{ "id": 1879954, "name": "Jane CZECH, City Clerk, and CITY OF LITTLE ROCK et al. v. Kenny BAER and FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE 7 et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Czech v. Baer", "decision_date": "1984-10-24", "docket_number": "84-235", "first_page": "457", "last_page": "462", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "283 Ark. 457" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "677 S.W.2d 833" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "78 S.W.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 Ark. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1421967 ], "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/190/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ark. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1606960 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/245/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Kan. 2", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 520501 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/194/0002-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ark. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8721969 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/217/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 S.W. 656", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1912, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ark. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1350631 ], "year": 1912, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/104/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ark. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1750231 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/277/0247-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 589, "char_count": 9445, "ocr_confidence": 0.838, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6438622596380967e-07, "percentile": 0.6915582723162624 }, "sha256": "6c25ab9718b6b988aa046853f24198b8e8dcec36eab471fe1631835a8c16e1bd", "simhash": "1:1b0e4fa1ad0750da", "word_count": 1543 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:00:41.772495+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hubbell, C.J., and Hollingsworth, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Jane CZECH, City Clerk, and CITY OF LITTLE ROCK et al. v. Kenny BAER and FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE 7 et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "George Rose Smith, Justice.\nIn early September, 1984, the appellees, Lodge 7 of the Fraternal Order of Police and some of its members, presented to the City Clerk of Little Rock separate initiative petitions to place two salary-related measures on the ballot for the November 6 general election. After the Clerk determined that the petitions did not have the required number of valid signatures, the appellees filed additional petitions with more signatures. The Clerk then found the number of signatures sufficient, but she refused to certify the measures to the county election commission because the city attorney doubted the validity of the proposed measures.\nThe Fraternal Order sought review in the chancery court, as provided by Amendment 7 to the Constitution of 1874. The appellants (the City and some of its officers) resisted the chancery complaint on the ground that the proposed measures would be invalid, if approved. The chancellor accepted the Clerk\u2019s finding of sufficient signatures, but he refused to order her to certify the measures, on the ground that a chancery court cannot issue writs of mandamus. The appellees countered by filing a suit for mandamus in the circuit court. There the matter was quickly tried on its merits. The court found that the City had improperly exercised its authority and issued the writ of mandamus. The City\u2019s two appeals have been consolidated for decision in this court. Our jurisdiction includes election cases. Rule 29 (1) (g).\nAt the outset the appellees argue that we should permit the measures to be placed on the ballot without first determining their validity. Certainly it is true that a party who resists an initiated petition on grounds such as insufficiency of signatures or improper ballot title is not required to question the validity of the proposed measure. On the other hand, that question may be considered and decided when it is properly raised, even before the election. Proctor v. Hammans, 277 Ark. 247, 640 S.W.2d 800 (1982); Hodges v. Dawdy, 104 Ark. 583, 149 S.W. 656 (1912).\nHere the matter is one of public interest. The validity of the proposed measures was challenged in the trial courts by the City, the real party in interest. The cases were heard in two courts, with the parties having an opportunity to present their proof. The consolidated cases have been fully briefed in this court. Except for certain matters to be explained later in this opinion, we perceive no reason why our decision should be deferred. To the contrary, it is desirable that as far as possible the questions should be set at rest, to avoid useless expenditures of time and money in campaigns for and against a measure which would be invalid even if approved by the electorate.\nBoth measures involve the salaries of the city police. Negotiations between the City and the Lodge for an increase in salary were at a standstill when the parties agreed to submit the issue to an arbitrator, Joe Woodward, whose decision would concededly not be binding on either party. Woodward had not reached his decision when the first petitions were filed in early September.\nOne measure, the \u201cfact-finder\u201d ordinance, relates only to the pending dispute. That measure provides that all patrolmen and sergeants will receive a pay increase \u201cin the amount as recommended by the Fact Finder, Mr. J. Woodward, now considering the facts presented before him by the City of Little Rock and the Fraternal Order of Police.\u201d The other measure, the \u201cbinding-arbitration\u201d ordinance, is a permanent measure providing a procedure by which any future wage controversy not resolved by agreement is to be referred to an arbitration panel whose decision will be final, binding all parties and not reviewable by any court. It is specifically provided that the city\u2019s board of directors will be required to carry out the arbitration panel\u2019s determination.