{ "id": 1878598, "name": "In the Matter of The Estate of Buel EPPERSON, Deceased", "name_abbreviation": "In re the Estate of Epperson", "decision_date": "1984-11-13", "docket_number": "84-133", "first_page": "35", "last_page": "41", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "284 Ark. 35" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "679 S.W.2d 792" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "275 Ark. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1753680 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/275/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ark. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1750239 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/277/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 U.S. 438", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11722742 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 Pa. 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 481071 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/459/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 Ark. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1616695 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/260/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "587 S.W.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 8721493, 8721623 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/266/0646-01", "/ark/266/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ark. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 Ark. 932", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725967 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/256/0932-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12055070 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 S.W.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1930, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ark. 1023", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1393628 ], "year": 1930, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/180/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 Ark. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1619303 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/259/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 U.S. 458", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 530, "char_count": 9286, "ocr_confidence": 0.838, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5261853502250665e-07, "percentile": 0.8120315122619118 }, "sha256": "2a51737085c82c07ac7f7d91af056cd175e1e9bd4f5392ef16699e380755ee14", "simhash": "1:d0e88710ec2d51df", "word_count": 1538 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:32.164820+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Purtle and Hollingsworth, JJ., dissent.", "Purtle, J., joins in this dissent." ], "parties": [ "In the Matter of The Estate of Buel EPPERSON, Deceased" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Webb Hubbell, Chief Justice.\nBuel Epperson executed a will on August 29, 1980, bequeathing his personal property to his wife Wanda, if she survived him, and the rest, residue, and remainder of his estate to the Buel Epperson Family Trust. Buel and Wanda were divorced on March 29, 1982, and Buel married appellee, Carolyn Epperson on August 30,1982. Buel Epperson died less than a year later on June 20, 1983, without having made a new will.\nThe August 29, 1980 will was admitted to probate, and appellee filed a petition to elect her dower rights against the will. The appellants, the estate of Buel Epperson, objected, citing Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 60-501 (Supp. 1983), which precludes a spouse from asserting a dower or curtesy right by taking against a will unless the surviving spouse had been married to the decedent continuously for a period in excess of one year. The probate court ruled that \u00a7 60-501: 1) conflicted with the Arkansas dower statutes; 2) was not intended to be applied when the will predates the marriage; and 3) was unconstitutional. We reverse and remand.\nThe probate court found that Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 60-501 (Supp. 1983) conflicts with Arkansas dower laws. We have a. duty, if possible, to reconcile our state\u2019s statutes to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. Shinn v. Heath, 259 Ark. 577, 535 S.W.2d 57 (1976). \u00a7 60-501 requires a surviving spouse to be married for more than one year before the spouse can take against the will. No similar requirement is placed on the surviving spouse if the decedent dies intestate. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 61-201 et seq. (Supp. 1983).\nThe legislature has the power to give or withhold dower, and it has the power to declare the manner in which the dower right might be barred. Skelly Oil v. Murphy, 180 Ark. 1023, 24 S.W.2d 846 (1930). Thus, it is within the province of the legislature to withhold dower where there is a will. However, the legislature merely limited, rather than withheld, dower rights where there is a will. Only those persons who have been married for more than a year may elect to take dower rights where there is a will \u00a7 60-501 limits dower rights, but does not conflict with \u00a7 61-201 et seq., which define dower rights.\nThe probate court found \u00a7 60-501 unconstitutional as a violation of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. When considering an equal protection challenge to a state legislative classification scheme which does not involve either a \u201csuspect\u201d classification or a \u201cfundamental\u201d right, the proper test is whether the classification bears some rational relationship to a premissible state objective. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). In order to evaluate whether there is a rational relationship, we examine (1) the character of the classification, (2) the individual interests asserted in support of the classification, and (3) the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification. Corbitt v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 256 Ark. 932, 511 S.W.2d 184 (1974).\nThe statute classes differently those people who have been married less than one year from those who have been married more than one year. The equal protection clause prohibits invidious discrimination but does not require identity of treatment. A classification is not invidious if some rational basis can be found to support it. Pridgeon v. State, 226 Ark. 151, 587 S.W.2d 225 (1979); Yarbrough v. Ark. State Highway Commission, 260 Ark. 161, 539 S.W.2d 419 (1961).