In Sanders v. State 277 Ark. 159 639 S.W.2d 733 (1982), for example, a police officer testified in a rape case of having seen evidences of marijuana in the defendant\u2019s room when he arrested him, yet we held that an instruction to the jury to disregard the evidence precluded the necessity of a mistrial.\nFinally, errors in the reception or rejection of evidence, to be reversible, must be shown to substantially affect the rights of the appealing party. Unif. R. Evid. 103. Appellant, Susan Lackey, was not even remotely connected with the evidence for which the court is reversing this case, so how can it be said her rights were substantially affected?", "type": "dissent", "author": "Steele Hays, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Acchione \u00e9 King, by: Harold King; and Lazar M Palnick and Jana Cairns, for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Theodore Holder, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Stanley LACKEY and Susan LACKEY v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 83-161\n671 S.W.2d 757\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered July 9, 1984\nAcchione \u00e9 King, by: Harold King; and Lazar M Palnick and Jana Cairns, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Theodore Holder, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0150-01", "first_page_order": 178, "last_page_order": 183 }