\nFirst, the binding-arbitration ordinance. The basic defect in this ordinance lies in the rule of law, twice stated in the Constitution, that no municipal corporation shall be authorized to pass any law contrary to the general laws of the state. Ark. Const., Art. 12 \u00a7 4, and Amendment 7. It is provided by state law that a city\u2019s legislative body is to fix the number and salaries of its policemen and firemen. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 19-1617 (Repl. 1980). It is fundamental that a city\u2019s legislative power cannot be delegated to a committee or an administrative body. City of Harrison v. Snyder, 217 Ark. 528, 231 S.W. 2d 95 (1950). Nor can the city directors delegate or bargain away their legislative authority. In holding that a city cannot be compelled to bargain collectively with its employees, we have said:\nBasically, the reason for the rule is that the fixing of wages, hours, and the like is a legislative responsibility which cannot be delegated or bargained away. [Emphasis supplied.] Several aspects of the matter were discuss\u00e9d in the Wichita case [194 Kan. 2, 397 P. 2d 357 (1964)], where the court said:\nThe entire matter of qualifications, tenure, compensation and working conditions for any public employee involves the exercise of governmental powers which are exercised by or through legislative fiat. Under our form of government public office or public employment cannot become a matter of collective bargaining and contract.\nThe objects of a political subdivision are governmental \u2014 not commercial. It is created for public purposes and has none of the peculiar characteristics of enterprises maintained for private gain. It has no authority to enter into negotiations with labor unions concerning wages and make such negotiations the basis for final appropriations. Strikes against a political subdivision to enforce collective bargaining would in effect amount to strikes against the government.\nCity of Fort Smith v. Council No. 38, AFL-CIO, 245 Ark. 409, 433 S.W.2d 153 (1968).\nAs we have noted, the Initiative and Referendum Amendment itself provides that \u201cno local legislation shall be enacted contrary to the Constitution or any general law of the State.\u201d Since state law prohibits a city from abdicating or delegating its legislative power to fix its employees\u2019 pay, that result cannot be accomplished by an initiated ordinance. Hence the binding-arbitration ordinance would be invalid even if approved by the voters. (We add that the appellees cite six out-of-state cases upholding binding arbitration agreements, but each decision was based on a statute permitting that procedure. We have no similar statute.)\nThe issues are not equally clear as to the fact-finder ordinance. The burden of proof was on the City, for Amendment 7 provides: \u201cIn the event of legal proceedings to prevent giving legal effect to any petition upon any grounds, the burden of proof shall be upon the person or persons attacking the validity of the petition.\u201d Amendment 7, subsection Amendment of Petition.\nAs we have seen, the first batch of petitions for the fact-finder ordinance proposed a pay increase in the amount to be recommended by Woodward. After those petitions, with an insufficient number of valid signatures, had been filed, Woodward announced a non-binding recommendation of a 7 1/2% increase. Additional petitions were then filed to supply the deficiency in the number of signatures. The only one of those petitions introduced in evidence, however, contains a revised proposal by which all patrolmen and sergeants \u201care hereby given a 10% increase in yearly salary.\u201d That was not Woodward\u2019s recommendation.\nWhen an initiated petition consists of several parts, as here, all the parts constitute one petition and must be considered together. Reeves v. Smith, 190 Ark. 213, 78 S.W.2d 72 (1935). In the case at bar, however, there is a conflict in that some parts of the petition refer to the increase recommended by Woodward, which proved to be 7 1/2%, while other parts refer to a 10% increase. The facts have not been sufficiently developed to show what the City Clerk, in response to the writ of mandamus, has certified or may certify to the County Election Commission as the correct ballot title.\nWith the record in such a state of uncertainty we are not justified in holding absolutely that the fact-finder ordinance should not be on the ballot in any form. Consequently we affirm the circuit court\u2019s issuance of the writ of mandamus with respect to the fact-finder ordinance, but we express no opinion about the effect of that writ.\nThe circuit court judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. An immediate mandate is ordered, directing that the binding-arbitration ordinance not be submitted to the electorate, or, to the extent that such a directive may be too late to be effective, that the votes not be counted or considered. The chancery decree is affirmed.\nHubbell, C.J., and Hollingsworth, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "George Rose Smith, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Carolyn B. Witherspoon and Thomas M. Carpenter, Little Rock City Att\u2019ys Office; and Friday, Eldredge if Clark, by: Bill S. Clark, Christopher Heller, and Diane S. Mackey, for appellants.", "Gill, Skokos, Simpson, Buford if Owens, P.A., by: John P. Gill, for appellant-intervenor.", "Nussbaum, Newcomb if Hendrix, by: Robert A. Newcomb; and Kaplan, Brewer if Miller, P.A., by: Phillip Kaplan and JoAnne Maxie, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jane CZECH, City Clerk, and CITY OF LITTLE ROCK et al. v. Kenny BAER and FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE 7 et al.\n84-235\n677 S.W.2d 833\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 24, 1984\nCarolyn B. Witherspoon and Thomas M. Carpenter, Little Rock City Att\u2019ys Office; and Friday, Eldredge if Clark, by: Bill S. Clark, Christopher Heller, and Diane S. Mackey, for appellants.\nGill, Skokos, Simpson, Buford if Owens, P.A., by: John P. Gill, for appellant-intervenor.\nNussbaum, Newcomb if Hendrix, by: Robert A. Newcomb; and Kaplan, Brewer if Miller, P.A., by: Phillip Kaplan and JoAnne Maxie, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0457-01", "first_page_order": 493, "last_page_order": 498 }