\n\u00a7 60-501 precludes a new spouse from immediately receiving full dower or curtesy rights when there is a will. Individual and governmental interests in this limitation include discouragement of deathbed marriages, and the classification bears a rational relationship to that objective.\nAppellee asserts that \u00a7 60-501 can be compared to a Pennsylvania mortmain statute, held unconstitutional as violative of Equal Protection by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Estate of Cavill, 459 Pa. 411, 329 A.2d 503 (1974). That mortmain statute makes invalid bequests for religious purposes included in a will executed within thirty days of death, unless those who would benefit by its invalidity agree that it shall be valid. The Pennsylvania Court, quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) found that the states do not have the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. However, \u00a7 60-501 is based on criteria related to its objective. It protects assets of a decedent in cases in which the assertion of a dower interest would often be contrary to the decedent\u2019s intent. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 60-501 (Supp. 1983) is constitutional and does not violate the 14th Amendment.\nSince we uphold the constitutionality of \u00a7 60-501, appellee\u2019s failure to serve the Attorney General with a copy of the proceedings pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 34-2510 (Repl. 1962) is not prejudicial. However, we would have reversed and remanded on that issue had we not found the statute constitutional. City of Little Rock v. Cash, 277 Ark. 494, 644 S.W.2d 229 (1983).\nThe probate court also found that \u00a7 60-501 was not intended to be applied when the will predates the marriage because of Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 60-407 (Repl. 1970). \u00a7 60-501 applies when a married person \u201cdies testate as to all or any part of his or her estate\u201d (Emphasis supplied). \u00a7 60-501 does not make any distinction between those wills predating a marriage and those wills made after a marriage. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 60-407 provides:\nIf after making a will, the testator is divorced all provisions in the will in favor of the testator\u2019s spouse are thereby revoked. . . .\nIn McGuire v. McGuire, 275 Ark. 452, 631. S.W.2d 12 (1982), we said the clear meaning of this statute is that any bequest to the former spouse is void, but the remainder of the will remains in effect. Unless the will is completely revoked because all of its substantive provisions favor the decedent\u2019s former spouse, the decedent will have died testate, and \u00a7 60-501 will apply. \u00a7 60-407 does not require a holding that \u00a7 60-501 was not intended to be applied when the will predates a marriage.\nSince we are reversing the probate court, we remand for further proceeding consistent with this opinion. Neither appellant nor appellee discusses, and the trial court did not make a finding whether decedent\u2019s will should have been completely revoked because of \u00a7 60-407. The residue of the estate under the will goes to a trust that appears to be for the benefit of decedent\u2019s former spouse and children, but this issue was not addressed or developed below, so we do not reach that issue on appeal.\nReversed and remanded.\nPurtle and Hollingsworth, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "Webb Hubbell, Chief Justice." }, { "text": "P.A.Hollingsworth, Justice,\ndissenting. The Court correctly states that \u00a7 60-501 requires a surviving spouse to be married for more than one year before the spouse can take against the will. The Court then recognizes the fact that no similar requirement is placed on the surviving spouse if the decedent dies intestate. There is a recognition of the different treatment the statute gives to those people who have been married less than one year from those who hav\u00e9 been married more than one year.\nIt is clear that under \u00a7 60-407 the former wife, Wanda Epperson, takes nothing under the will. The remaining issue is whether the children take everything or whether the present wife, Carolyn Epperson, has a right to elect to take against the will since she had not been married to the decedent one year.\nThe Court holds today that \u00a7 60-501 is a valid governmental interest discouraging death bed marriages. However, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 458 (1972), the United States Supreme Court stated:\nThe Equal Protection Clause of [the fourteenth amendment] does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a state into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification \u201cmust be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.\u201d Citations omitted.\nOne statute, \u00a7 60-501, precludes a surviving spouse from participating in the deceased spouse\u2019s estate because of a marriage lasting less than one year. Another section of statutes, \u00a7 61-201 et seq., allows a surviving spouse to be endowed in fee simple to various percentages to the decedent spouse\u2019s estate regardless of the length of marriage. Clearly, the statutory classification bears only the most tenuous relation to the legislative purpose. Such a combination of results can only be characterized as arbitrary. Therefore, the Equal Protection Clause forbids us to give it any effect.\nI would affirm.\nPurtle, J., joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "P.A.Hollingsworth, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Jacoway if Sherman, by: Merl O. Barnes; and George N. Plastiras, for appellant.", "Richard L. Smith, P.A., by: Daniel R. Carter and Mary J. Pruniski, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In the Matter of The Estate of Buel EPPERSON, Deceased\n84-133\n679 S.W.2d 792\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered November 13, 1984\n[Rehearing denied December 17, 1984.]\nJacoway if Sherman, by: Merl O. Barnes; and George N. Plastiras, for appellant.\nRichard L. Smith, P.A., by: Daniel R. Carter and Mary J. Pruniski, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0035-01", "first_page_order": 63, "last_page_order": 69 }